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Abstract of the Dissertation  
The Political Economy of Poverty in the ‗Glocal‘ Context: 
A Multilevel Cross-National Study 
 
by 
Philip Young P. Hong 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
University of Missouri—St. Louis, 2010 
Professor Kenneth P. Thomas, Chair 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which socio-
politico-economic factors at the structural level impact individual poverty 
across 17 developed countries in a period of welfare state retrenchment and 
growing international interconnectedness.  This dissertation contributes to a 
newly developing body of knowledge on cross-national comparison of 
individual poverty using multilevel analyses.  This method allows for 
modeling various determinants of poverty (variables with different units of 
analysis at both individual and structural levels) together in a single analysis. 
The OECD and Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data were used to 
conduct a cross-national comparative analysis of 17 affluent economies.  The 
LIS is a cross-national data archive, one of the best harmonized database 
sources for comparative studies on poverty and income distribution.  In order 
to examine the variations in poverty among individuals in advanced welfare 
states, 17 countries were selected from LIS Wave 5 (around year 2000).  
 viii 
Focusing on labor market active age group (between 18 and 65 years of age), 
merging of the data for these countries yielded roughly 120,838 working-age 
individuals in the sample. 
Analyses leading up to the multilevel approach examined the 
variations of social welfare effort among 110 countries by their socio-economic 
and political development, poverty at the aggregate level in a series of 
bivariate analyses of 17 affluent economies, and the local perspective of 
individual poverty in the United States.  Social welfare effort cross-nationally 
is found to be conditioned primarily by the socio-economic determinants in 
the larger global context.   
Globalization and politics play a more significant positive role on social 
welfare effort among the advanced democracies.  Globalization also has a 
positive effect on politics.  While globalization does not have a direct effect on 
aggregate poverty, politics and social welfare effort have significant effects.  
Local determinants of poverty show that human capital and demographic 
variables significantly affect poverty, but with differential effects of human 
capital for the poor compared to the near poor. 
The multilevel analyses provide a glocal perspective on explaining 
individual poverty.  Results indicate that individuals who reside in countries 
with higher degree of globalization and greater left political power are less 
likely to be poor.  Plus, those residing in countries with higher welfare state 
generosity and active labor market policies are less likely to be poor.  
 ix 
Controlling for individual level demographic and human capital variables, 
the global and nation level structural variables were found to be significant.  
Individual poverty is affected by: (1) globalization; (2) politics [representation 
of the poor; cumulative left party power; and union density]; and (3) social 
welfare commitment [welfare generosity; active labor market policies; and 
public educational expenditure].  Implications for U.S. poverty and 
glocalization strategies to tackle structural poverty are discussed. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
This introduction section provides the overview of the dissertation.  
This dissertation attempts to investigate the individual and structural 
determinants of individual poverty.  Supported by the structuration theory 
that views state actors not only as being influenced by external and internal 
structures but also causing variations in these structures, the dissertation 
understands the concept of ‗self‘ within this type of dynamic global system 
and subsystems.  Considering multiple layers of causal factors, I suggest that 
individual poverty be understood from a ‗glocal‘ perspective.  Here, lack of 
human capital within the local context could reflect the consequence of 
structural vulnerability of the poor vis-à-vis the global system and the 
national subsystems (Rank 2004).   
Guided by these theoretical orientations, the dissertation asks to what 
extent socio-politico-economic variables, given individual human capital, 
demographic, and household structures, affect poverty at the individual level.  
Employing a cross-national comparative method, the dissertation first 
analyzes the interplay of structural—i.e., global and national level—variables 
as they affect welfare state and poverty at the aggregate level.  Then, it 
examines the interplay of individual factors affecting individual level poverty 
in the United States.  These two perspectives were combined in analyses of 
multilevel models of 17 affluent democracies in order to answer the main 
question. 
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1.1. Problem Issue and Purpose  
This dissertation focuses on the issue of poverty both at the aggregate 
and individual levels.  It is maintained that poverty results from the natural 
workings of the global economic system, but the degree to which the political 
system exercises power vis-à-vis the global market determines social welfare 
commitment and poverty.  Active government involvement to ensure ‗social 
rights‘ for its citizens makes economic well-being a key common good issue, 
while failure to organize the public will to remedy poverty keeps it a 
bootstrap issue.  In this regard, globalization, politics, and social welfare 
commitment represent the structural socio-politico-economic environment 
contributing to the consequence of poverty. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which these socio-
politico-economic factors at the structural level impact aggregate and 
individual level poverty across affluent democracies during a period of 
growing international interconnectedness and welfare state retrenchment.  
Employing a multilevel study, the dissertation seeks to understand the 
interplay among the nation-level social, political and economic factors and 
individual labor market and demographic factors as they affect individual 
poverty outcome.   
The dissertation will provide answers to the following research 
questions: 
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1. To what extent are socio-economic and political development associated 
with social welfare effort of nation-states in general? [Chapter 2] 
2. Controlling for socio-economic and political development, how do 
globalization and politics affect social welfare effort among affluent 
democracies? [Chapter 2] 
3. What are the effects of socio-politico-economic factors on poverty at the 
aggregate level in affluent democracies? [Chapter 3] 
4. What are the effects of socio-politico-economic structural factors, along 
with individual factors, on poverty at the individual level in affluent 
democracies? [Chapter 4 & 5] 
The dissertation portrays contemporary society as workings of both 
global and local forces and structures the world as a global society.  
Understanding poverty requires thinking globally about its structural causes 
and linking local particularities—hence ‗glocalizing‘ structural poverty—to 
improve the well-being of individuals and families as the social policy 
outcome.  In this respect, application of glocal knowledge on social policy and 
poverty can help plan for eradication of poverty in this highly complex, 
globalized world-system.  
 
1.2. Significance of the Issue  
Jeffery Sachs estimates that about 1 billion world citizens live in 
extreme poverty and another 1.5 billion live in poverty; this totals 
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approximately 40% of humanity. The world has made great economic 
progress over the centuries, but ―at a different rate in different regions‖ (2005, 
31).  Fed by a confluence of factors in recent history—notably technological 
innovation—the gap between the richest economies and the poorest regions 
has widened to twenty to one.  In this global environment, Sachs maintains, 
the poor are caught in a poverty trap and challenged by structural forces that 
―keep them from getting even their first foot on the ladder of development‖ 
(2005, 226). 
Government involvement in social welfare has been most extensive in 
Western industrialized countries since the early 1900s (Dixon and Scheurell 
2002; Esping-Andersen 1990; Ginsburg 1992; Pierson 1991).  These 
governments have intervened to promote the welfare of their citizens, and 
thus they have acquired the name ―welfare states‖ (Finer 1999, 16-17; 
Midgley 1997, 79) and have enjoyed their ―golden years‖ roughly from 1945 to 
1975 (Dixon and Scheurell 2002, 237; Esping-Andersen, 1996, 1).  During 
these years, many developing nations and more recently the transitional 
economies have modeled after one or some mixes of these forerunner systems 
to establish their own kinds of state welfare structures.   
Since the mid-1970s, however, governments of advanced capitalist 
democracies have in varying degrees attempted to retrench the welfare state 
(Swank 2001; Esping-Andersen 1996).  Welfare states engaged in ―across-the-
board cost cutting in response to a crisis of profitability in the capitalist 
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economy‖ (Fabricant and Burghardt 1992, 29).  These budget cuts and 
consequent changes in the structure of social services have been 
fundamentally linked to declining economy.  With the emergence of the 
economic crisis and the rise of the debtor state, access to and benefit levels of 
entitlement programs have diminished (Fabricant and Burghardt 1992, 14).   
 
Figure 1.1: Average social welfare spending among 18 Affluent Democracies 
 
  
Figure 1.1 reports the change over time in average social welfare 
spending using the Comparative Welfare States Dataset assembled by Huber, 
Ragin, and Stephens in 1997 and later updated by Brady, Beckfield and 
Stephens in 2004 (Huber et al. 2004).  It is evident that the mean social welfare 
spending as a percentage of GDP among 18 affluent democracies declined 
precipitously since the early 1990s.  For some countries, downward changes 
were taking place since the 1980s.  The United States in particular 
maintained the lowest social welfare spending per GDP compared to other 
advanced economies.  The cost-containment policies have not only 
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undermined the living situations of the poor people (Fabricant and Burghardt 
1992) but also degraded global humanity as a whole (Mohan 1985; 2005). 
Welfare states play a crucial role of managing economic risks, 
distributing economic resources and institutionalizing equality (Brady, 2009a; 
2009b).  Even with gradually increased spending on social welfare between 
1980 and 1992, the post-tax post-transfer poverty rate reversed the reduction 
trend prior to this time (Calyton and Pontusson 1998).  Economic changes in 
more egalitarian Nordic welfare states during the 1980s and 1990s—i.e., 
declining employment—contributed to earnings inequality, which triggered 
increased government redistribution (Kenworthy 2004).   
Wage inequality has grown since 1980 due to the declining wage 
bargaining and public sector restructuring along with various structural 
factors—i.e., structural unemployment, immigration, changes in demand for 
labor, slower growth of higher education, (Clayton and Pontusson 1998).  In 
countries where wage inequality was key to rising poverty and household 
income inequality—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy—
welfare states were less generous thereby increasing post-tax post-transfer 
income inequality (Kenworthy 2004).   
Compared to other advanced welfare states, the United States has the 
highest poverty rate and inequality at the beginning of the 21st Century 
(Smeeding 2005; Brady 2009a; 2009b).  Poverty is a significant structural 
issue as it is deeply present in the United States, the world‘s richest nation 
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(Brady 2009b; Rank 2004).  Due to American institutions and lack of 
spending effort, government policies and social spending produces much less 
effect in the United States compared to any other advanced democracies 
(Smeeding 2005). 
Approximately 50 million or 20% of Americans are relatively deprived 
and this figure may be as large as thrice the size of some Western European 
countries (Brady 2009b).  Even more striking is that the high risk of 
experiencing poverty cuts across all age groups.  A series of life-table 
analyses conducted by Rank and Hirschl (2001) suggest that poverty is a real 
issue that affects the lives of almost everyone in America. Their studies 
revealed that about 66% of all Americans are expected to experience at least 
a year in poverty by age 75 and that 37% of American adults will experience 
extreme poverty (below 50% of the poverty line).   
The magnitude and pervasiveness of the issue suggest the structural 
nature of poverty.  What is most striking is that 34% of all American 
children—including 69% of African-American children and 63% of children 
whose household head has less than 12 years of education—will experience 
poverty before the age of 17 (Rank and Hirschl 1999).  In 2006, about 17% of 
all children (13 million) lived in families with below-poverty income (National 
Center for Children in Poverty [NCCP], 2007b). Research suggests that 
families need income of at least twice the federal poverty level (FPL) to take 
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care of basic needs, but one finds that an additional 19% of children live in 
families with 100% to 200% FPL income (NCCP 2007a). 
The United States, to a large extent, exercises its post-Cold War 
hegemonic power as a military and an economic leader.  As an icon of 
prosperity based on individual freedom and liberty, the United States‘ central 
position within the international community triggers other nation-states to 
emulate its policy choices.  For example, welfare reform is already being 
modeled by other Western European and developing countries as a way to 
meet the financial challenges that governments have had to face since the 
‗welfare state crisis‘ (Schelkle 1999).  A ‗race to the bottom‘ as it applied to 
the United States (Schram and Beer 1999) could lead to an international 
pattern of moving toward lower benefits and stricter rules for welfare 
provision (Mosley 2005). 
 
1.3. Global vs. Local in the World-System  
1.3.1. Globalization and Welfare State 
Various schools of thought in international political economy—
liberalism, realism, and historical structuralism1—have over many years 
developed theoretical arguments on the processes and effects of capitalism.  
Especially after the fall of Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, which signaled 
the end of the Cold War, an agreement growingly emerged that capitalism‘s 
                                                          
1 The three main perspectives are not mutually exclusive ideologies and each contains a wide 
variety of writings within (Cohn 2000). 
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liberal market forces are being unleashed into the unclaimed prairies of open 
global economy.  This is the context in which this dissertation begins the 
academic inquiry about what impact global capitalism has on the degree of 
state authority in terms of protecting the welfare of its citizens domestically.  
So long as welfare states remain an influential actor in this global arena, the 
locally weak and rather underrepresented needs of its citizenry could avoid 
marginalization by the whims and woes of the global market forces. 
Globalization is often referred to as a market-induced process by which 
changes take place in capital flows, production systems, markets and trade of 
goods and services (Poole and Negi 2008).  It is manifested by global changes 
in economic structures and transnationlization of the world economy (George 
and Wilding 2002).  These processes involve the spatial reorganization of 
production from advanced industrial to developing countries, the 
interpenetration of industries across borders, the spread of financial markets, 
decrease in transportation and communication costs, and the diffusion of 
identical consumer goods to distant countries (Mittelman 1996; Yeates 1999).   
Dominelli (1999) suggests that globalization not only promotes the 
‗market discipline‘ but also affects all government activities, social welfare 
systems, and human relationships.  The main concern of globalization stated 
by Cox (1996) is the loss of autonomous regulatory power by states.  The 
state‘s capacity of shielding domestic economies from negative effects of 
globalization has diminished.  Mittelman (1996) further adds that ‗in a 
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globalized division of labor, the state no longer primarily initiates action in, 
but reacts to, worldwide economic forces.‘  In order to realize material gain 
from globalization, ‗the state increasingly facilitates this process, acting as its 
agent.‘  While the curative measure offered to confront this has been more 
globalization, no regulatory power at the level of global economy has been 
provided (Cox 1996).   
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999) explain the theory behind welfare state 
retrenchment that increased government spending on social welfare would 
raise the labor costs, which in turn would decrease profitability.  In addition, 
when mobile capital will seek high-profit areas, it is inevitable that migration 
of capital will take place from generous welfare states to other profit 
maximizing areas.  This process necessitates reform or the welfare states 
have to suffer economic crisis.  This efficiency perspective suggests that 
globalization reduces political power and economic autonomy thereby causing 
welfare state retrenchment (Blackmon 2006; Stiglitz 2006).  
Many scholars have supported this position that global capitalism has 
challenged the welfare states in their authority and capacity to protect the 
common good against market failures at the global level (Deacon 2000; 
Fabricant and Burghardt 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001; Mkandawire and 
Rodriguez 2000; Mishra 1999; Nitzan 2001; Rieger and Leibfried 1998; Stoesz 
and Lusk 1995; Strange 1996; Teeple 2000).  However, this dominant view 
has been contested by others who have maintained that globalization will 
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have a positive effect on social spending, reflecting the increased need for 
social protection (Garrett 1998; Kittel and Winner 2005). 
In some recent studies, globalization was found to have a rather 
curvilinear relationship with welfare state generosity (Brady et al. 2005; 
Hicks 1999; Kim 2009; Rodrik 1997).  Globalization has a differential effect 
on the government social welfare effort—positive for less globalized countries 
and negative for more globally integrated countries (Kim 2009).  As 
governments of developing nations are constrained more broadly by financial 
market pressures than advanced nations (Mosley 2003), social welfare effort 
will be enhanced by triggering economic development (Brady et al. 2005).  For 
already developed, mature welfare states, however, globalization causes 
contractions. 
 
1.3.2. Agent-Structure Relationships in a Global Society 
In light of these mixed findings and arguments, having knowledge in 
the linkages between the world economy and the national and local 
economies, and the changes in such linkages, is indispensable to 
understanding the social and political consequences within countries 
(Keohane and Milner 1996).  When it comes to understanding welfare states‘ 
adoption of social insurance legislation, Usui (1994) maintains that world 
contextual factors contribute significantly by way of developing world-system 
and global norms for state provision of social security.  
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The world-system theorists define international system structures in 
terms of ―the fundamental organizing principles of the capitalist world 
economy, which underlie and constitute states‖ (Wendt 1987).  Thus, 
capitalism has created a global economy that subsumes the economics of the 
nation state (Wallerstein 1974).  A world economy, according to Wallerstein 
(1974), is an economic division of labor, which is overlaid by a multicentric 
system of states.  He further argues that capitalism, as a mode of production, 
has always been imperialistic by constituting a hierarchical division of labor 
between core areas and peripheral areas (Chase-Dunn 1981).   
This categorization involves core areas being concentrated with 
capital-intensive production that uses skilled and high-wage labor, while 
peripheral areas contain mostly labor-intensive production that utilizes low-
wage labor, which is often subject to extra-economic coercion.  There is an 
inherent relationship of exploitation between the developed and the less 
developed world (Yearly 1996).  Wallerstein (1974) believes that the 
governments of developing nations need to understand the way the system 
works and seize the chances created by the flow of global capital if they were 
to prosper (Midgley 1997). 
The nation state, based on this view, should no longer be treated as the 
unit of analysis but the world in its totality.  Barker (1978), cited by Chase-
Dunn (1981), in support of this, points out that the social system of 
capitalism is not the state, but rather, the larger competitive state system.  A 
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global economy requires analyzing the world as an integrated system in 
which economic forces flow according to the interests of capital.  Wallerstein 
(1974) shares this view as he emphasizes that the only meaningful unit of 
analysis in comparative or international research of the global society is the 
whole world-system. 
Observing the twentieth-century state in the core of the modern world-
system, Taylor (2003) contends that a state is a container of multiple 
functions—i.e., waging war, managing economy, giving national identity, and 
providing social services.  The states‘ traditional territoriality that was used 
to contain these functions has been challenged due to increasing 
globalization.  Against the end of the state thesis and the argument that this 
container function might be leaking, he maintains that there is plenty of life 
left in the container. 
Wendt (1987) critiques the structural approach in world-system theory 
by raising the question of ‗agent-structure problem,‘ which situates agents 
and social structures in relation to one another.  He suggests that human 
agents and social structures are theoretically interdependent or mutually 
implicating entities as he outlays two truisms about social life in which the 
agent-structure problem has its origins.  One is that human beings and their 
organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or 
transform the society in which they live; and the other that society is made 
up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these 
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purposeful actors.  The problem in world-system theory, therefore, is that 
there is no straightforward way to conceptualize these entities and their 
relationships—the agent-structure relations. 
World-system theorists‘ approach to the agent-structure problem is to 
consider the world-system primitive and then to reduce state and class 
agents to the effects of the reproduction requirements of capitalist world-
system.  Wendt (1987) questions the ability of the world-system theory to 
explain the properties and causal powers of its primary units of analysis as 
seriously undermining the potential explanations of state action.  While 
world-system theory provides important insights into examining the 
structure and dynamics of global systems, it leaves serious weaknesses in the 
theorization of the two basic building blocks on the global society—states and 
international system structures. 
Instead, Wendt (1987) proposes a structurationist approach to the 
state system which views states in relational terms as generated or 
constituted by internal relations of sovereignty and external spheres of 
influence.  The structuration theory suggests that states can be considered 
goal-directed units of action or agents by definition.  Wendt (1987, 356) 
further states, ‗just as social structures are ontologically dependent upon and 
therefore constituted by the practices and self-understandings of agents, the 
causal powers and interests of those agents, in their own turn, are 
constituted and therefore explained by structures.‘   
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In other words, structuration theory conceptualizes agents and 
structures as mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct entities where 
each is in some sense an effect of the other.  The two entities are co-
determined where the social structures are the result of the intended and 
unintended consequences of human action, just as those actions presuppose 
or are mediated by an irreducible structural context. 
The structures that constitute agents can be divided into two distinct 
parts—external (social) structures and internal (organizational) structures—
where each explains a distinct set of the causal powers and interests of 
agents.  The external structure—the world economy in which states interact 
with each other—affects the internal structure of state agents, according to 
which states perform in the international stage.  Through this process a new 
external structure is formed which, again, cyclically returns to influence the 
internal structure. 
According to Wendt (1987), theories explaining global phenomena 
must have foundations in theories of both their principal units of analysis—
state agents and system structure—because they are necessary when 
explaining state action.  The world-system theory, although it provides deep 
insight into understanding globalization, only treats state and class agents as 
no more than passive bearers of systemic imperatives.  Contrarily, the 
structuration theory emphasizes the importance of internal organizational 
structures for explaining the subjectively perceived interests of agents since 
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they condition their perceptions and responses to social structural 
imperatives and opportunities.  This theory will guide contextualization of 
poverty in the global and local spheres as discussed in this dissertation. 
 
1.3.3. Local Contexts in a Global Society 
Social science knowledge has traditionally been locally focused and 
pragmatic (Shahidullah 1998).  Yearly (1996, 9) posits that ‗while claiming to 
be the scientific study of society as an abstract entity, sociology has in 
practice long acted as though society was only found in the form of nation-
states.‘  As globalization is transforming the construction of social facts and 
the formation of social discourses in societies worldwide, examining present 
multidimensional social issues only within the bounds of nation-states will 
have to be limited.   
However, social science was not originally born to become a national 
intellectual enterprise of a particular country.  Rather, it was more local and 
global in focus before the days of nation-state development.  
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, Marx, Mills, Freud, Weber 
and Durkheim of classical social science searched for 
universals in understanding of human behavior and the 
organization of human society.  But in the wake of the rise of 
social science in the nineteenth century, the old boundaries of 
empires crumbled, a process of decolonization began, and 
world societies began to be divided into nation-states.  Social 
science‘s growth and expansion, then, began primarily as a 
part of national reconstruction and modernization in all the 
world societies in the twentieth century (Shahidullah 1998, 
173). 
 
 17 
Addressing the national and local concerns within the context of globalization 
could form a theoretical framework that can help bridge the issues of 
globality and locality (Harris and Chou 2001; Shahidullah 1998). 
Could individuals act as an agent to the external structure or internal 
structure affecting the state agent and the global external structure?  
Arguably, it would be important to examine where the concept of the self 
stand in the global society (Simpson 1996).  The features of the modern self, 
formulated by Mead (1934) is described as follows: ―… linking identity 
formation and knowing, assimilating, absorbing subjectivity, the self is a 
highly complex, organized, and unified reality that incorporates and 
represents the social relations of which it is a part‖ (cited in Simpson 1996, 
117).   
As an acting unit, the self is the capacity to call forth the social 
attitudes and social meanings that the individual‘s action call forth in others.  
Mead (1934, 310) states that the social ideal and ultimate goal of human 
social progress is: 
…the attainment of a universal human society in which all 
human individuals would possess a perfected social 
intelligence, such that all social meanings would each be 
similarly reflected in their respective individual 
consciousness—such that the meaning of any on individual‘s 
act or gestures … would be the same for any other individual … 
who responded to them. 
 
The viability of the Meadian self—that (1) the self is a natural unified 
identity and (2) the referential representative nature of the self is constituted 
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by social relations—is criticized by Simpson (1996) in the globalization 
paradigm.  First, the recursive self of Mead anchored in concrete face-to-face 
primary and secondary relations cannot be produced at the global level.  In 
other words, it is impossible to be situated in a network of interpersonal 
relations that encompasses everyone in the entire global society.  Second, the 
universal human society envisioned by Mead where all human beings would 
possess a perfected social intelligence of common social meanings cannot be 
feasible in the sense that it depends on the acquisition of interpretive codes 
in common universal primary relations. 
Therefore, no such unified common global society can exist for 
individuals when the global Meadian self is rejected.  However, Simpson 
(1996, 199) notes, ‗the Meadian self of family, locale, neighborhood, and 
community can be global actors in the sense that it can enter the global 
circuitry as a unit with a partial but entirely representative presence.‘  It is 
partial because of being formed in a limited milieu and representative 
because it can present to the world the features of that milieu.  In other 
words, self realized in the local context rather than the global context.   
Therefore, individuals are legitimate actors in a world of multi-level 
actors that represent individuals.  Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez (1997, 
171) posit that the world society enjoys actors at several levels, each 
demonstrating ‗appreciable legitimacy.‘  They go on to state: 
Individuals and states mutually legitimate each other via principles of 
citizenship, while individuals and international organizations do the 
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same via principles of human rights.  Between individuals and nation-
states lie any number of interest and functional groups that have 
standing as legitimated actors due to their connections with 
individuals and states. 
 
These functional groups can represent individuals as ―social actors and 
structures such as new communities, cities, regions, and organization, which 
will be essentially local in spirit but global in character‖ (Shahidullah 1998, 
164).  In this context, individuals entitled to demand equality and claim 
primordial ethnic and familial rights (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 
1997). 
 
1.4. Plan of the Dissertation  
This dissertation contributes to the body of knowledge on poverty by 
linking globalization, politics, welfare state, and poverty.  Based on the 
structuration theory, I outline the following multilevel conceptual map 
illustrated in Figure 1.3.  There are several proposed relationships to be 
tested in the dissertation.  First, globalization is the outer layer of the circle 
that represents the external structure, and politics and social welfare 
commitment are the nation level characteristics.  While there are mixed 
findings on the effects of globalization on welfare state and poverty, politics 
has been known to significantly affect welfare generosity and poverty (Brady 
2009a; 2009b).  Little is known about how politics mediates the relationship 
between globalization and welfare state and this dissertation fills this gap. 
Figure 1.2: Multilevel Conceptual Map of Structural Effects on Poverty 
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Second, poverty at the individual level may be a consequence reflecting 
variations in the nation-level politics and social welfare commitment and 
globalization.  This type of inquiry requires conducting a multi-level analysis 
and there is paucity of cross-national comparative work done on individual 
poverty using a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) technique.  This method 
allows for modeling various dimensions of poverty (variables with different 
units of analysis at both individual and structural levels) together in a single 
analysis.   
Only a few studies have examined individual and structural factors 
together in the same model explaining individual level poverty (Brady 2009a; 
Tai and Treas 2009).  These two studies used a dichotomous dependent 
variable (poor=1 or non-poor=0) and therefore used a generalized estimating 
equations (GEE) method and a robust cluster analysis respectively.  This 
dissertation adds to these previous studies by including multi-dimensional 
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socio-politico-economic structural factors in the analyses using HLM.  Using a 
continuous poverty gap variable as the dependent variable, an HLM analysis 
could be conducted.  While this dissertation does not interpret the results 
beyond the significance and the direction of the effects, the HLM allows for 
the interpretation of the magnitude of effects, one of the key missing pieces in 
these previous works mentioned above.   
I follow Brady‘s (2009a) method and run a series of GEE models when 
examining poverty status among the working age population in general and 
then analyze poverty gap as the dependent variable for a sub-set of only those 
who are poor in a series of linear mixed models.  Poverty gap is a continuous 
variable and therefore a PROC MIXED command can be used in SAS for an 
HLM analysis.  The main global and nation level structural variables 
included in the study are: (1) globalization; (2) politics [representation of the 
poor; cumulative left party power; and union density]; (3) social welfare 
commitment [welfare generosity; active labor market policies; and public 
educational expenditure]; and (4) economic [unemployment rate].  The 
relationships among these structural variables and on individual poverty 
tested in this dissertation are illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.3: Hypothesized Relationships of Structural Variables 
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In order to explore the extent to which these hypothesized 
relationships hold, a series of analyses at multilevel are conducted in this 
dissertation.  First, Chapter 2 starts with examining how socio-economic 
development and political development are associated with social welfare 
effort among 110 nation-states.  This analysis was conducted to revisit some 
of the traditional theories of welfare state comprehensively as they apply to a 
cross-national dataset from 1980, the time point when the recent wave of 
globalization begins its full course.  Finding that socio-economic variables 
predominantly explain the variations in social welfare effort, I then control 
for these variables by narrowing the investigation only to 17 affluent 
democracies on globalization, politics, and social welfare commitment 
(depicted by thin arrows in Figure 1.3). 
Second, in Chapter 3, I then examine the extent to which these 
structural variables—socio-politico-economic factors—affect poverty at the 
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aggregate level in 17 affluent democracies.  The chapter introduces various 
measures of poverty—particularly the head count percentage and the poverty 
gap—and measures of politics and social welfare commitment that will be 
used mainly for analyses in the dissertation.  Based on the aggregate 
country-level data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), a series of 
bivariate analyses are conducted to validate the hypothesized relationships 
depicted by the thick arrows in Figure 1.3. 
Third, Chapter 4 entertains the question of how local-level variables 
affect poverty at the individual level.  Using a nationally representative 
dataset from the United States, I tested the traditionally dominant human 
capital theory and labor force attachment perspective along with other 
demographic variables.  This relationship can be found in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4: Hypothesized Relationships of Individual-Level Variables 
  
Fourth, Chapter 5 combines Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4—therefore the 
glocal perspective—to examine the effects of socio-politico-economic 
structural factors, along with individual factors, on poverty at the individual 
level in 17 affluent democracies.  The LIS data is primarily used along with 
structural variables adopted from the OECD data and the Comparative 
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Welfare States Dataset (Huber et al. 2004).  The model depicted in Figure 1.4 
is tested for each country using LIS and then HLM is used in a combined 
analysis using both the headcount poverty and poverty gap measures. 
Fifth, in Chapter 6, I discuss poverty as the consequence of structural 
dependence of politics.  Poverty may be a naturally occurring consequence 
within the capitalist economic system (Rank 2004), on which ideological 
values and political decisionmaking processes have become structurally 
dependent.  The structural dependence of public will in dealing with 
structural poverty leads to political inertia that supports the status quo.  
Hence, what becomes marginalized is the structural definition of poverty and 
the policy alternatives for systematically dealing with the issue of poverty.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with an overall summary of the 
arguments based on empirical analyses and provides suggestions for research 
looking to the future. 
While many international social policy scholars tend to agree that 
measures need to be taken to address the adverse effects of economic 
globalization, the views are split between resolving the problems through 
concerted global effort and emphasizing local activities (Ife 1998; Midgley 
2001; Wagner 1997).  Little institutional development has been made to 
provide systematic and formal approaches to confront global social 
problems— i.e. poverty and other human rights issues.  The major social 
justice concern is not that globalization is causing these phenomena, but that 
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there is lack of government or state accountability in this newly emerged era 
of global social welfare needs.  While politics is the most important structural 
variable that buffers these effects on individual poverty, a structurally 
dependent political system may not have the power to be accountable to its 
citizenry. 
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Chapter 2. Global Perspective I: Welfare State Generosity  
Chapter (Sections 1.1, 2.1-2.3) Published as:  
Hong, P.Y.P. (2006). ―A cross-national comparison of welfare effort in an age 
of welfare state retrenchment.‖ Journal of Comparative Social Welfare, 22(2): 
125-142. 
 
This chapter examines the extent to which socioeconomic and political 
factors impact the degree of welfare effort in a period of welfare state crisis 
and growing international interconnectedness.  The question driving the 
analysis is: What are some major determinants that have contributed to 
greater welfare effort soon after the mid-1970s when the erosion of the 
welfare state started occurring?  What implications can one make taking into 
account that welfare effort over the last 30 years has substantially decreased 
as the economic interdependence among nation-state increased?  This chapter 
explores these questions using the 1980 cross section of the Indicators of 
Social Development data in the beginning of welfare state retrenchment.  
Then a series of bivariate analyses are conducted to examine them among 
affluent democracies in order to control for the variations in socioeconomic 
and political development. 
As acknowledged by Baldwin (1990), there exists a tension between 
socioeconomic and political explanations of welfare state development.  In 
this chapter, these two theoretical perspectives are tested to permit an 
extensive reexamination of traditional studies of welfare state development.  
First, a literature review of the two mainstream theoretical perspectives (i.e. 
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socioeconomic and political perspectives) is conducted.  Then, two models 
based on variables suggested in these traditional perspectives are tested to 
see which would have greater explanation in welfare effort of nation-states.  
These two models are then integrated into a single model in order to observe 
how together they explain welfare effort of nation-states.  Although laying 
emphasis on testing of theories imposes competition on theories (Mabbett and 
Bolderson, 1999), this chapter suggests complementary measures to explain 
welfare effort in a more complex globalized world-system. 
 
2.1. Traditional Perspectives in Comparative Welfare State  
Although the sum of all activities that promote human welfare may be 
called social welfare effort (Midgley 1997, 68), this study primarily focuses on 
the government involvement in social welfare to connote welfare effort or 
what Wilensky et al. (1985, 5) referred to it as ―welfare-state effort‖.  
According to Mabbett and Bolderson (1999, 37), there is a group of studies 
that used aggregate statistical data on government social expenditure to 
measure social policy activity or welfare effort.  These studies refer to welfare 
effort as government expenditures on social programs—i.e., social security 
spending as a fraction of the GNP or GDP (Esping-Andersen 1996; Castles 
1996; Pryor 1968; Wilensky 1975) or per capita social security spending 
(Aaron 1967; Peters 1972). 
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While government spending could reflect the magnitude of allocation, 
it is difficult to examine the comprehensiveness of a welfare state‘s legislative 
commitment to various dimensions of social protection.  As a clue to welfare-
state development, Cutright (1965) relied on an index of social insurance 
program experience indicated by the number of years a nation has had any of 
five Guttman-scaled programs in operation.  This included work injury, 
sickness and/or maternity, old age, invalidism and death, family allowance, 
and unemployment insurance.  In a study of seventy-six nations, he revealed 
that program experience was most strongly related to the level of 
development.  Also to support this, Flora and Alber (1987) and Usui (1994) 
have included the year when key social legislation was implemented as a 
proxy indicator of welfare effort. 
Wilensky, Luebbert, Reed Hahn, and Jamieson (1985) offer a wide 
spectrum of perspectives by which governments view their social policy 
development.  Social policy—in contrast to economic or environmental 
policy—is a diffuse, residual category in some countries as broad as three 
quarters of what governments do, in others as narrow as income maintenance 
for the poor.  As Aspalter (2006, 7) put it, ―there is no one indicator of 
measuring it [social welfare] all‖.  In this regard, Mabbett and Bolderson 
(1999) argue that search for knowledge requires that theoretical propositions 
be widely tested.  International comparison allows propositions to be 
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examined with reference to information obtained from many countries 
(Aspalter 2006). 
Therefore, conducting cross-national social policy analyses is important 
in that it enhances knowledge about the welfare state development and 
different social conditions of other countries (Midgley 1997).  Major 
contributions have been made by the field of comparative social policy studies 
in terms of understanding the multiple dimensionality of social welfare 
effort—having a wide range of interventions—and highlighting how social 
welfare effort can be linked with key socio-economic outcomes (Mabbett and 
Bolderson 1999).  Wilensky et al. (1985, 4) identify three basic contributions 
of comparative social policy research for top policymakers: 
(1) Improvement can be made in policy deliberations by a better 
grasp of the degree to which welfare effort and program 
development are constrained by distant social, economic and 
historical factors and the degree to which social policy is a 
matter of political choice. 
 
(2) By specifying broad policy options and program emphases 
chosen by diverse countries confronting similar problems, 
comparative social policy brings a wider range of policy options 
to view. 
 
(3) Since comparative research uncovers the social, political and 
economic consequences of different types of social policy and 
levels of welfare effort, it can improve the policymakers‘ 
understanding of real opportunities and constraints. 
 
2.1.1. Socioeconomic Perspectives of the Welfare State  
The socioeconomic perspective of welfare effort emphasizes ―the impact 
of economic growth and demographic and organizational/bureaucratic 
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correlates‖ (Wilensky et al. 1985, 5).  Usui (1994) also includes changes in 
technological and social structure of a society as socioeconomic forces 
affecting welfare state development.  The convergence theory suggests that 
economic development makes welfare states more identical in their approach 
to providing social welfare.  With economic growth, countries that vary in 
terms of their cultures and political traditions grow closer in their strategy 
for building the social safety net (Cutright 1965; Pryor 1968; Wilensky 1975).  
In a later study on the development of social insurance, Kuhnle (1981) also 
concluded that the timing of program adoption and the scope of legislation 
(extent of government funding) were influenced by levels of economic 
development. 
Wilensky (1975) focused on economic development as the main 
variable explaining the differences in social welfare effort cross-nationally 
and over time.  In his study of sixty-four nations, he found that welfare effort 
varies by economic level.  Also, his findings indicate that this relationship 
depended highly on demographic and bureaucratic outcomes of affluence.  
Consistently using GNP per capita as a proxy measure of economic 
development, convergence theorists are on solid ground as they assert, 
―programs to protect against basic risks of industrial life are primarily 
responses to economic development and are independent of political factors‖ 
(Wilensky et al. 1985, 7-11). 
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In contrast to sole economic explanations, a sociological diffusion 
process views social policy initiatives primarily as the outcome of imitation, 
whereby nations copy the efforts of welfare-state pioneers.  Collier and 
Messick (1975) suggest that innovations appear in the most advanced, largest 
centers (modernized countries) and are then adopted by successively less 
advanced or smaller units (non-modernized countries).  They use the 
percentage of labor force employed in agriculture to measure non-
modernization and the date of first program to measure welfare effort.  The 
reported findings seemed to indicate that a fairly strong tendency for 
countries to adopt social welfare programs at progressively higher levels of 
modernization.  One could read this to understand that a hierarchical 
diffusion process would consistently occur from more modernized to less 
modernized countries.  However, Collier and Messick (1975) report a rather 
contradictory finding when they examined a subset of Western European 
countries (Wilensky et al. 1985).  The more modernized or advanced a 
country was in the Western European context, the later it adopted a social 
insurance scheme. 
To suggest a little different approach to understanding modernization, 
the concept can represent the degree of dehumanization (Mohan 1985; 1992; 
1993; 1997) and the failure of voluntary provision to adequately address ―the 
human costs of unmet social welfare needs that threaten to become social and 
political costs‖ (Dixon and Scheurell 2002, 233).  Modernization may mean 
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various aspects of economic, social, and political advancements (Germani 
1981) and they are associated with the process of Great Transformation 
(Polayni 1957)—i.e., social differentiation, individuation and individualism, 
market / scientific growth, autonomization, social / organizational 
innovations, etc.   
This is in line with the basic thesis asserting, ―welfare state is a 
product of the needs generated by the development of industrial societies‖ 
(Pierson 1991, 16).  Germani (1981, 52) provides urbanization as an 
amalgamation of social traits that are attributed to industrial societies, 
commonly characterized by ―opposing traditional (or sacred) to modern (or 
secular) society.‖  He assembled 36 indicators of economic, social, and 
political modernization and found them to be high correlated with 
urbanization (Ibid, 74). 
 
2.1.2. Political Perspectives of the Welfare State 
According to Usui (1994, 255-56), there are two camps of thought 
within the political perspectives on welfare state development.  One 
emphasizes the societal political forces as critical to welfare state 
development—i.e., working-class political mobilization; strength of unions; 
mass party organizations; electoral turnout; and government characteristics.  
She categorizes these societal political forces into two groups: (1) the class-
based interests and (2) non-class-based, demographically connected interests.  
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The class-based interests demand state-sponsored benefits as supported by 
the working-class strength theory (Shalev 1983) and power resource theory 
(Korpi 1989).  A non-class-based interest demand from diverse groups of 
citizens in contemporary society can also affect government action through 
electoral participation. 
The second stream of thought within the political perspectives 
emphasizes government related factors—i.e., government representatives, 
politicians, and political parties.  These researchers maintain that ―it is not 
just class-based political struggles but also government administrators that 
affect welfare state development‖ (Usui 1994, 256).  It is in the self-interest of 
government officials to represent the societal interest in order to gain 
electoral support.  Government representatives therefore mediate the 
relationship between societal interests and government social welfare 
policies. 
Another political perspective on different levels of welfare effort 
focuses on government ideologies in terms of attitudes about more or less 
planning for equality (Castles 1978a).  Coughlin (1980) asserts that a 
country‘s mix of economic collectivism and economic individualism will match 
its social spending and taxing and the actual amount of government 
intervention.  Castles (1978a) argues that ideology is a crucial variable in 
explaining differences in welfare effort.  His concept of ideology is defined 
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through the degree to which parties and party systems agree on promoting 
egalitarian policies. 
Castles introduced two alternative variables as indicators of ―pure 
welfare‖—education expenditures as a percentage of GNP and deaths in the 
first year per 1,000 live births.  He asserted that over the long term, 
education spending would redistribute income-earning potential.  Also, he 
contended that infant mortality should be seen as an index of society‘s care 
for the weak.  However, Wilensky (1975) rejected the idea of including 
education expenditures as a measure of egalitarian ideology.  He asserted 
that education at higher levels and among better institutions may have 
effects that are regressive rather than egalitarian.  He further criticized 
Castles for including infant mortality because the measure is influenced by 
outcomes that are only partly attributable to policy (Wilensky et al. 1985).  
Therefore, it was later agreed upon that these two variables do not 
adequately represent the political perspective explaining the variation in 
welfare effort. 
Based on the study of Scandinavian countries, Castles (1978b) argued 
that high levels of welfare effort were associated with left dominance in the 
party system.  Left parties, according to Wilensky et al. (1985), are defined by 
broad ideological stance: any party with a major commitment to using the 
state apparatus to redistribute national income toward lower strata that has 
historically advocated increased economic, political and social equality.   
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In attempting to isolate the role of parties and electoral competition, 
Heclo (1974) focuses on the function of parties in democratic societies: parties 
offer distinct choices; voters make distinct choices; and parties in government 
have a mandate to implement the choices.  In support of this view, Gastil 
(1996/1997) contends that electoral democracies offer the best climate in 
which basic freedoms can thrive.  Moreover, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) 
introduce a position that political democracy operates to reduce distributional 
inequalities. 
 
2.1.3. An Integrated Perspective 
While Wilensky particularly emphasized socioeconomic factors 
contributing to the variations in social welfare effort across countries, other 
researchers highlighted political factors as being key to impacting social 
welfare effort (Castles 1978a; Heclo 1974; Gastil 1996/1997; Sirowy and 
Inkeles 1990).  These two streams of thoughts have been tested through 
continuous research activities from which new explanations continued to be 
added.  Mabbett and Bolderson (1999) cite the role of religion (Wilensky et al. 
1985; Castles 1994), and the structure and size of the state (Huber, Ragin, 
and Stephens 1993).  Along these lines of effort, Wilensky came to develop ―a 
further model which combines the influence of industrialization (convergence) 
and politics (divergence) and includes the role of democratic corporatism and 
the power of mass-based Catholic and ‗left‘ political parties‖ (Mabbett and 
Bolderson 1999, 43). 
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2.2. Traditional Comparative Cross-National Analysis  
2.2.1. Research Question and Model 
The first part of this chapter explores the different effects that the two 
traditional theoretical perspectives and an integrated model have on nation-
states‘ welfare effort, as have been previously documented in different 
literatures.  First, the socioeconomic perspective (Model 1) included GNP per 
capita (Wilensky 1975) as a proxy for economic development and 
modernization (Collier and Messick 1975) for unmet social welfare needs 
accompanied by urban industrialization.  Second, considering that no 
information on the ideology, type of government, power of labor, or party 
representation were available in this dataset, the political perspective (Model 
2) could only include freedom (Gastil 1996/1997; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990) as 
a measure of political rights and civil liberty that the nation-states provide 
for its people.  Third, after examining these two models independently of each 
other, the integrated model (Model 3), which combines both socioeconomic 
and political perspectives, is examined as to how they affect welfare effort 
(Cutright 1965; Flora and Alber 1987). 
Revisiting the traditional theoretical perspectives, it is hypothesized 
that both socioeconomic and political models significantly affect welfare effort 
in separate analyses.  However, it is further hypothesized that the integrated 
model has a significant relationship with welfare effort of a country.  This 
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exploratory study is not intended for preferring a particular model to the 
other.  Rather, the main focus is to validate the traditional knowledge on how 
different measures account for welfare effort across nations in order to 
pursue a complementary and broader explanation of welfare effort in the 
advent of a more complex globalized world-system. 
In order to test these hypotheses, a multiple regression or an ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression analysis was employed.  OLS is eminently 
suited for analyzing collective and separate effects of two or more 
independent variables on a dependent variable‖ (Mabbett and Bolderson 
1999, 3).  Particularly in explanatory research, it is useful for taking 
information from independent variables to explain the variability of a 
dependent variable (Ibid, 5).  Also, OLS is noted as one of the main 
methodological features of comparative social welfare research (Ibid, 41).  As 
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999, 44) contend, ―the convergence theory was most 
strongly supported when the data were drawn from countries across a wide 
range of levels of economic development.‖  In this regard, this dataset was 
found to be particularly appropriate for testing the expected relationship 
between welfare effort and GNP per capita as a proxy for economic growth.   
 
2.2.2. Data and Analysis 
This study is based on a secondary analysis of the Indicators of Social 
Development 1970-83 data, which is a collection of data from the World 
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Bank, United Nations organizations and other internationally based 
organizations (Estes 1988; 1997).  The key source of information for this 
country-level data is the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
series.  Also included are data from external agencies, such as the UN‘s 
Human Development Report, UN HABITAT, EIU, and ICRG among others.   
The Indicators of Social Development provide a snapshot of a country‘s 
or region‘s social development that is a useful starting point for more detailed 
analytical work.  By making social development issues comparable across 
countries and regions, the indicators provide cross-country evaluations of 
development effectiveness.  The indicators are organized into four sections, 
starting with the country context, which provides background information on 
each country, and the three conceptual dimensions of the social development 
strategy—inclusion, cohesion, and accountability.  Information gathered in 
the dataset reflects the time in which governments of advanced capitalist 
democracies have in varying degrees attempted to retrench the welfare state 
in response to declining economy.   
A cross-sectional analysis using selected variables for the year 1980 
from the dataset is conducted on 110 countries.  When a set of data consists 
of a high percentage of missing values, it may be difficult if not impossible to 
make interpretations of the results and to draw correct conclusions.  In other 
words, missing values could be a threat to generalizability of results.  The 
Indicators of Social Development 1970-83 data presented this problem having 
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as many as 82 cases out of 192 total missing values for the dependent 
variable.  The frequencies of missing data for each independent variable were 
68 for GNP per capita, 0 for modernization, and 68 for freedom.  A closer 
physical examination of these 82 missing cases revealed a systematic pattern 
such that they were disproportionately among ‗least developed‘ or ‗developing‘ 
country categories—i.e., Angola, Belize, Botswana, North Korea, Sudan, etc.  
Governments of these countries have consistently failed to contribute their 
data on many of these variables to the World Bank and/or the UN‘s Human 
Development Report (UNDP 1998). 
The fact that welfare effort is defined in this data based on the number 
of years since first social policy legislations were implemented could possibly 
speak to the major reason why these countries might be missing this 
information.  Midgley (1997, 68) suggests that welfare effort in this sense is 
called ―statutory‖ or government involvement in social welfare, which could 
be neglecting other forms of social services that may exist in these countries.  
Missing data could denote nonexistence of government social policies or 
perhaps lack of systematic government data management system.  These 
missing cases are omitted from the analysis rather than loosely imputing any 
values (i.e., predicted or mean values).  Therefore, generalization of the 
findings should only be applied to those countries that have had any 
government-sponsored welfare effort in place. 
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2.2.3. Social Welfare Effort  
The dependent variable of interest is the welfare effort sub-index, 
which is a component of the Index of Social Progress (ISP).  Richard J. Estes 
(1997) from the University of Pennsylvania has developed an ISP for the 
purpose of identifying significant changes in ‗adequacy of social provision‘ 
and to assess the progress in providing more adequately for the basic social 
and material needs of the world‘s population.  The ISP consists of 46 social 
indicators that have been subdivided into 10 subindexes: education, health 
status, women status, defense effort, economic, demography, geography, 
political participation, cultural diversity, and welfare effort.  All 46 indicators 
are known to be valid indicators of social development. 
The welfare effort sub-index is a composite measure comprising five 
variables measuring the number of years from 1980 since the ―First Law‖ 
was implemented to protect income loss resulting from (1) old age, invalidity, 
death; (2) sickness and maternity; (3) work injury; (4) unemployment and (5) 
cash payments to families with children (USDHHS 1990).  First Law is 
defined as the first consolidated compulsory legislation extending protection 
against a specific risk to a substantial segment of the salaried labor force on 
an industry-wide or nation-wide basis.   
The weights used to construct the index were derived through a two-
stage varimax factor analysis in which each indicator and subindex was 
analyzed for its relative contribution toward explaining the variance 
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associated with changes in social progress over time (Sharpe 1999).  
Standardized subindex scores were then multiplied by the factor loadings to 
create weighted subindex scores and the Composite Weighted Index of Social 
Progress (WISP) scores were obtained through a summation of the weighted 
subindex scores.  Estes argues that the WISP is a more comprehensive, valid, 
reliable instrument for assessing changes in social development over time 
than other indices on national and international progress like GDP and the 
HDI.  Estes (1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1997) has provided estimates for 124 
countries for 1970, 1980, and 1990. 
When observing the data, Denmark with the highest welfare sub-index 
value of 29 had its age law passed in 1891, sick law in 1892, injury law in 
1898, work law in 1907 and family law in 1952.  In other words, the welfare 
sub-index score of 29 was the highest ranking score among all countries.  
Germany, which also scored 29 on the welfare sub-index, reported to have 
passed the age law in 1889, sick law in 1883, injury law in 1884, work law in 
1927 and family law in 1954.  Both of these countries had 360 total years to 
1980 since all five categories of laws were passed.  Theoretically, welfare 
effort was bounded at the lower end by 0 (for those countries that did not 
have any of these laws implemented) and was unbounded at the upper end.  
Total observation was 110, empirically bounded by 1 at the lower end and 29 
at the upper end (see Table 1).  The mean value of this variable was 11.47 
and the standard deviation was 7.95. 
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Table 2.1:  Descriptive summary of variables 
 
Variables Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Welfare effort 110 11.47 9.00 7.95 1.00 29.00 
GNP per capita 110 3131.46 1285.00 3966.41 110.00 16440.00 
GNP log 110 7.21 7.16 1.37 4.70 9.71 
Modernization 110 46.93 48.00 24.87 0.00 100.00 
Free 110 .31 0.00 .46 0.00 1.00 
Part free 110 .34 0.00 .47 0.00 1.00 
Europe 110 .25 0.00 .43 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
2.2.4. Socioeconomic Variables 
Socioeconomic variables represent the economic and social 
characteristics that accompany industrialization.  GNP per capita was 
selected as a proxy for economic development.  It is a continuous independent 
variable, expressed in US dollars, that measures the total domestic and 
foreign output claimed by each resident of a country.  It comprises gross 
domestic product (GDP) adjusted by net factor income from abroad, which 
includes income for factor services (labor, investment and interest).  It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation.   
GNP per capita is theoretically bounded at the lower end by US$ 0 and 
unbounded at the upper end.  A univariate analysis indicated that there were 
110 observations (see Table 1).  The empirical range for GNP per capita was 
US$ 16,330, bounded by US$ 110 at the lower end and US$ 16,440 at the 
upper end.  The mean value of this variable was US$ 3131.46 (standard 
deviation=3,966.41) with the median value of US$ 1,285.  This variable, 
however, violated the linearity assumption for Classical Linear Regression 
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Model (CLRM), suggesting the need for a log transformation.  The 
transformed log GNP per capita ranged from 4.70 to 9.71 with the mean 
value of 7.21 (standard deviation=1.37).  
Modernization was chosen to reflect the social consequence of unmet 
social welfare needs based on the extent to which a country is urban 
industrialized.  It is a continuous independent variable that measures the 
percentage of urban population in total population.  The calculation involved 
dividing the percentage of population living in areas termed urban of a 
particular country by the sum of percentage of those living in rural and urban 
areas.  Modernization is theoretically bounded at the lower end by 0 percent 
and 100 percent at the upper end.  There were 108 observations in this 
variable whose observed range was 0 percent at the lower end and 100 
percent at the upper end (see Table 1).  The mean value was 48 percent 
(standard deviation=.24) and the median was 48 percent. 
 
2.2.5. Political Variable 
Freedom was selected to represent the political climate of a country.  It 
is a polychotomous variable that reflects a composite rating based on national 
averages attained on the Civil Liberties and Political Rights Indexes.  Gastil 
(1996/1997) defines freedom as right of all adults to vote and compete for 
public office, and for public office, and for elected representatives to have a 
decisive vote on public policies.  Freedom is a broad concept that encompasses 
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two sets of characteristics grouped under political rights and civil liberties.  
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process.  
Civil liberties are the freedom to develop views, institutions and personal 
autonomy apart from the state.  Countries are rated as either 1 for ―free‖; 2 
for ―partly free‖; and 3 for ―not free‖.  A total of 110 observations were found 
with 30.28 percent of the countries reporting as ―free‖ (n=34), 33.94 percent 
―partly free‖ (n=37) and 35.78 percent ―not free‖ (n=39).  Then, this variable 
was dummy coded with not free being the reference group. 
 
2.2.6. Control Variable 
One of the CLRM assumptions is that there is no autocorrelation 
between the disturbances, having no disturbance ui and uj correlated with 
each other.  The data used for this study being a cross-sectional data, a 
spatial autocorrelation among countries closely located geographically could 
possibly exist in this dataset.  This would mean that the estimated residuals 
may exhibit a systematic pattern associated with the regional differences.  
Once detected, this would need to be taken out of the data.  After sorting 
welfare effort in the descending order and examining the pattern, a 
possibility of spatial autocorrelation among European countries scoring 
higher in the welfare sub-index than countries of other regions.  A new 
dummy variable was created whereby the value of 1 was assigned for 
European (n=27) and 0 for non-European countries (n=83).  Once this 
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variable was entered into each model to control for spatial autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity found in the error terms disappeared as well.  
 
2.2.7. Findings 
To provide a summary of key findings, first, the OLS results from the 
socioeconomic and political models were found to be significant when 
examined separately.  From the socioeconomic model, one can understand 
that countries that have greater potential unmet social needs of the modern 
world represented by the level of urbanization have greater welfare effort.  
Also, in the political model, countries that enjoy greater freedom have greater 
welfare effort.  Second, in an integrated model, the combined effect was 
significant in the model but with only modernization remaining as a 
significant variable.  Controlling for all other variables, unmet social needs in 
modern urbanized countries influence governments‘ decision to implement 
social protection schemes.  Detailed findings by each step are provided in the 
following: 
A multiple regression analysis of the socioeconomic model was 
conducted, in which welfare effort was regressed on the log of GNP per capita, 
modernization, and Europe.  The socioeconomic model (Model 1) was 
significant [F(3,106)=122.86; p=.0000] explaining about 78 percent (R2=.7766) 
of the variance in welfare effort (see Table 2).  The adjusted R2, corrected for 
sample size and number of independent variables, was .7703.  Modernization 
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(b=.05, t=2.22, p=.028) had a partial slope significantly affecting the model 
while the log of GNP per capita was not found to be statistically significant.  
An increase of 1 percentage point in modernization was associated with an 
average welfare sub-index score rise of .05 when the log of GNP per capita 
and Europe was held constant. 
 
Table 2.2:  Multivariate Regression Analyses of Welfare Effort  
Theoretical 
Perspectives 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
Socioeconomic 
GNP per capita 
Modernization 
.95 
.05 
(.54) 
(.02) 
 
* 
   
.87 
.05 
(.57) 
(.02) 
 
* 
Political 
Free  
Partly free 
   
2.17 
.73 
(1.08) 
(.99) 
* 
 
.51 
-.28 
(1.05) 
(.92) 
 
Control variable Europe 12.13 (1.19) *** 14.68 (1.09) 
**
* 
11.89 (1.26) *** 
 Constant -.87 (2.99)  6.95 (.71) 
**
* 
-.38 (3.11)  
N 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
110 
.78 
.77 
110 
.72 
.72 
110 
.78 
.77 
 
Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
The political model (Model 2) was significant [F(3,106)=92.25; p=.0000] 
with about 72 percent (R2=.7230) of the variance in welfare effort explained.  
The adjusted R2 was .7152.  The independent variable—freedom (b=2.17, 
t=2.01, p=.047)—had a partial slope significantly affecting the model when 
controlling for part free and Europe.  The mean welfare effort goes up by 2.17 
points as one moves from not free to free countries.  The integrated model 
(Model 3) was significant [F(5,104)=72.80; p=.0000] explaining about 78 
percent (R2=.7778) of the variance in welfare effort with the adjusted R2 of 
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.7671.  One socioeconomic independent variable—modernization (b=.05, 
t=2.26, p=.026)—had its partial slope significantly affecting the model.  One 
percentage points increase in modernization was associated with an average 
welfare sub-index rise of .05 when other independent variables were held 
constant. 
Findings suggest that both socioeconomic and political models are 
significant.  This supports the first hypothesis that both models are 
significant when examined in separate models.  When comparing the amount 
of variance explained, there is a difference of only about 6 percent between 
the two models—the socioeconomic model explaining about 78 percent and 
the political model about 72 percent of the variance in welfare effort.  The 
results seemed to be in line with both theoretical perspectives when observed 
separately.  The integrated model was significant as well, which confirmed 
the second hypothesis.  However, only one variable from the socioeconomic 
perspective was significantly affecting the model.   
One might conclude that these findings reconfirm Wilensky‘s (1975) 
argument that welfare effort would ‗converge‘ in the course of economic 
development rather than ideologically develop by political variations (Castles 
1978a; Heclo 1974; Gastil 1996/1997; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990).  However, 
this chapter remains distant from simplistically taking positions favoring one 
particular model.  Rather, I suggest some ways to improve the enterprise of 
comparative social policy research after revisiting the traditional approach. 
 48 
 
2.3. Critique of the Traditional Approach  
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999) suggested that there is no agreement on 
the extent to which social democracy, policy maturity, economic growth or 
population aging affect the level of social welfare effort.  Although 
substantive findings were gathered by comparing social welfare effort, on the 
whole, large-scale regression analyses could not provide any answers to 
resolving these theoretical debates (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999).  Amenta 
(1993) attributes this partly to not having good empirical measures for some 
key theoretical concepts and therefore not adequately representing 
theoretical propositions.  Next, particularities of the domestic contexts 
challenge the goodness-of-fit of the regression models when applying the 
common factors in cross-national analyses (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999).  
Lastly, there are problems with taking a uni-dimensional view of welfare 
effort while many different aspects configure the whole of social policy effort 
of nation-states. 
What the chapter argues for is the need to acknowledge the past 
limitations of conducting comparative social policy research and to develop a 
new set of cross-national measures and methods to meet the changes that are 
occurring at the global level.  As mentioned in an earlier section, first, 
documentation of more political variables—i.e., ideological tendencies of 
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ruling parties, length of a particular party in power, power of labor, etc.—
could further improve model specifications using the political perspective.   
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999, 42) suggested that a single coefficient 
and measure of significance generated for all the observations of each 
variable included requires an assumption that ―the independent variables 
have the same effect on the dependent variable across countries‖ in cross-
sectional analyses.  This assumption may not be met in models that include 
political variables since not all governments are democratic in nature. 
Perhaps the political dimension is more applicable when examining 
the variations among countries with democratic governments.  The major 
reason why the political perspective had less explanation in this study seems 
to be because it was originally developed from studies of Scandinavian 
countries to investigate divergence among highly industrialized countries 
whose socioeconomic factors would be similar.  Therefore, applying it to other 
parts of the world would be a threat to its validity as would be the case in this 
data, which were drawn from countries across a wide range of levels of 
economic development.  Industrialized countries are unquestionably more 
likely to have greater economic capacity with longer history of building their 
economy which in turn may have necessitated the institutionalization and 
implementation of social policies long before less developed countries. 
Supported by De Swaan (1994) and Deacon (1997), Mabbett and 
Bolderson (1999) introduced a new convergence theory that all market 
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economies are subject to competitive constraints on state welfare activity 
suggesting severe limits to comparative social policy analysis in today‘s 
world.  This challenges the lack of a well-defined dependent variable.  
Welfare effort as a measure of years count since the First Law and rank 
ordering them using a composite welfare sub-index fails to capture the nature 
and the total quantity of welfare effort.  While comparative studies on 
welfare states have primarily dealt with government social welfare programs, 
it is now recognized that more attention needs to be given to non-statutory 
provisions.  A multi-dimensional analysis of welfare effort requires different 
methodological approaches.  Cochrane and Clarke (1993) assert that the 
study of welfare effort comparison should be conducted within the context of 
changed relationship of each country to the international economy. 
Conducting comparative social policy research is not a straightforward 
matter.  It is characterized by complex methodological difficulties that limit 
development of broad, scientifically accurate theories.  Two of the 
mainstream theories in comparing welfare effort cross-nationally have been 
examined.  Then, an integrated model that included both socioeconomic and 
political perspectives has been examined to further investigate where 
previous discrepancy existed in attempts to explain welfare effort in an 
international context.  Modernization as a proxy for socially unmet needs in 
the midst of the stresses of urban industrialized environment is a strong 
predictor of welfare effort.   
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Although this analysis seemed to verify the extent to which both 
socioeconomic and political perspectives predict welfare effort, little is said 
about how they complement each other.  Perhaps, modernization with its 
political dimension (Pierson, 1991) may have taken out the effect of freedom 
in the integrated model.  Examination of the current world trends and 
limitations in the past comparative social policy studies suggests that 
exploring modernization as a concept that encompasses all aspects of 
economic, social and political spheres of human need. 
 
2.4. Comparison of Welfare States in the Global Context  
As Keohane and Milner (1996) point out, no longer can one understand 
politics within countries without comprehending the nature of the linkages 
between national economies and the world economy, and the changes in such 
linkages.  As countries become more integrated into the world economy, state 
welfare effort becomes challenged when countries try to stay competitive in 
the world market.  This calls for understanding welfare effort in the context 
of increased local governmental and non-governmental participation and 
global efforts by international organizations to promote social rights of all 
people. 
Globalization, which is a process defined by Midgley (1997, xi) as 
―global integration in which diverse peoples, economies, cultures and political 
processes are increasingly subjected to international influences,‖ has become 
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increasingly important features of modern life.  Government social policies 
are not exceptions to being influenced by these global forces of change.  
Socioeconomic and political changes that a nation-state might experience in 
relation with other countries directly and indirectly influence today‘s social 
policies at the domestic level (Deacon 1997).  
The causes of many social issues not necessarily being confined to 
national institutions and structures (Yeates 2005), the new global realities 
call for internationalizing of social problems and public policies, and 
universalizing of knowledge (Mohan 2003; 2005).  Therefore, a cross-national 
comparison in this context can be an effective means for identifying key 
factors that explain the nation-state variations on welfare effort.  Newly 
developed knowledge through comparative social welfare could ―lay the 
ground stone for a better tomorrow‖ by exporting ideas from one part of the 
world to another (Aspalter 2006, 4, 14). 
 
2.4.1. Globalization, Politics and Welfare State  
This section explores a wider range of variables that reflect the 
dynamics of change in welfare provision due to global economic factors.  I 
restrict the analyses to 18 affluent democracies in order to control for 
variations in socio-economic and political variables examined in the 
traditional approach.  This allows for investigation of other domestic 
variables that could better capture how countries are internally organized to 
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affect welfare effort.  Deeper examination of internal economic and political 
variations is particularly important in an era of globalization when less 
macro-socioeconomic differences would be observed beyond borders, 
especially among the 18 affluent democracies. 
Iversen and Cusack (2000) uses a sample of 16 Western industrialized 
nations to set forth an economic analysis of welfare state expansion.  Their 
theorizing effort challenges the two major theoretical perspectives—that (1) 
globalization weakens welfare states and (2) globalization triggers strong left-
labor power to stimulate welfare state growth.  Their economic analysis 
involves reexamining the risks induced by de-industrialization: 
Most of the risks being generated in modern industrialized societies 
are the product of technologically induced structural transformations 
inside national labor markets.  Increasing productivity, changing 
consumption patterns, and saturated demand for products from the 
traditional sectors of the economy are the main forces of change.   
 
These structural sources of risks are identified as the factors that stimulate 
demands for state compensation and risk sharing.  They conclude that the 
severity of internally driven employment losses in the traditional sectors 
affects the degree of transfers and government consumption.   
They refer to the explanatory variable in this relationship as 
deindustrialization, which is defined as ―100 minus the sum of 
manufacturing and agricultural employment as a percentage of the working-
age population‖ (Ibid, 331-32).  This is a substantial departure from the 
traditional convergence theory that posits industrialization measured in 
 54 
terms of economic growth is directly and linearly related to upward 
convergence toward welfare state development.  Instead, Iversen and Cusack 
introduces the internal sectoral shift in labor market participation as a 
different economic variable to explain welfare state commitment.   
They also hypothesized that ―partisan governments and organized 
interests are expected to shape social policies in order to benefit the 
distributive interests of their own constituencies‖ (Ibid, 328).  Therefore, 
where unions are strong and centrally organized and where left government 
has been dominant, the welfare state is expected to assume a more 
redistributive form.  They confirm the hypothesis with significant results 
using left government, electoral participation, and strength of labor added to 
economic variables.  The path analysis results indicate that through various 
channels these political variables tend to mediate the relationship between 
deindustrialization and welfare state commitment. 
The central thesis proposed by Esping-Andersen‘s (1990, 1, 30) 
historical coalitional analysis is that ―the history of political class coalitions is 
the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations.‖  In this sense, this model 
supports a direct impact of social groups on the shaping of welfare state 
regime types—liberal, conservative, and social democratic.  For instance, in 
Nordic countries, a broad red-green alliance was the necessary condition for a 
―full-employment of welfare state in return for farm-price subsidies‖ (Ibid, 
30).  As the author sees that social classes are the main agents of change, the 
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balance of class power would determine distributional outcomes (Ibid, 16) 
characterized by the types of welfare state regimes, which would 
subsequently determine the degree of welfare state commitment.   
The author identifies three independent variables that interactively 
explain the extent to which welfare state commitment varies: (1) the pattern 
of working-class political formation; (2) political coalition-building in the 
transition from rural economy to a middle-class society; and (3) past reforms 
contributing to institutionalization of class preferences and political behavior 
(Ibid, 32).  The class coalitions, which Esping-Andersen (Ibid, 33) points to 
having affected the foundation of three welfare state regime types, ―explain 
not only their past evolution but also their future prospects for welfare 
commitment.‖  He supports his propositions with historical accounts of class 
coalition to generate political behaviors that contributed to the development 
of varying types of welfare states.   
Notermans‘s (1993, 136) institutional analysis brings to light that ―the 
demise of full-employment policies reflects the institutional inability of 
present-day market economies to contain inflationary pressures.‖  The 
independent variable examined is the institutional ability to contain 
inflation, which causally influences welfare state commitment.  Using the 
cases of Norway and Sweden, Notermans (1993, 153) asked why even in 
Social Democratic countries, a switch was made to a restrictive 
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macroeconomic regime, which sacrificed growth and employment in an effort 
to reduce inflation.   
The author is convinced that ―the historical task Social Democracy 
performed in the thirties was not to establish full employment as the first 
priority of economic policies but to halt a disruptive deflation‖ (Ibid, 156).  
And, therefore, this institutional arrangement would not have survived much 
longer if both Norway and Sweden had not found an effective way of keeping 
inflation in check during the fifties and sixties.  In fact, Labor is essentially 
excluded from macroeconomic policy-making in a regime, which gives 
preference to external balance (Ibid, 134).  Also, there is a mention of weaker 
links between the trade unions and the conservative governments of the first 
half of the 1980s in Norway, which might have partly played a role in shying 
away from incomes policies (Ibid, 149). 
 
2.4.2. Analysis and Findings 
Eighteen affluent democracies are examined comparatively using 
Scruggs‘s (2005) Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset.  These 
countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  This data 
set provides systematic data on institutional features of social insurance 
programs spanning much of the post-war period.  The welfare generosity 
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variable was extracted for each country for three time points—1980, 1990, 
and 2000.  
Merged with this data set was the Comparative Welfare States (Huber 
et al. 2004), which provided variables for cumulative left party dominance for 
the three time periods.  KOF Index of Globalization2 was also included in the 
analysis (Dreher 2006; Dreher, Gaston and Martens 2008).  This composite 
index includes economic globalization (characterized as long distance flows of 
goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that 
accompany market exchanges); political globalization (characterized by a 
diffusion of government policies); and social globalization (expressed as the 
spread of ideas, information, images and people).  In order to explore the 
effect of internal economic condition, the percentage of service sector civilian 
workers was extracted from the OECD statistical data and included to reflect 
de-industrialization. 
 
Figure 2.1: Average Welfare Generosity over Time  
 
                                                          
2 The KOF Index of Globalization was introduced in 2002 (Dreher 2006) and is updated and 
described in detail in Dreher, Gaston and Martens (2008). Following Clark (2000), Norris 
(2000) and Keohane and Nye (2000), it defines globalization to be the process of creating 
networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a 
variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. Globalization is 
conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, 
cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual 
interdependence. 
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Figure 2.1 shows welfare generosity increasing on average until about 
the mid-1980s.  Then, the trend gradually decreases.  Welfare generosity is 
particularly low and stagnant in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
 
Figure 2.2: Average Globalization over Time 
 
  
Figure 2.2 shows average globalization score increasing over time and 
this trend is quite consistent among all countries observed although there are 
variations on the rate of change. 
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Figure 2.3: Average Cumulative Left Party Dominance over Time  
 
  
Figure 2.3 describes the change over time on the average cumulative 
left party power.  While most countries display an increasing trend in left 
party power, Canada, Japan, and the United States have no left party 
activity at all.   
 
Figure 2.4: Average Percentage of Service Sector Workforce over Time 
 
  
Figure 2.4 depicts the increasing trend of the average percentage of 
civilian workforce working in the service sector over time.  The overall change 
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between 1970 and 2000 is nearly 20 percentage points, a huge change in the 
makeup of the economy in industrialized nations.  Most of these affluent 
democracies seem to be undergoing de-industrialization.  
Table 2.3 lists the country-level data for four variables in consideration 
at three time points: 1980, 1990, and 2000.  For each year, a series of 
bivariate regression analyses are conducted considering the small sample 
size.  Left party power and service workforce are regressed on each other and 
on globalization.  Then, welfare generosity is regressed on globalization, left 
party power, and service workforce. 
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Table 2.3:  Description of Globalization, Left Party Power, Service Workforce, and Welfare Generosity 
 
Countries 
1980  1990  2000 
Globaliza-
tion 
Left party 
power 
Service % 
Welfare 
generosity 
 
Globaliza-
tion 
Left party 
power 
Service % 
Welfare 
generosity 
 
Globaliza-
tion 
Left party 
power 
Service % 
Welfare 
generosity 
               
Australia 64.77 6.94 62.62 19.30  75.16 14.77 69.04 19.80  82.64 19.94 73.41 18.40 
Austria 72.97 20.45 49.22 27.80  77.73 28.06 55.19 27.40  91.70 33.38 63.58 28.93 
Belgium 72.80 11.98 62.13 31.30  82.72 13.74 68.97 32.50  93.38 18.98 71.91 32.61 
Canada 80.97 0.00 66.19 21.20  79.79 0.00 71.41 24.80  89.88 0.00 74.16 25.45 
Denmark 70.76 23.72 62.55 37.20  75.86 25.39 66.91 36.30  90.52 32.18 70.21 35.44 
Finland 60.94 14.20 51.81 27.40  66.94 19.14 60.69 34.40  88.15 22.93 66.30 30.72 
France 64.91 3.09 55.67 30.30  74.83 10.34 64.63 31.90  85.55 16.17 73.96 27.96 
Germany 57.80 10.89 51.01 29.10  61.43 12.31 57.95 27.90  83.61 0.00 63.69 27.51 
Ireland 74.41 3.12 49.17 21.20  74.40 4.20 56.08 21.00  87.01 5.98 63.51 26.93 
Italy 53.00 2.60 47.83 17.80  65.02 4.66 58.80 21.30  81.31 8.56 62.22 26.73 
Japan 42.57 0.40 54.24 17.40  48.12 0.40 58.71 17.70  60.56 1.37 63.71 20.39 
Netherlands 83.43 8.36 63.64 35.90  83.72 9.22 69.13 35.40  92.23 13.66 76.75 35.77 
New Zealand 62.55 9.92 55.30 26.20  67.42 16.25 66.25 27.90  81.27 17.33 68.12 23.70 
Norway 71.03 28.50 61.87 38.40  76.31 32.88 68.72 41.10  85.05 40.54 73.95 41.56 
Sweden 73.44 29.61 62.17 42.30  81.07 37.86 67.36 42.50  89.68 44.86 73.05 36.16 
Switzerland 76.71 8.62 54.99 31.20  82.39 11.40 63.59 28.70  93.81 14.40 69.83 19.58 
UK 67.30 16.16 59.74 18.70  72.66 16.16 65.55 20.00  81.61 19.83 73.28 21.37 
US 64.70 0.00 65.92 19.30  71.48 0.00 70.94 19.20  78.03 0.00 74.40 18.78 
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Table 2.4:  Bivariate Regression Analyses 
 
Independent variables 
 1980  1990  2000 
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
  Left party power  Left party power  Left party power 
Globalization  .26 (.23)   .40 (.29)   .73 (.40) * 
Service workforce  .20 (.38)   .11 (.53)   .64 (.70)  
          
  Service workforce  Service workforce  Service workforce 
Globalization  .28 (.14) *  .29 (.13) **  .18 (.15)  
Left party power  .08 (.16)   .03 (.12)   .08 (.09)  
          
  Welfare generosity  Welfare generosity  Welfare generosity 
Globalization  .38 (.17) **  .39 (.19) *  .41 (.19) ** 
Left party power  .61 (.14) ***  .51 (.12) ***  .31 (.10) *** 
Service workforce  .32 (.31)   .40 (.35)   .25 (.35)  
          
 * indicates p<.10, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01. 
 
The results reported in Table 2.4 indicate that significant positive 
relationships exist between globalization and welfare generosity and left 
party power and welfare generosity, consistently in 1980, 1990, and 2000.  
The signs of significant regression coefficients did not support the 
hypothesized direction for globalization.  It followed the contention of a small 
group of scholars who argue that globalization positively affects welfare 
generosity due to the increased need for social protection (Garrett 1998; 
Kittel and Winner 2005). 
The signs of significant regression coefficients consistently supported 
the hypothesized direction for left party power.  The efficiency argument 
mentioned in Chapter 1—that globalization reduces political power and 
economic autonomy thereby causing welfare state retrenchment (Blackmon, 
2006; Stiglitz 2006)—was not supported by these findings.  Rather, left party 
power displayed consistently strong positive relationships throughout.  The 
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greater the left party power, the more generous welfares states are.  
Interestingly, globalization had a significant positive effect on left party 
power in 2000 while no relationship was found prior to this time point.   
Although tentative, this may confirm Kim‘s (2009) findings on 
curvilinear relationship between globalization and welfare state generosity.  
Welfare states with stronger left party power are more likely to hold on to the 
social welfare ideals, particularly in recent years of heightened globalization.  
While the de-industrialization argument (Iversen and Cusack 2000) pointed 
to including service workforce as an internal economic structure variable, it 
did not significantly affect welfare generosity.  Globalization had significant 
effects on service workforce in 1980 and 1990, but no relationship was found 
in 2000.   
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Chapter 3. Global Perspective II: Welfare States and 
Poverty  
This chapter investigates the effects of globalization, politics, and 
social welfare commitment on poverty at the aggregate level.  Various 
measures of poverty and their relationship with key structural global and 
domestic variables are examined.  The underlying assumption is that poverty 
is a form of social exclusion based on its ‗structural and multidimensional 
nature of processes by which individuals or specific areas are actually 
excluded‘ from activities that are an intrinsic part of socio-economic 
integration (Bhalla and Lapeyre 2004, 15).  
The series of data analyses in this chapter is based on compilation of 
key variables from two major data sets—the OECD data set and the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).  The OECD Statistics Portal allows 
researchers, government officials, and other interested users to extract key 
cross-national indicators of OECD member countries.  Particularly, this 
chapter used poverty rate, poverty gap, Gini coefficient, public social 
expenditure, labor market policy expenditure, unemployment rate, and union 
density around year 2000 for comparison with the point of Wave V in LIS 
data. 
The LIS is a cross-national and historically harmonized data archive 
and a Research Institute located in Luxembourg.  The LIS archive contains 
nationally representative individual-level data sets with some key 
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standardized variables (Rainwater and Smeeding 2004).  It is made up of two 
primary databases.  The LIS database includes income microdata from a 
large number of countries at multiple points in time.  The newer LWS 
Database includes wealth microdata from a smaller selection of countries. 
Both databases include labor market and demographic data as well. 
Microdata is accessed for social scientific research using a remote-access 
system. 
 
3.1. Poverty in the Global Context  
The conventional measures of poverty include the head count ratio and 
the mean poverty gap (Rodgers and Rodgers 1991, 342).  First, the relative 
headcount measure of poverty is considered typical in cross-national poverty 
research (Brady 2003; 2005; 2006; 2009a; DeFina and Thanawala 2001; 
Hagenaars 1991; Jantti and Danziger 2000; Moller et al. 2003; Osberg and 
Xu 2000; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004; Sen 1999; Smeeding et al. 2001).  
Individuals are considered poor if the household in which he or she belongs 
has total income below 50% of the overall median household income.  The 
headcount poverty is often translated into poverty rates (denoted by H) for 
the entire country and for some specific groups within countries.  The 
headcount poverty rate is expressed by nmH / , where n is the size of the 
population, m is the number of poor. 
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Second, poverty gap is a concept that measures the distance between 
the relative poverty line and the overall mean household income.  Pre-
transfer poverty gap has been growing over time and it would mean that 
government transfers would have to be more generous to fill the poverty gap, 
bringing families up to the poverty line (Ziliak 2008).  The poverty gap 
(denoted by G) is expressed as pzG  , where z is the poverty threshold 
and p  is the mean income of the poor.  A severe limitation of G is that ―it is 
not independent of the units in which income is measured‖ (Rodgers and 
Rodgers 1991: 342).  Therefore, I employ a more comparable measure of 
poverty gap rate (GR) which by dividing G by z, better represents the depth of 
poverty.  This is expressed as 
z
z
GR
p
 .  GR will be referred to as poverty 
gap hereon forth. 
Figure 3.1: Comparison of Pre/Post-Transfer Poverty Rates 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the stark differences between the pre-transfer 
(before taxes and government transfers) and post-transfer (after taxes and 
government transfers) headcount poverty rates in 2000.  Belgium had the 
highest market income poverty at 35.60% compared to other advanced 
democracies (mean=25.62%), but its post-transfer poverty drops significantly 
to 10.40%.  The United States on the other hand had pre-transfer poverty 
rate close to the overall average (25.40%) but ends up with the highest post-
transfer poverty rate (17.10%).  The average post-transfer poverty rate is 
9.68%. 
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Pre/Post-Transfer Poverty Gap 
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Figure 3.2 shows the change in poverty gap before and after taxes and 
government transfers in 2000.  One can observe an overall trend of high pre-
transfer poverty gaps in most of the affluent democracies.  Belgium and 
Australia had the highest pre-transfer poverty gap at 75.40% below the 
poverty line and Spain had the lowest at 40.00%.  The United States had the 
pre-transfer poverty gap of 56.80% which is lower than the overall average of 
66.26%.  Despite its relatively low pre-transfer poverty gap, its post-transfer 
poverty gap is among the highest at 34.70%.  The overall mean poverty gap is 
26.88% with Ireland having the lowest score of 15.40%. 
Figure 3.3: Percentage Change in Poverty Rate and Poverty Gap 
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Figure 3.3 summarizes the extent to which both poverty rate and 
poverty gap have decreased after taxes and government transfers in 2000.  
The bars indicate the magnitude of percentage change, which reflects the 
degree to which government social policy intervention has been effective.  The 
average percentage reduction in poverty rate is 60.81% and that of poverty 
gap is 57.09%.  Most countries either keep their effectiveness about the same 
between poverty rate and poverty gap or do slightly better with poverty rate.  
Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland had much higher percentage 
change rates for poverty rate.   
Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been 
more effective in terms of reducing poverty gap than poverty rate.  Among 
them, Ireland has a disproportionately higher percentage change rate for 
poverty gap than poverty rate.  The United States is second only to Spain for 
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less effective government social policies in terms of reducing both poverty 
rate and poverty gap.  Figure 3.4 depicts the poverty rates among working-
age adults in 17 affluent democracies from the LIS data.  The highest poverty 
rate of 17% found in the United States further confirms its lack of social 
welfare commitment to reducing poverty. 
Figure 3.4: LIS Poverty Rates for Working-Age Adults 18-65 
 
Many studies have investigated comparative levels of inequality 
among nations and the growing trend of inequality in the United States since 
the beginning of the 1970s (Smeeding 2005).  Often used by economists in 
studies of inequality, the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (perfect equality of 
income distribution) and 1 (perfect inequality of income distribution).  A Gini 
score of 1 would indicate one person getting 100% of the total income and 0 
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would indicate every person getting the same percentage of the total income.  
Therefore, if country A has a higher score between the range of 0 and 1 
compared to country B, it would mean that country A would have a more 
unequal distribution of income.  In table 3.1, the United Kingdom and the 
United States have the highest Gini coefficients and Denmark and Sweden 
have lowest.  
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Table 3.1:  Country-level characteristics from OECD (around year 2000) 
 
Welfare 
state 
regimes 
Countries 
Poverty Poverty gap 
Gini 
coefficient 
WSI 
Public social expenditure 
Pre-transfer Post-transfer Pre-transfer Post-transfer Total 
Cash 
benefits 
In-kind 
benefits 
           
Social 
democratic 
Denmark (2000) 23.20 5.10 74.00 20.90 0.23 1.43 25.81 13.17 10.62 
Finland (2000) 18.00 6.40 55.10 20.70 0.26 0.36 24.31 14.95 8.48 
Norway (2000) 22.60 6.30 64.80 28.20 0.26 0.16 21.31 11.16 9.54 
Sweden (2000) 27.00 5.30 68.70 26.10 0.24 1.37 28.54 14.23 12.55 
           
           
Conservative 
Austria (2000)  9.30  30.00 0.25 0.55 26.37 18.08 7.77 
Belgium (2000) 35.60 10.40 75.40 38.40 0.29 0.39 25.28 15.54 8.66 
France (2000) 33.00 7.20 74.60 24.80 0.28 0.79 27.86 16.60 10.07 
Germany (2000) 31.10 9.20 74.10 30.20 0.27 0.67 26.18 15.55 9.45 
Luxembourg (2000)  5.50  17.30 0.26 0.06 19.75 13.20 6.36 
Netherlands (1999) 23.60 6.80 72.70 20.30 0.28 -0.36 19.79 11.21 7.07 
Switzerland (2000) 16.50 7.50 54.50 36.60 0.28 -0.72 17.88 10.76 6.57 
           
           
Liberal 
Australia (2001) 29.80 12.20 75.40 28.90 0.32 -1.13 17.84 9.32 8.15 
Canada (2000) 21.60 10.30  24.40 0.30 -0.47 16.50 6.97 9.15 
Ireland (2000) 25.70 15.40 61.50 12.10 0.30 -1.42 13.59 7.02 5.62 
UK (1999) 27.80 10.20 73.00 23.20 0.37 -0.11 19.19 9.85 9.00 
US (2000) 25.40 17.10 56.80 34.70 0.36 -1.53 14.50 7.64 6.71 
           
           
Southern 
European 
Italy (2000) 31.10 11.80 73.30 37.00 0.34 0.30 23.26 16.07 6.63 
Spain (2000) 17.90 13.70 40.00 30.00 0.34 -0.36 20.31 13.21 6.43 
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Table 3.2:  Country-level characteristics from OECD (around year 2000) 
 
Welfare 
state 
regimes 
Countries 
Labor market policy expenditure Unemploy-
ment rate 
Union 
density 
Low-income 
seat 
Left party 
Public health 
expenditure 
Public 
educational 
expenditure Total Active LMP Passive LMP 
j           
Social 
democratic 
Denmark (2000) 4.27 1.89 2.38 4.30 74.20 33.00 25.39 8.30 8.30 
Finland (2000) 2.97 0.89 2.08 9.80 75.00 37.00 22.93 7.20 6.00 
Norway (2000) 1.11 0.61 0.50 3.20 54.40 38.00 40.54 8.40 5.90 
Sweden (2000) 3.09 1.75 1.34 5.60 79.10 40.00 44.86 8.20 7.20 
           
           
Conservative 
Austria (2000) 1.69 0.52 1.17 3.60 36.50 33.00 33.38 9.90 5.60 
Belgium (2000) 3.34 1.22 2.11 6.90 49.30 33.00 18.98 8.60 5.90 
France (2000) 2.57 1.19 1.38 9.00 8.30 47.00 16.17 10.10 6.00 
Germany (2000) 3.12 1.23 1.89 7.50 24.60 33.00 14.56 10.30 4.40 
Luxembourg (2000) - - 0.43 2.20 43.10 35.00 15.68 5.80  
Netherlands (1999) 3.23 1.47 1.75 2.80 22.60 33.00 13.20 8.00 5.00 
Switzerland (2000) 1.10 0.56 0.54 2.60 20.80 37.00 14.40 10.20 5.40 
           
           
Liberal 
Australia (2001) 1.25 0.37 0.88 6.30 24.70 34.00 18.77 8.30 4.70 
Canada (2000) 1.10 0.40 0.70 6.80 30.40 16.00 0.00 8.80 5.10 
Ireland (2000) 1.61 0.81 0.80 4.40 39.30 36.00 5.98 6.30 4.30 
UK (1999) 0.56 0.25 0.31 5.40 29.60 7.00 18.83 7.00 4.30 
US (2000) 0.45 0.17 0.28 4.00 12.80 5.00 0.00 13.60 4.90 
           
           
Southern 
European 
Italy (2000) - - 0.62 10.20 34.70 35.00 8.56 8.10 4.50 
Spain (2000) 2.14 0.79 1.35 11.10 16.70 35.00 13.50 7.20 4.30 
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Table 3.3:  Descriptive statistics for LIS working age adults (18-65) 
 
Welfare 
state 
regimes 
Countries N LIS Poverty Age Female 
# of 
children 
under 18 
# of earners Working 
High 
education 
Medium 
education 
           
Social 
democratic 
Finland (2000) 6,952 .05 42.32 .48 .94 1.60 .81 .35 .41 
Norway (2000) 8,036 .06 40.84 .48 .99 1.72 .78 .27 .59 
Sweden (2000) 8,304 .07 41.63 .50 .93 1.53 .81 .23 .56 
           
           
Conservative 
Austria (2000) 1,397 .07 42.25 .50 .88 1.52 .67 .07 .70 
Belgium (2000) 1,260 .08 40.61 .51 .99 1.31 .73 .36 .33 
France (2000) 6,255 .08 40.18 .51 1.01 1.37 .70 .27 .41 
Germany (2000) 6,980 .08 40.78 .50 .74 1.36 .74 .21 .50 
Luxembourg (2000) 1,422 .06 47.36 .51 1.15 1.48 .47 .19 .36 
Netherlands (1999) 2,686 .05 40.42 .51 .99 1.43 .75 .25 .44 
Switzerland (2000) 2,280 .08 40.52 .51 .90 - .79 .22 .66 
           
           
Liberal 
Australia (2001) 5,216 .13 40.40 .51 1.06 1.50 .72 - - 
Canada (2000) 17,817 .12 40.29 .51 .98 1.76 .75 - - 
Ireland (2000) 1,392 .15 39.87 .51 1.47 1.66 .69 .20 .29 
UK (1999) 14,280 .13 41.39 .52 .99 1.39 .70 - - 
US (2000) 28,469 .17 41.15 .52 1.20 1.70 .74 .34 .52 
           
           
Southern 
European 
Italy (2000) 5,134 .12 41.98 .51 .71 1.28 - .11 .42 
Spain (2000) 2,958 .13 38.52 .51 .78 1.53 .59 .13 .27 
           
           
All countries  120,838 .13 41.04 .51 1.02 1.51 .73 .27 .49 
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A correlation matrix of all poverty and income distribution measures is 
observed.  Several findings stand out.  Percentage change in poverty rate and 
that of poverty gap are significantly correlated (r=.545, p<.05).  The LIS 
poverty rate is significantly associated with Gini coefficient (r=.838, p<.001), 
post-transfer poverty rate (r=.921, p<.001), and percentage change in poverty 
rate (r=-.753, p=.001).  Post-transfer poverty rate is also significantly 
associated with inequality (r=.781, p<.001) and reduction of poverty rate (r=-
.832, p<.001). 
Countries with most effective social policies in terms of reducing the 
poverty rate tend to be also effective when it comes to reducing the poverty 
gap.  As unequal distribution of income increases, the poverty rate increases.  
The greater the reduction in poverty rate, the lower the LIS poverty rate.  
Using these measures of poverty, the following sections examine how 
globalization, politics, social welfare commitment contribute to poverty and 
income distribution at the aggregate levels among 17 affluent democracies. 
 
3.2. Effects of Globalization and Politics on Poverty  
In Chapter 2, globalization and politics were found to be independently 
affecting welfare state generosity.  Furthermore, globalization had an effect 
on left party power, suggesting a possible mediating effect of politics between 
globalization and welfare state generosity.  This section examines the direct 
effects of globalization and politics on poverty.  Literature on globalization is 
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not conclusive about this relationship.  Some argue that globalization 
contributes to higher income inequality as increased capital mobility and 
economic interdependence undermines domestic economies from rewarding 
individuals equitably (Hurrell and Woods 1995; Reich 1992; Tonelson 2000).  
Others who support global liberalism assert that it is a powerful engine of 
economic growth, benefiting all income groups (Burtless, Lawrence, Litan, 
and Shapiro 1998; Lawrence 1996).  
The former scholars argue that with lack of economic resources, the 
low-income populations are at higher risks of experiencing poverty under 
―increasingly ruthless and unforgiving international competition that has 
seriously jeopardized their wages, benefits, and job security‖ (Mahler 2004, 
1027).  The latter group of scholars contrarily point to globalization‘s 
stimulus effects on lowering of prices by international competition, making it 
advantageous to low-income groups, and to promote domestic flexibility in 
class mobility leading to less inequality. 
Mahler (2004) explored the effects of three major modes of 
international integration—trade, direct foreign investment, and financial 
openness—on income distribution and redistribution.  He found a borderline 
significant effect examining the relationship between one of the international 
integration variables—financial openness—and earnings inequality.  
The analyses conducted in this section similarly found no relationship 
between globalization and various dimensions of poverty (see Table 3.4).  
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Unlike what many scholars have maintained, globalization does not directly 
add to the higher risk of poverty.  However, it does directly affect welfare 
state generosity and politics in 2000, as found in Chapter 2, and politics 
directly affects welfare state generosity.  This would mean that politics plays 
a major role as a buffer for maintaining social protection against 
vulnerability in the global market. 
 
Table 3.4:  Effects of Globalization on Poverty 
 
Independent variables  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
 
Pre-transfer 
poverty rate 
 Post-transfer 
poverty rate 
 
LIS poverty 
Globalization  -.26 (.30)   -.03 (.29)   .00 (.001)  
          
 
 
Pre-transfer 
poverty gap 
 Post-transfer 
poverty gap 
 
Inequality 
Globalization  .07 (.60)   .19 (.23)   -.001 (.001)  
          
 * indicates p<.10, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01. 
 
Mahler (2004) found reasonably strong positive relationships between 
several political variables—the partisan balance of national cabinets, 
electoral turnout, union density, and the centralization of wage-setting 
institutions—and an egalitarian income distribution and redistribution.  He 
argues that these findings confirm a growing number of studies emphasizing 
the resilience of domestic political factors despite the challenges of economic 
globalization. 
Using eight different measures of left political institutions—(1) voter 
turnout, (2) cumulative historical power of left parties, (3) percent of votes for 
left parties, (4) the percent of seats for left parties, (5) wage coordination, (6) 
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neocorporatism, (7) gross union density, and (8) employed union density—
Brady (2003) found that these political factors combine with and partially 
channel through welfare state generosity to reduce poverty.  The strength of 
left political institutions consistently demonstrates a powerful negative 
impact on poverty. 
The analyses conducted in this section reveal that political institutions 
have significant effects on post-transfer poverty rate, LIS poverty, and 
income inequality (see Table 3.5).  Politics plays a minor role in terms of 
explaining pre-transfer poverty, both for poverty rate and poverty gap.  And 
it does little in terms of explaining the variance in post-transfer poverty gap.  
As union density goes up, poverty rate and inequality goes down.  As the 
number of electoral seats from poor districts increase, poverty rate and 
inequality decreases.  Also, cumulative left party power negatively affects 
poverty rate and inequality. 
 
Table 3.5:  Effects of Politics on Poverty 
 
Independent variables  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
 
Pre-transfer 
poverty rate 
 Post-transfer 
poverty rate 
 
LIS poverty 
Union density  -.03 (.07)   -.09 (.04) **  -.001 (.001) * 
Low-income seat  .02 (.13)   -.16 (.07) **  -.002 (.001) ** 
Left party power  -.001 (.12)   -.18 (.06) ***  -.002 (.001) ** 
          
 
 
Pre-transfer 
poverty gap 
 Post-transfer 
poverty gap 
 
Inequality 
Union density  .05 (.12)   -.09 (.08)   -.001 (.001) *** 
Low-income seat  .05 (.26)   -.06 (.16)   -.002 (.001) *** 
Left party power  .16 (.25)   -.01 (.15)   -.002 (.001) *** 
          
 * indicates p<.10, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01. 
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3.3. Effect of Welfare State Commitment on Poverty  
Esping-Andersen (1990), Iversen and Cusack (2000), and Notermans 
(1993) challenge Wilensky‘s traditionally held linear paradigm, , whereby 
economic performance or industrialization captured by GNP per capita 
determines welfare state ‗spending‘ cross-nationally.  These authors have 
taken diverse steps to conceptualize and measure welfare state commitment 
and have modified the traditional measure of social welfare—namely 
spending on social programs—which has dominated the field of comparative 
welfare state over the years.  
Esping-Andersen (1990, 12) introduces a common textbook definition of 
welfare state that constitutes, ―state responsibility for securing some basic 
modicum of welfare for its citizens.‖  This somewhat vague definition opened 
the doors for diverse approaches to conceptualize and operationalize welfare 
state activities.  Most prevalent among them has been the traditional mode of 
attributing social expenditure to a state‘s commitment to welfare.  Esping-
Andersen challenges this by asserting, ―not all social spending counts 
equally‖ (Ibid, 19), for some would spend more on targeted social assistance 
for the poor and others on tax privileges for the middle class and full 
employment for all.  He also takes a firm stance against a mere 
transformation of state activities towards acceptance of standard social 
programs to be regarded as a state‘s commitment to welfare state.   
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Esping-Andersen‘s conceptualization of welfare state is best captured 
by commitment to social citizenship and solidarity.  He cites Titmuss‘s work 
on residual and institutional welfare distinction for having contributed to 
incorporating some essential tools for characterization of welfare states.  The 
content of these tools include: ―targeted versus universalistic programs, the 
conditions of eligibility, the quality of benefits and services and … the extent 
to which employment and working life are encompassed in the state‘s 
extension of citizen rights‖ (Ibid, 20). 
In essence, Esping-Andersen‘s conceptualization of welfare state 
commitment rests on the degree to which a state is granting social rights.  
His work offers a strong emphasis on the concept of social right as the 
guiding principle for which all welfare states should follow.  The following is 
what he considers as key elements of social citizenship: 
If social rights are given the legal and practical status of 
property rights, if they are inviolable, and if they are granted 
on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will 
entail a de-commodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis 
the market.  But the concept of social citizenship also involves 
social stratification: one‘s status as a citizen will compete with, 
or even replace, one‘s class position (Ibid, 21). 
 
In this sense, both de-commodification and social stratification are 
used as proxy variables for a state‘s commitment to social rights, which are 
used as measures to characterize the typology of welfare states into three 
categories: (1) liberal; (2) conservative; and (3) social democratic.  Higher 
scores on the composite index would indicate higher levels of de-
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commodification, corresponding to the three types of welfare state regimes: 
(1) high de-commodification (=social democratic); (2) low de-commodification 
(=liberal); and (3) moderate de-commodification (=conservative).  He finds in 
his study of 18 industrial democracies that combined de-commodification 
scores cluster around three groups of high, low, and moderate de-
commodification.   
De-commodification is a concept that captures the degree to which ―a 
service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a 
livelihood without reliance on the market‖ (Ibid, 22).  Or one can simply put 
it as capturing ―the degree of market-independence for an average worker‖ 
(Ibid, 50).  The author uses combined scores of de-commodification by three 
social welfare programs—pensions, sickness, and unemployment cash 
benefits—which summarize a list of variables3 that illustrate ―the ease with 
which an average person can opt out of the market‖ (Ibid, 49).   
In other words, de-commodification accounts for social rights by being 
operationalized as the degree of generosity in benefits and restrictions among 
core social welfare programs.  Social stratification is the second concept of 
interest to Esping-Andersen for measuring welfare state commitment.  He 
contends that welfare states not only intervene in the structure of inequality, 
but also is ―an active force in the ordering of social relations‖ by providing a 
system of stratification (Ibid, 23).  
                                                          
3 (1) The prohibitiveness of conditions for eligibility, such as work experience, contributions, 
or means-tests; (2) the strength of in-built disincentives (such as waiting days for cash 
benefits); and (3) the degree to which benefits approximate normal expected earnings-levels. 
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Social democratic regimes (e.g., Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden) provide comprehensive social provisions and universal coverage.  
Liberal regimes (e.g., Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) prefer market solutions and only provide minimal social 
transfers to the most needy.  Conservative regimes (e.g., Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) have 
social programs that sustain status differences by providing different benefits 
to different occupational groups (Leira 2002).  Mediterranean countries (e.g., 
Italy, and Spain) are separately grouped as Southern European based on 
their dualistic schemes, institutional fragmentation, universal health care, a 
mix of public and private welfare, and particularism and clientelism (Tai and 
Treas 2008). 
In contrast to Esping-Andersen, Iversen and Cusack (2000) and 
Notermans (1993) do not engage in much theoretical discussions on what 
constitutes a welfare state.  Iversen and Cusack implicitly assume that the 
welfare state is a response to demands for social insurance and compensation 
to meet economic insecurity encountered by its citizens.  Here, they review 
three distinct ways in which governments have responded to such demands: 
(1) promoting employment in private services and supported by public 
insurance schemes; (2) maintaining extensive regulation in private services 
while expanding employment in public services; and (3) regulating private 
sector service employment without allowing growth in the public sector (Ibid, 
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314-16).  They try to explain these variations by estimating welfare state 
commitment measured in terms of the two main components of welfare-state 
spending—transfers and government consumption. 
Iversen and Cusack incorporate somewhat modified social spending 
variables as proxies for welfare state commitment as compared to the ones 
used in the traditional comparative research.  Replicating Garrett‘s usage of 
these two variables as dependent variables capturing welfare state 
commitment, they made some refinements to the variables in order to more 
accurately take into account nondiscretionary effects in transfers and 
consumption measures.   
They define government transfers as ―the percentage share of transfers 
in GDP relative to the percentage share of the nonworking population in the 
total population‖ and government consumption as ―total government 
consumption of goods and services net of military spending as a percentage of 
GDP‖ (Ibid, 348).  While these are much improved social spending variables, 
they suffer the same criticism of government spending not capturing the 
ideological dimensions of welfare state commitment.  In this regard, their 
composite economic index of social spending could not account for the quality, 
the composition, or the magnitude of spending by various categories of social 
policies. 
Notermans (1993) to some degree implicitly endorses the idea of 
promoting equality and full employment as a social right that underlies 
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welfare state commitment.  When the economic conditions on which Social 
Democracy and Keynesian strategy is based does not operate in favor of its 
sustenance, the argument for social rights as welfare state commitment could 
not hold.  The ideal welfare state according to Notermans (1993, 134) is a 
policy regime, ―which found its roots in the thirties and which gave 
preference to growth and employment over fixed exchange rates.‖  The 
welfare state commitment varies with the state of existence (when full 
employment policy acquires a priority status) at the one end and non-
existence (when inflationary policy becomes dominant at the expense of full 
employment policy) at the other end. 
Scruggs and Allan (2006) operationalize welfare state generosity based 
on three main areas of social insurance programs: pensions, unemployment 
insurance, and sickness benefits.  These programs protect workers against 
the risk of old age, unemployment, and illness.  They calculate the net 
program replacement rates and create an aggregate generosity score using a 
modified approach from the one used by Esping-Andersen (1990).  After 
adjustment (adding 2 to the scores ranging from -2 to 2) to the standardized 
replacement rate, the replacement rate ranges from 0 to 4.  Also, countries 
are coded 1 to 3 based on the distribution of the scores on other 
characteristics—e.g., waiting period, duration, qualifying period, etc.  Each 
program generosity scores are calculated and then added to obtain the 
general benefit generosity score (Scruggs 2008).  He finds that welfare state 
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generosity is associated with both lower relative poverty and absolute 
poverty.  
Brady (2009a) developed a Welfare State Index (WSI) that measures 
welfare effort, generosity, and extensiveness.  This standardized score 
(mean=0, s.d.=1) represent a composite score of social welfare expenditures, 
social security transfers and government expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP, and public health spending as a percentage of total health spending.  
This measure correlates strongly with Scruggs and Allan‘s (2008) measure of 
welfare state generosity (r=.63), but two countries in Brady‘s (2009a) sample 
does not appear in this dataset.  Brady (2009a) reports that WSI has a 
significant effect on poverty.   
Contributing to these two most recent studies on welfare state 
generosity and poverty in Western industrialized countries, numerous 
studies in comparative social policy have found similar results (Brady 2005; 
Carroll 1999; Ferrarini 2006; Kangas 1991; Kangas and Palme 2000; 
Kenworthy 1999).  They show that welfare states have effectively intervened 
in the lifecycle events that often lead to economic hardships and 
vulnerability—i.e., childhood, child rearing, old age, sickness, and job loss—
and therefore have significantly reduced poverty.  Brady (2005) found that 
social security transfers and public health spending as indicators of social 
welfare commitment significantly reduce poverty.  These effects are much 
greater than economic and demographic determinants of poverty. 
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Table 3.6:  Effects of Welfare State Commitment on Poverty 
 
Independent variables  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
 
 
Pre-transfer 
poverty rate 
 Post-transfer 
poverty rate 
 
LIS poverty 
Welfare state index (Brady)  1.45 (1.64)   -3.05 (.71) ***  -.03 (.009) *** 
Welfare state generosity (Scruggs)  -.02 (.21)   -.33 (.10) ***  -.004 (.001) *** 
Social expenditure  .44 (.30)   -.47 (.15) ***  -.005 (.002) *** 
Cash benefit spending  .61 (.43)   -.46 (.23) *  -.006 (.002) ** 
In-kind benefit spending  .77 (.79)   -1.10 (.41) **  -.008 (.005)  
Total LMP expenditure  .92 (1.29)   -1.72 (.70) **  -.02 (.008) ** 
Active LMP expenditure  2.05 (2.85)   -4.09 (1.45) **  -.05 (.02) ** 
Passive LMP expenditure  .88 (2.15)   -1.95 (1.22)   -.03 (.01) ** 
Public health expenditure  .43 (.86)   .53 (.48)   .004 (.005)  
Public educational expenditure  -.33 (1.32)   -2.24 (.59) ***  -.03 (.009) *** 
          
 
 
Pre-transfer 
poverty gap 
 Post-transfer 
poverty gap 
 
Inequality 
Welfare state index (Brady)  4.51 (2.94)   .03 (2.11)   -.03 (.009) *** 
Welfare state generosity (Scruggs)  .22 (.31)   -.27 (.27)   -.004 (.001) *** 
Social expenditure  .90 (.58)   .27 (.39)   -.005 (.002) ** 
Cash benefit spending  .84 (.92)   .58 (.51)   -.005 (.003) * 
In-kind benefit spending  2.63 (1.36) *  -.09 (.997)   -.01 (.005) * 
Total LMP expenditure  2.86 (2.48)   -1.08 (1.55)   -.02 (.007) *** 
Active LMP expenditure  2.05 (2.85)   -3.15 (3.32)   -.05 (.02) *** 
Passive LMP expenditure  7.24 (5.41)   -.86 (2.65)   -.03 (.01) ** 
Public health expenditure  -.02 (1.63)   2.40 (.80) ***  .003 (.006)  
Public educational expenditure  1.94 (2.45)   -.73 (1.63)   -.03 (.006) *** 
          
 * indicates p<.10, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01. 
 
Table 3.6 shows the results from a serious of bi-variate regression 
analyses of poverty on variables that indicate welfare states‘ commitment to 
social welfare.  Close to none of these government interventions had 
significant impact of pre-transfer poverty—both the poverty rate and poverty 
gap.  Only in-kind benefit spending had a positive relationship with pre-
transfer poverty gap.  Greater the spending on in-kind benefits, the larger the 
poverty gap becomes.  Interpretations would need to be made with care as 
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this may suggest reducing in-kind provision of benefits due to its countering 
effects on reducing the depth of poverty.   
Moreover, the welfare state variables do little to impact poverty gap in 
general.  Other than the countering effect of public health expenditure on 
post-transfer poverty gap, there is literally no significant effect found.  As 
public health expenditure increases, post-transfer poverty gap also increases.  
Again, caution is warranted when interpreting this result.  This may be in 
part due to those who have left poverty due to higher spending on public 
health, which leaves those who are in deeper poverty for the post-transfer 
poverty gap to be calculated. 
Overall, these variables contributed significantly to post-transfer 
poverty rate, LIS poverty, and income inequality.  Both WSI and Scruggs‘s 
indexes of welfare state generosity significantly reduce the poverty rate and 
income inequality.  Notably, total social expenditure (including cash 
spending), total labor market policy expenditure (including active labor 
market policy expenditure), and public educational expenditure largely 
affected post-transfer poverty rate, LIS poverty, and income equality. 
 
3.4. Effects of Other Socio-Economic Variables on Poverty  
Consistent with the literature reviewed in the previous sections, 
Moller, Bradley, Huber, Nielsen, and Stephens (2003) have found that 
welfare state generosity, constitutional structure—i.e., number of veto 
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points—and the left political power in unions and in government explain the 
extent of income redistribution.  On the other hand, socio-economic factors—
i.e., de-industrialization and unemployment—significantly impact pre-
tax/transfer poverty rates of working-age populations in advanced capitalist 
democracies. 
Brady (2006) examined the extent to which manufacturing 
employment, agricultural employment, female labor force participation, the 
elderly population, and children in single mother families as structural 
variables affect headcount poverty.  While having less powerful influence 
than welfare state, structural variables were found to have greater effects 
than economic growth.  Backman (2009) also found that structural socio-
economic factors—i.e., female labor force participation and the proportion of 
families with children—explain temporal variations in poverty rates. 
 
Figure 3.5: Percentage of Female Working-Age Population and Poverty 
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After reviewing the correlation matrix of all socio-demographic 
variables generated from LIS working-age adults—i.e., age, gender, number 
of children in the household, number of earners in the household, percentage 
of workers, unemployment rate, and percentage of highly educated—only 
gender and number of earners were found to be significant.  Figure 3.5 
illustrates the positive relationships between the percentage of female 
working-age adults and post-transfer poverty rate (b=168.91, t=2.42, p=.028) 
and LIS poverty (b=2.09, t=3.14, p=.007).  
 
Figure 3.6: Number of Earners in Household and Poverty 
 
 
Figure 3.6 shows a negative relationship between the number of 
earners and both pre-transfer poverty rate (b=-23.44, t=-3.34, p=.006) and 
pre-transfer poverty gap (b=-43.50, t=-2.51, p=.029).  As the average number 
of earners in the household increase, the market income poverty (pre-transfer 
poverty) decreases.  Socio-economic variables in this data set may not have 
much influence on aggregate poverty because the variations at the individual 
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may yield more meaningful results.  Theoretically, they determine the extent 
to which an individual participates in the labor market activities. 
This chapter examined the aggregate country-level variables as they 
relate to various aspects of poverty at the aggregate level.  Globalization was 
not found to have a significant influence on poverty while left political power 
and pro-poor electoral representation had significant impact on post-transfer 
poverty rate, LIS poverty, and income inequality.  Variables that represented 
welfare state generosity, or often referred to as welfare states‘ social welfare 
commitment, were found to be very significant when it comes to affecting 
post-transfer poverty rate, LIS poverty, and income inequality.  The following 
chapter investigates the poverty at the individual level within the local 
context. 
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Chapter 4.  Local Perspective: Poverty in the U.S.   
Chapter (Sections 4.1-4.3) Published as:  
Hong, P.Y.P. and Pandey, S. 2008. ―Differential effects of human capital on 
the poor and the near poor: Evidence of social exclusion.‖  Journal of Poverty, 
12(4): 456–480. 
 
Centeno and Lopez-Alvez (2001, 7, 9) see grand theorizing efforts in 
comparative analysis offer little contextuality, contingency, and relationality 
by failing to specify the functions associated with the social phenomenon 
under study.  Case-specific theories give full analytic attention to small 
details that might contribute to explaining a certain phenomenon from one 
particular case.  What Centeno and Lopez-Alvez (2001) refer to as ―context‖ 
are history, culture/local practices, institutions, and so forth that make each 
case carry a unique explanation of the phenomenon at hand.   
This chapter examines the effects of individual human capital and 
demographic differences on poverty at the individual level among working-
age adults.  A nationally representative data from the United States is used 
to closely investigate these relationships.  This case-specific analysis provides 
the context of welfare state retrenchment—i.e., welfare reform—within which 
variations in individuals‘ access to education, training, and health determine 
the degree to which one experiences poverty. 
 
4.1. Human Capital, Social Exclusion, and Poverty in the U.S.  
  92 
According to the human capital theory, investment in human capital 
can raise the future returns in the labor market, even though it may entail 
opportunity costs in forgone short-term earnings (Becker 1964; 1993).  Many 
researchers have for decades linked human capital—in the form of education 
(Schultz 1961; Becker 1964; Zhan and Pandey 2002; 2004a), training (Mincer 
1962; Hamilton 2002), and health (Grossman 1972; Bartel and Taubman 
1979; Burkhauser, Butler, Mitchell, and Pincus 1986)—to labor productivity 
and economic wellbeing.  In essence, educated, skilled, and healthy 
individuals tend to enjoy higher occupational status and earnings, thus 
increase their chances of upward mobility.   
However, the quality of the U.S. workforce on average is falling behind 
relative to the labor market demands.  While labor supply would need to 
balance out the demand for skilled workers with good education, training, 
and health in order to ensure labor market stability, only about 28% of 
Americans 25 years and over had a bachelor‘s degree as of 2004 (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2005).  In a changing global economy with more jobs requiring post-
secondary education, there is a mismatch between the projected growth of 
these jobs and the growth in the number of skilled workers.  Jobs that 
require higher education are expected to account for 42% of total job growth 
by 2010 (Hecker 2002).  It is projected that the increase in the number of 
individuals with post-secondary education over the next 20 years will only be 
at 19% as opposed to a 138% rise between 1980 and 2000 (Ellwood 2003). 
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Given this economic environment, the low-income individuals and 
families particularly face greater social exclusion in terms of not being able to 
access quality education and training, and maintain good health (Silver 2006).  
Highlighting its structural roots, Estivill (2003, 19) defines social exclusion as 
―an accumulation of confluent processes with successive ruptures arising 
from the heart of the economy, politics and society, which gradually distances 
and places persons, groups, communities and territories in a position of 
inferiority in relation to centres of power, resources and prevailing values.‖  
In fact, low education, low skills, and poor health confluence are the most 
common forms of barriers to employment that former and current TANF 
recipients experience in the labor market (Goldberg 2002).   
First, pursuing higher education becomes a distant goal when met 
with the reality of nearly half of single mothers on welfare do not graduate 
from high school (Gueron and Hamilton 2002; Zedlewski and Anderson 2001).  
One major public policy paradox is that the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA; Public Law 104-193) and 
its reauthorization in the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA; Public Law 109-171) 
reduced poor women‘s access to college education and increased obligation to 
find employment. 
PRWORA shifted the federal policy emphasis toward ―Work First‖ 
approach, which limited opportunities for welfare recipients to pursue a 
college education (Cohen 1998).  As a result, three years after welfare reform, 
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there were fewer welfare recipients with college degrees (Peterson, Song, and 
Jones-DeWeever 2002).  Further jeopardizing the chances for acquiring post-
secondary education, DRA substantially increased the proportion of welfare 
recipients—i.e., 50% in a given state—who must participate in work activities 
for a specified number of hours each week (Greenberg 2006).   
These welfare-to-work policies mark the triumph of the Labor Force 
Attachment (LFA) approach or ―employment-focused‖ programs over the 
Human Capital Development (HCD) or ―education-focused‖ programs 
(Hamilton et al. 2001).  LFA include programs that emphasize short-term job 
search assistance to find employment quickly while HCD promote longer-
term skill-building activities, for the most part basic education (Gueron and 
Hamilton 2002).  Hamilton et al. (2001) found that LFA had greater effects 
on employment, earnings, and welfare receipt compared to HCD.  It is 
projected that higher costs, higher dropout rates, and longer completion time 
of HCD may have given way to the short-term success of LFA, comparatively 
speaking, since HCD cannot immediately produce measurable outcomes 
(Freedman, Michell, and Navarro 1999). 
Second, training programs for the poor have been found to be less than 
effective.  This is due in part to poor funding and administration, which are 
common characteristics of training packages for economically vulnerable 
groups (Grubb 1995).  A national Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) study 
suggested that classroom skills training did not increase the earnings of 
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welfare recipients (Orr et al. 1996).  Little evidence of success is found in 
training and short term educational programs for single mothers on public 
assistance (Hamilton 2002).  Training may have some effects on the increase 
in earnings but the gains tend to be less than enough to move people out of 
poverty (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; LaLonde 1995).   
Public sector-sponsored training in general suffers from strikingly 
modest investments compared to the level of skills deficiencies that the 
programs try to overcome (LaLonde 1995).  The number of workers who 
received training under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 
105-220) was 17% lower in 2003 compared to that in 1998, which was the 
final year of WIA‘s predecessor, JTPA (Frank and Minoff 2005).  The 
underfunded WIA is only able to provide services to a fraction of those who 
need training and employment services when skill shortages undermine U.S. 
companies (Baider 2008).   
Third, when it comes to health, the Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation (MDRC) found in a study of low-income women in four 
major cities that 34% among non-working welfare recipients suffered some 
physical conditions that limited work (Polit, London, and Martinez 2001).  
Similar health limitations were reported by 17% of a national sample of 
TANF recipients (Zedlewski and Anderson 2001).  Also, the latest 
government data available suggest that close to 47 million (or 15.8% of the 
population) were without health insurance in 2006 and the number rose by 
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2.2. million between 2005 and 2006 (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 
2007).  This is particularly significant for low-income jobseekers as reviews of 
empirical literature indicate significant relationships between health 
insurance and health (Levy and Meltzer 2001) and health and labor market 
outcomes (Currie and Madrian 1999). 
Despite what the human capital theory may have suggested over the 
years, the poor seem to be disconnected from how the theory should play out 
in the mainstream society.  Lack of human capital for the economically 
disadvantaged in this case may reflect their structurally vulnerable positions 
in society, resulting from being trapped in the lower segment of the 
bifurcated labor market (Rank 2004; Schneider 2005).  Lack of human capital 
as structurally vulnerable attributes for the poor could be evidence of social 
exclusion taking place in the American labor market.   
In this regard, this chapter explores the differential effects of human 
capital on the poor and other income categories.  It would be important to 
investigate the extent to which human capital is distributed 
disproportionately among the poor compared to other upper income 
categories.  Understanding how education, training, and health status affect 
the poor differently becomes crucial particularly when vulnerability in the 
labor market could increase with any one of these elements missing for the 
poor.  The following research question is asked: What is the role of human 
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capital in the form of education, training and health status in explaining 
different levels of poverty? 
 
4.2. Analyses of Human Capital and Poverty  
The data for this analysis come from the Core and Topical Module files 
of the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  
The 1996 panel, consisting of 12 waves or 48 months, starts in April 1996 and 
ends in March 2000.  The 1996 panel also includes an oversample of the low 
income population in order to support the primary goal of the SIPP, which is 
to produce longitudinal estimates of income and program participation, 
paying most attention to improving the information for people who are 
economically at risk, and improving the capability to respond to current 
policy needs in topical areas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001).  The SIPP is a 
nationally representative, multi-panel, and longitudinal survey of about 
9,000 housing units per month (36,700 in the entire 1996 panel) conducted by 
U.S. Bureau of the Census.  Data from Wave 8 (August - November 1998) of 
the 1996 panel is used for the analyses, which comprises 46,562 working-age 
individuals between ages 18 and 65.  This particular wave was selected 
because data on job training and health conditions were available in the 
Topical Module 8 questions. 
 
4.2.1. Variables  
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Two dependent variables were used to measure the poverty status of 
working-age adult individuals in this analysis.  First, a dichotomous poverty 
status variable indicates whether one‘s total household income in dollar 
amount was above the official poverty line in August 1998.  A value of 1 was 
assigned for individuals who were identified as non-poor, having total 
household income greater than or equal to the poverty threshold, and 0 for 
those who were poor.   
Second, a mutually exclusive multi-category poverty status variable 
was created in order to further examine the extent to which educational 
achievement and other accompanying human capital variables differentially 
affect various levels of income groups beyond the poverty line.   
Individuals whose total household income fell below the federal 
poverty level (FPL) were coded as 0 once again.  The non-poor group was 
divided into three groups following the groupings used by Newacheck, Hung, 
Park, Brindis, and Irwin (2003).  The first group (coded 1) included the near-
poor individuals who lived in households with income greater than or equal 
to 100% and less than 200% of the poverty line [also similarly used by Kasper, 
Giovannini, and Hoffman (2000)].  The moderate income group (coded 2) 
comprised individuals at 200-299% FPL, and the middle/high income group 
(coded 3) had household income at greater than or equal to 300% FPL.  
Three-hundred % FPL is close to the median household income for many as 
nearly half (52.8%) of all Americans live within this threshold (U.S. Census 
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Bureau 2006).  Hereon forth, these categories are referred to by their 
assigned numbers as indicated above, i.e., below 100% FPL will be referred to 
as Category 0. 
Control variables include demographic and employment-related factors 
that have been found in previous research to have significant effects on 
economic outcomes.  The demographic control variables are respondent‘s age, 
race, gender, marital status, and number of children under 18 living in the 
household.  Respondent‘s age and number of children under 18 living in the 
household are continuous variables, while the remaining ones are categorical.  
Race (non-White=1, White=0) and gender (female=1, male=0) are included as 
factors associated with being poor.  Since only little over 2% of the sample 
was widowed, the variable marital status was collapsed into three categories: 
never married, married, and previously married (divorced, separated, and 
widowed) and was dummy coded with never married being the reference 
category. 
Two employment-related variables were included in this analysis: 
Employment status of the respondent (working=1, not working=0) and the 
presence of additional household earner(s).  Additional adult earners may 
include non-spouse adults living in the same household.  While the lack of 
additional earners complicates the economic situation of the poor, other 
adults with zero or low earnings would be less than helpful.  Inclusion of 
additional earners in the household is important especially considering that 
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heterosexual couple families are on decline and other forms of living 
arrangements including—single parent, cohabiting, gay and lesbian couples 
are on the rise.  Additional earners would need to provide about $2,000 - 
$3,700 each in earnings in order to offset the increase in family needs 
required by an additional person (Lerman 2002). 
In the current sample, there were 27,338 (35.7%) that were married.  
Of these married individuals, 26,881 were living with the spouse and 457 
were not living with the spouse.  Among those 26,881 individuals who were 
living with the spouse, 5,723 (21.29%) had no extra earner in the house other 
than the income of the respondent.  And 15,850 (58.9%) had one extra earner 
in the house earning more than $2,000 annual income, who happened to be 
the spouse of the respondent.  Interestingly, about 20% of those who were 
living with the spouse had earners other than the spouse who were 
contributing to the household income.  Also, of the total unmarried sample, 
about 60% had other adults earning more than $2,000 annual income.  A 
dummy variable was created to capture the effect of additional earners.  
Households with additional earners other than the respondent and the 
spouse of the respondent that earned more than $2,000 annual income 
received a score of 1 and the household with no additional earner served as 
the reference group. 
The independent variables of interest are a group of human capital 
variables—educational attainment, job training, and work-preventing health 
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conditions.  Supported by previous research that suggested postsecondary 
education is a strong predictor of economic well-being (Zhan and Pandey 
2004a; 2004b), a four-category education variable was created: Less than 
high school degree, high school degree / GED, some college, and college 
degree and above.  Then, these categories were dummy coded with less than 
high school degree being the reference group.  Job training is a dichotomous 
independent variable that captures whether a respondent received any job 
training between August 1988 and August 1998 (job training=1, no job 
training=0).  Health is a dichotomous independent variable that captures 
whether a respondent had work-preventing health conditions at the time of 
interview (in August 1998).  A value 1 was assigned for individuals who 
reported having health problems and 0 for those who did not. 
 
4.2.2. Analysis and Findings 
Three types of statistical analyses were conducted.  First, a descriptive 
analysis provided the demographic and poverty characteristics of the sample.  
Second, poverty status was regressed on control variables and human capital 
variables.  A binomial logistic regression analysis examined the extent to 
which human capital variables, together as a block and individually, may 
influence poverty status.  In order to observe the former, the log-likelihood 
ratio (LR) test was conducted to assess whether there was a statistically 
significant increase in the log-likelihood when the human capital variables 
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together as a block were added to the control variables.  Finally, a 
multinomial logistic regression analysis was used in which a multi-category 
poverty status variable was regressed on control variables and human capital 
variables.   
This method is particularly helpful when examining how multiple 
categories in the dependent variable are affected differently in comparison to 
a particular reference category.  The ordinal character of the multi-level 
poverty status variable might suggest using an ordered logistic regression, 
but the failure to meet the parallel regression assumption justified the use of 
multinomial logistic regression (Allison 1999).  Comparisons were first made 
using Category 0 as the comparison group with respect to all other categories.  
Next, Category 1 was used as the base category in comparison with 
Categories 2 and 3, followed by Category 2 being the base category in 
comparison with Category 3.  The following two hypotheses were tested: 
(1) Human capital has a significant effect on poverty in the 
binomial model, and  
(2) Human capital has a differential effects on the poor and other 
upper income categories in the multinomial model. 
A weighted descriptive summary of demographic and poverty 
characteristics is provided in Table 3.1.  Individuals with household incomes 
above 100% of the FPL are considered non-poor (90%), whereas those with 
incomes below this threshold are considered poor (10%).  The non-poor are 
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divided into three groups: Category 1 (16%), Category 2 (18%), and Category 
3 (56%).  On average, the non-poor were older than the poor and had fewer 
children under 18 living with them in the household.  The poor were less 
likely to be White, more likely to be female, and less likely to be married 
compared to the non-poor.  The non-poor had a much higher percentage of 
individuals who were living with an additional earner with more than $2,000 
annual income.  Also, respondents in the non-poor category were more likely 
to be working than the poor.  Among the non-poor categories, Category 3 was 
most likely to be White, most likely to be married, most likely to have 
additional household earners, and most likely to be working.  Also, this 
category of households had the least number of children under 18. 
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Table 4.1:  Weighted Demographic and Poverty Characteristics of the Sample (N=46,562) 
 
Variables Full Sample (%) 
 
Poor (n=4,815) 
 Non-poor (n=41,747)  
  All non-poor Relative poverty status 
  
 
(0) 
100-199%  
(1) 
200-299%  
(2) 
≥ 300%  
(3) 
         
Dependent variables   10.17  89.83 15.88 17.82 56.13 
         
Control variables         
         
Age (years) 
a
 39.29   37.76  39.46 37.82 38.42 40.26 
Race         
White 82.94  69.46  84.47 77.77 81.62 87.27 
African American 12.31  24.06  10.98 16.98 13.62 8.45 
Other 4.74  6.49  4.55 5.26 4.75 4.28 
Female 50.75  58.25  49.90 52.69 51.23 48.69 
Marital status         
Never married 27.21  36.71  26.14 29.63 26.74 24.96 
Married 57.70  38.44  59.88 51.64 56.99 63.13 
Divorced or separated 12.99  20.92  12.10 15.72 13.79 10.53 
Widowed 2.09  3.92  1.88 3.00 2.48 1.38 
Number of children under 18 
a
 .79   1.12  .75 1.10 1.14 .59 
Additional household earner(s) 35.77  20.90  37.45 25.13 34.99 40.66 
Working 78.82  47.38  82.37 67.51 78.86 87.70 
         
Human capital variables         
         
Educational attainment         
Less than high school 14.26  32.89  12.15 26.80 16.19 6.73 
High school degree / GED 32.26  33.55  32.11 37.75 38.13 28.61 
Some college (vocational, associates) 30.74  23.18  31.59 26.45 31.83 32.98 
4-year college or above 22.74  10.38  24.14 9.00 13.85 31.69 
Job training 38.61  23.28  40.35 25.49 33.48 46.73 
Health conditions that prevent working 15.96  35.24  13.78 26.29 17.54 9.05 
         
Note: 
a
 Mean scores are reported for continuous variables. 
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Compared with the non-poor individuals, a higher proportion of the 
poor had received less than high school education.  On the other hand, the 
non-poor were twice as likely to have had at least a 4-year college degree.  
The non-poor also had a higher percentage of individuals who had received 
some type of job training in the past 10 years.  The poor were more likely 
than the non-poor to have some health conditions that prevented them from 
working.  Particularly, when compared to other non-poor groups, Category 3 
were most likely to have received a 4-year college degree or more, most likely 
to have received some type of job training, and least likely to report having 
any work-preventing health conditions. 
 
4.2.3. Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis  
A binomial logistic regression model explaining poverty status was 
examined to assess factors related to the probability of living above FPL (see 
Table 3.2).  The log likelihood ratio (log likelihood=12,077.58) compares the 
likelihood function for the model to the likelihood function if all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0.  There was a good fit between the model and the 
data (2(13)=6,809.74, p<.001), which indicated that the independent 
variables were better predictors of the dependent variable to have the value 
of 1 (non-poor) than a model without them.   
By using the LR test, a nested logistic regression model that only 
included the control variables was compared with the unconstrained model 
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that added a block of human capital variables to the control variables.  The 
LR test result suggested that adding these four human capital variables to 
the control variables significantly increased the log likelihood value compared 
to the model without them (2(5)=899.50, p<.001).  This reconfirmed that the 
human capital variables make up an important perspective in terms of 
explaining the likelihood of an individual living above FPL. 
As hypothesized, all three human capital variables strongly affected 
poverty status.  Educational attainment at all levels significantly increased 
the chance of being non-poor.  The adjusted odds of living above FPL for 
individuals with a high school degree / GED were 1.76 times the odds for 
those without a high school degree.  In other words, the odds of living above 
FPL for those with a high school degree are 76% higher than the odds for 
those without a high school degree, holding control variables constant.  The 
odds of living above FPL for individuals with some college education were 
2.25 times the odds for those with less than high school education.  Having at 
least a 4-year college degree was most influential in keeping people out of 
poverty. The odds of these individuals living above FPL were 2.96 times the 
odds for those with less than high school education.   
Job training also kept people out of poverty.  The adjusted odds of 
living above FPL for those with some previous job training were 1.46 times 
the odds for those without any job training.   
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This chapter also showed that health conditions matter in explaining 
poverty status.  The odds of living in poverty for those with health conditions 
that prevented them from working were 41% higher than for those who were 
healthy and lacked any work preventing health conditions. 
Looking at the control variables, older individuals and those who had 
fewer children living in the household were more likely to be living above 
FPL when all other variables were kept constant.  The adjusted odds of non-
White individuals living in poverty were 37% higher than the odds for White 
individuals.  Being female was associated with 8% higher odds of living in 
poverty.  Compared to never-married individuals, those who were married 
were more likely to be non-poor while previously married ones were less 
likely to be living above FPL.  Having another household earner(s) with more 
than $2,000 annual income increases the odds for living above FPL 5.14 
times holding all other independent variables constant.  Being employed is 
also associated with 3.81 times the odds of being non-poor compared to not 
being employed. 
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Table 4.2:  Logistic Regression Model Explaining Poverty Status (N=46,562) 
 
Independent variables 
 Non-poor
 a
 
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. Odds ratio 
     
Control variables     
     
Age  .02 (.002) *** 1.02 
Non-White  -.46 (.04) *** .63 
Female  -.08 (.04) * .92 
(Never married)     
Married  1.25 (.05) *** 3.50 
Previously married  -.20 (.06) *** .82 
Number of children  -.33 (.02) *** .72 
Additional household earner(s)  1.64 (.05) *** 5.14 
Working  1.34 (.04) *** 3.81 
     
Human capital variables     
     
(Less than high school)     
High school degree / GED  .57 (.04) *** 1.76 
Some college (vocational, associates)  .81 (.05) *** 2.25 
4-year college or above  1.09 (.06) *** 2.96 
Job training  .38 (.04) *** 1.46 
Health conditions that prevent working  -.53 (.04) *** .59 
     

2
(13)  6809.74 *** – 
Log likelihood  12077.58 – – 
     
     
LR test for human capital variables: 

2
(5) 
 899.50 *** 
– 
     
 * indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
a
 Dependent variable (poverty status) = (0) Less than 100% poverty, (1) 100% poverty and above. 
 
 
 
4.2.4. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis  
To make a closer examination of how multiple categories of poverty 
status with reference to one another are affected by the independent 
variables, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted (see Table 
3.3.).  The dependent variable in this case was the multi-level poverty status 
with four categories.  This variable was regressed on the human capital 
variables and the demographic and employment-related control variables.  
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The analysis demonstrated a good fit between the model and the data 
(2(39)=16,743.81, p<.001), which suggested that these independent variables 
were better predictors of the dependent variable than a model without them. 
First, when Category 0 (individuals with incomes less than 100% FPL) 
was compared with three other income groups, with one exception, the 
likelihood of being in higher income groups improved as the education level 
increased.  The odds of having incomes above 300% FPL versus those below 
FPL for individuals with at least a 4-year college degree were 8.43 times the 
odds for their counterparts without a high school degree (see Table 4.3).  
Although less pronounced than Category 3, having a 4-year college degree 
had a significant effect on the likelihood of being in Category 2 compared to 
Category 0. 
The notable exception was that having a 4-year college degree or more 
did not show any difference in the likelihood of being in the near-poor income 
level in Category 1 compared to Category 0.  On the other hand, having a 
high school degree / GED and some college education significantly increased 
the chance of being in all levels of income groups versus Category 0.  This 
confirms the hypothesis that there is a differential effect of higher education 
on the poor and other higher income categories. 
Also, having received job training significantly contributed to the 
increased likelihood of being in a higher income category with the exception 
of one category.  Once again to support the hypothesis of differential effects of 
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human capital on the poor, having received job training did not significantly 
affect the likelihood of being in Category 1 versus Category 0.  In comparison 
with other higher income categories, job training was consistently a strong 
predictor.  For instance, the odds of having an income above 300% FPL 
versus being in Category 0 for those with job training were 90% higher than 
the odds for those without any job training. 
As expected, health conditions that prevented work had negative effect 
on income. Consistently in comparison with all higher income categories, 
individuals with work-preventing health conditions earned less.  For instance, 
the predicted odds of individuals with work-preventing health conditions to 
have incomes above 300% poverty were 64% lower than those without such 
conditions compared to the base group (that is, below 100% FPL). 
Second, the non-poor categories were compared with each other.  
Human capital variables consistently played critical roles in explaining the 
odds of being in higher income categories.  Among non-poor individuals, the 
odds of belonging to a higher income group increased with education (see 
Table 4.3).  For example, when comparing between Categories 1 and 3, 
individuals with a 4-year college had 9.56 times the odds of having incomes 
above 300% FPL compared to the odds for those without a high school degree.  
The odds ratio was remarkably high even when the comparison was between 
Categories 2 and 3.  The odds of having incomes above 300% FPL were 4.54 
times for those with at least a 4-year college compared to individuals without 
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a high school degree. Similarly, job training improved the odds of earning 
incomes above 300% FPL by 43% and work preventing health conditions 
reduced the odds of earning incomes above 300% FPL by 43%. 
Some observations stand out in the findings with regard to the control 
variables.  What seemed more important in terms of the magnitude of effects 
was the presence of additional earner(s) in the household.  This factor, as 
opposed to not having additional adults with earnings over $2,000 per year, 
had the largest odds ratio (OR=8.77) among all variables affecting the odds of 
being in higher income categories in comparison to Category 0.  Another 
control variable of importance was employment status, which greatly 
contributed to the increased likelihood of being in a particular category in 
comparison to the reference category. Finally, in every comparison, 
previously married mothers consistently fared worse than never married 
mothers in terms of their income. 
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Table 4.3:  Multinomial Logistic Regression Model Explaining Multi-Category Poverty Status (N=46,562) 
 
* p<.05, ** p<.01,  *** p<.001. 
Dependent variable is a multi-category poverty status as follows: (0) less than 100% poverty, (1) 100% poverty to less than than 200% poverty,  
(2) 200% poverty to less than 300% poverty, and (3) 300% poverty and above. 
 
 
Independent variables 
Poverty status 
(0) vs. (1)  (0) vs. (2)  (0) vs. (3)  (1) vs. (2)  (1) vs. (3)  (2) vs. (3) 
βˆ  
 
Odds 
ratio 
 βˆ  
 
Odds 
ratio 
 βˆ  
 
Odds 
ratio 
 βˆ  
 
Odds 
ratio 
 βˆ  
 
Odds 
ratio 
 βˆ  
 
Odds 
ratio 
 
                       
Control variables                        
                        
Age .01 *** 1.01  .02 *** 1.02  .03 *** 1.03  .01 *** 1.01  .02 *** 1.02  .01 *** 1.01 
Non-White -.22 *** .80  -.41 *** .66  -.74 *** .48  -.18 *** .83  -.52 *** .60  -.33 *** .72 
Female -.05  .95  -.06  .94  -.11 ** .89  -.01  .99  -.06 * .94  -.05 * .95 
(Never married)                        
Married .87 *** 2.38  1.29 *** 3.65  1.70 *** 5.48  .43 *** 1.54  .84 *** 2.31  .41  1.50 
Previously married -.01  .99  -.07  .93  -.40 *** .67  -.06  .94  -.39 *** .68  -.33 *** .72 
Number of children -.10 *** .90  -.27 *** .76  -.64 *** .52  -.17 *** .84  -.54 *** .58  -.37 *** .69 
Additional household earner(s) 1.07 *** 2.93  1.62 *** 5.06  2.17 *** 8.77  .55 *** 1.73  1.10 *** 2.99  .55 *** 1.73 
Working .86 *** 2.37  1.32 *** 3.73  1.78 *** 5.92  .45 *** 1.58  .92 *** 2.50  .46 *** 1.59 
                        
Human capital variables                        
                        
(Less than high school)                        
High school degree / GED .22 *** 1.24  .64 *** 1.89  1.10 *** 2.99  .42 *** 1.52  .88 *** 2.41  .46 *** 1.58 
Some college (vocational, associates) .22 *** 1.24  .80 *** 2.23  1.58 *** 4.85  .58 *** 1.79  1.36 *** 3.90  .78 *** 2.18 
4-year college or above -.13  .88  .62 *** 1.86  2.13 *** 8.43  .75 *** 2.11  2.26 *** 9.56  1.51 *** 4.54 
Job training .04  1.04  .28 *** 1.33  .64 *** 1.90  .25 *** 1.28  .61 *** 1.83  .36 *** 1.43 
Health conditions that prevent working -.13 ** .88  -.47 *** .63  -1.02 *** .36  -.34 *** .71  -.90 *** .41  -.56 *** .57 
                        
  

2
(39) 16743.81*** 
Log likelihood 45981.32 
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4.3. Differential Effects of Human Capital on the Poor  
There are two important findings from these analyses—(1) the 
differential effects of human capital on the poor as compared to the non-poor; 
and (2) the effects of demographic and employment-related variables on 
poverty status.  First, this chapter clearly shows that human capital 
variables in general are associated with greater chances of being in upper 
income categories.  Education consistently increases the chance of being in 
higher income groups even after controlling for demographic characteristics, 
work status, and health status.  With regard to both high school / GED and 
some college level education, an individual‘s likelihood of being in upper non-
poor groups consistently increase.  However, results are mixed when 
examining individuals with more than a 4-year college degree.  There exists a 
differential effect of higher education on the poor and the near-poor.  Having 
a 4-year college degree or more would make little difference for the poor to 
get out of poverty into Category 1, but would help the near-poor to move into 
Category 2 and beyond.   
This is indicative of social exclusion from the opportunity structure 
where lack of higher education represent not the failure to invest in 
individual development but the structural vulnerability for those that are in 
poverty and those that are at the margin of being poor.  Investing in higher 
education for the poor may be too simplistic an answer when the segmented 
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labor market structure in America is characterized by the growing wage 
differentials between the skilled and unskilled workers (Jensen and Slack 
2003; Shulman 2003).   
As mentioned earlier, of major concern is that the number of low-
skilled jobs has been declining in the United States and that the majority of 
jobs will require a postsecondary education (Dohm and Shniper 2007; Gittell 
Gross and Holdaway 1993).  Over the years, the United States has fallen 
behind many other industrialized nations in terms of college participation 
and graduation rate among young adults.  According to a report by the 
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education (2006), the United 
States ranked 16th among 27 countries compared in terms of college 
completion and the college enrollment rate has remained flat especially since 
the 1990s while enrollment rate in other countries have been rising rapidly.   
As the low-skilled jobs decline, workers with little education have 
lower chances of entering the labor market and earning sufficiently to 
support a family.  Also, majority of students from low-income background rely 
on financial aid and loans to support their cost of college education (Choy and 
Berker 2003), but the interest rates on educational loans have been rising 
over the years and Pell grants have not kept up with inflation.  As a result, 
higher education has become increasingly unaffordable to students in the 
lower rungs of the economic ladder.  Of those that choose to attend college, 
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many are left with large debt burdens with or without a college degree (Baum 
and O‘Malley 2002).   
As long as education is used as a screening device to exercise labor 
market discrimination (Taubman and Wales 1973), forcing the path of 
upward mobility that may be most suitable to the near-poor and upper 
income groups would invite even more exclusion of those that are already 
excluded.  Targeting educational strategies tailored specifically for the lower 
income workforce would be desirable.  With a strong commitment to basic 
education for all—i.e., focusing on high school completion and vocational / 
associates degree—and tackling the structural vulnerability at the core—i.e., 
linking with local community-based enterprise development efforts in 
partnership with other community resources—would help build ‗employment 
hope‘ for the socially excluded. 
This chapter also shows that job training programs benefit non-poor 
individuals but not the poor individuals.  This is consistent with the earlier 
discussion of Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) and LaLonde (1995) that 
job training does not sufficiently increase the earnings to move people out of 
poverty.  Job training programs are generally poorly funded and 
administered, particularly those that train the very poor (Grubb 1995).  The 
quality of these programs is mediocre at best.  For instance, short-term job 
training programs offered to welfare recipients are criticized as placing 
overemphasis on quick results and being not rigorous in nature and therefore, 
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do not result in upward economic mobility.  On the other hand, employer 
initiated trainings are much more rigorous and not only result in real skill 
development, but also may result in promotion and salary raise.  While 87% 
of municipalities find that job training is an effective strategy to assist low-
income working families, more than 80% of manufacturers reported lack of 
applicants with required education and skills (Katz, Hoene, and Nicole de 
Kervor 2004). 
Despite WIA‘s original intent to encourage collaboration between 
workforce and adult education services, fewer low-skilled adults are being 
trained under it Title I and Title II programs (National Commission on Adult 
Literacy [NCAL] 2008).  The number of people who received training under 
WIA was only 206,000 in 2002 and President Bush‘s proposal to double this 
number has stood against the congressional proposal to cap or reduce WIA 
funding (Patel, 2005).  This is detrimental particularly to the low-income 
participants whose decline in training under WIA is most pronounced (Frank 
and Minoff 2005).  From 1998 to 2007, low-income adults exiting the WIA 
training program declined nearly half from 96% to 53.7% (NCAL 2008).  
Therefore, investing in quality training and increasing resources for the most 
disadvantaged rather than the more employable ones will make the 
beneficiaries more competitive as job seekers. 
Finally, work preventing health conditions negatively affect the odds of 
being in upper income groups.  This result is just as paramount when it 
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comes to implication.  The pervasiveness of health at all income categories 
highlights its importance.  One might plainly take this as an individual 
investment issue and call for a healthy lifestyle to increase labor market 
performance.  Nonetheless, even with the expansion of the State Children‘s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the 1990s, the number of uninsured 
has increased by 9 million people between 2000 and 2006 (DeNavas-Walt, 
Proctor, and Smith 2007).  And over 8 out of 10 uninsured people are in 
working families, and 70% of them are from families with one or more full-
time workers (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006).  At the structural level, it 
would be vital to strengthen the employment-based health coverage and 
access to health care services to maintain good health status for individuals 
(Kasper, Giovannini, and Hoffman 2000).   
Among the findings related to control variables, race and gender need 
to receive special attention as they relate to social exclusion.  Being non-
White was found to affect income categories at all levels.  While some might 
argue that earnings disparities between the Whites and Blacks is due to the 
skills that they bring to the labor market and not necessary due to 
discrimination (Heckman 1998), Coleman (2003) found that a clear pattern of 
racial discrimination that exists in the American labor market, evidenced by 
the Black-White wage differences despite having the same set of skills.  
Historical disparities in educational attainment have existed between the 
Whites and Blacks, and employers continue to avoid hiring inner-city 
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minority men even with recent increase in their educational levels (Holzer 
1996; Kantor 1999; Braddock and McPartland 1987).  It is imperative that 
anti-discriminatory and inclusive labor market practices be enforced 
concerning racial minorities. 
Keeping all other demographic factors, human capital variables and 
employment factors constant, the gender effect become more distinct in the 
higher income level.  For women, the probability of earning above 300% FPL 
versus below FPL is 11% lower than for men (see Table 4.3).  Other studies 
also suggest that men and women enjoy differential earnings (Zhan and 
Pandey 2004a).  Women are certainly at a disadvantage probably due to 
discrimination in the labor market, especially in the upper income level.  
Equal opportunity to jobs in the higher income categories will further ensure 
upward economic mobility for women at the same rate as that for male 
counterpart.   
Next, household earner structure was consistently significant in both 
the binomial and multinomial models, controlling for marriage and other 
variables.  This may point to the possibility that, as far as household poverty 
is concerned, living arrangements or household structures with extra 
earner(s) would be a critical factor rather than considering the mere fact that 
a person is married or not married.  One could speculate that the current 
American economy may require not just the spouse as an additional earner 
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but also other household earners to contribute to household income for 
financial sustainability. 
This chapter found differential effects of higher education and training 
on the poor and the near-poor.  Human capital in the form of higher 
education and training operates not so much as investment for the poor but 
as structurally vulnerable attributes in the market place (Rank 2004).  
Therefore, promoting upward economic mobility based on investment in 
higher education and training may seem less applicable to the poor than the 
near-poor.  However, for the non-poor, the prospects for upward mobility 
improve with every additional level of education. Those with at least a 4-
years college degree enjoy the highest upward economic mobility prospects.  
Training and having work-preventing health status consistently affect the 
chances of being in upper income categories. 
The three aspects of human capital become all the more important in a 
growingly global market place that challenges the traditional theory of 
human capital.  Reich‘s (1991) warning about the new 21st century U.S. 
economy is well warranted.  Enterprises are no longer rooted in nation-states 
and therefore they lose the community connection by relocating cross-
nationally wherever quality workforce is available.  Public investment in 
human capital declines as a result.  This further exacerbates the reward gap 
between the highly educated ‗symbolic analysts‘ and the unskilled workers.  
Symbolic analysts, according to Reich (1991), are the most advantaged and 
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marketable few who can cultivate lifelong learning in the new global labor 
market.   
It is difficult to conceive any element out of education, training, or 
health to be missing for lifelong learning to take place in a highly competitive 
labor market.  Comprehensive programs that ensure basic and post-
secondary education, relevant quality training, and health protection would 
need to be the full package for a long-term human capital development.  
Facilitating this type of workforce development would take combining 
development of social capital, cultural capital, work experience, and training 
(Schneider 2005).   
At the same time, these efforts would have to be accompanied by 
economic reforms that focus not just on the ‗employability‘ of individuals but 
rather on the development of ‗inclusive labor market‘ that enhances 
employment hope for low-income individuals (Hong, Sheriff, and Naeger 
2009).  This approach would provide a meaningful matching of 
comprehensive human capital development and better job opportunities in 
order to combat social exclusion (Estivill 2003; Silver 2006) that exists in the 
form of underemployment (Livingstone 1997a; 1997b; 1997c) and structural 
vulnerability in the labor market (Rank, 2004). 
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Chapter 5.  Glocal Perspective: Poverty among Welfare 
States  
5.1. Structural Vulnerability Thesis  
This chapter combines the analyses of the structural and individual 
level variables as they relate to poverty status and poverty gap.  This is 
examined using the multilevel analyses called GEE and HLM.  The GEE is 
used for the dichotomous dependent variable poverty status and HLM for the 
continuous poverty gap.  In a series analyses, the effects of socio-politico-
economic structural variables are sequentially examined along with 
individual and household characteristics.  The analyses contribute to 
empirically validating Rank‘s (2004) structural vulnerability thesis in the 
global cross-national context. 
Poverty in America according to Rank, Yoon, and Hirschl (2003) is a 
result of structural failings at the economic, political, and social levels to 
which many poor are vulnerable.  These structural conditions are lack of job 
opportunities, less generous social safety net, and the high risk of 
experiencing poverty in adult lifetime.  Rank (1994; 2000; 2001; 2005) argues 
that individual poverty is determined by the structural vulnerability of 
individuals.  In other words, human capital and labor market attributes are 
structurally conditioned by their vulnerable positions in the economic system 
in the first place which keep the poor in disadvantaged positions in the labor 
market. 
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5.2. Multilevel Analysis of Poverty Status  
5.2.1. Data and Sample 
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data is used to conduct a cross-
national comparative analysis of 17 affluent democracies.  LIS is a cross-
national data archive located in Luxembourg.  The number of member 
countries continues to grow and the database now covers more than 30 
countries with datasets that span up to three decades.  LIS constructs 
harmonized databases that can be considered as the best source for 
international comparative studies. 
In order to examine the variations in advanced welfare states, 18 
countries were originally selected from LIS Wave 5 (around year 2000): 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, and USA.  Wave 5 data for Denmark did not run with the 
rest of the 17 countries and therefore had to be omitted.  Focusing on labor 
market active age group (between 18 and 65 years of age) of 17 remaining 
countries, merging of the data for these countries yielded 120,838 working-
age individuals in the sample.   
 
5.2.2. Variables 
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Dependent variable is poverty defined as 1 if individuals reside in a 
household with less than 50% of the median household income in 2000.  
Poverty gap is the second dependent variable which captures the distance of 
the poor individual‘s household income to the poverty threshold.   This 
measure is denoted as GR [in Chapter 3] which by dividing the gap G by the 
poverty threshold z, due to the difference in the national currency.  Individual level 
independent variables include age, gender, marital status, educational level, 
labor force status, number of children under 18, and number of earners in the 
household.  While some countries had information on ethnicity, immigrant 
status, and occupational training, there were too many missing values to 
include these variables. 
Level of education represents the human capital perspective.  Based on 
the LIS standardization, low education is dummy coded with middle to high 
education categorized together as the reference group.  Demographic and 
employment-related factors found in previous research to have significant 
effects on economic outcomes are included.  Respondent‘s age, gender 
(female=1, male=0), marital status (dummy coded married=1 and divorced, 
separated, and widowed with never married as the reference category=0), and 
number of children under 18 living in the household.  Two employment-
related variables were included in this study: Employment status of the 
respondent (working=1, not working=0) and the number of household 
earner(s).   
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The country level data set was created by using the OECD data 
archive for 2000 and key measures in recent publications.  These variables 
include: (1) globalization; (2) politics [representation of the poor; cumulative 
left party power; and union density]; (3) social welfare commitment [welfare 
generosity; active labor market policies; and public educational expenditure]; 
and (4) economic [unemployment rate]. The globalization variable for 2000 
was taken from KOF Index of Globalization which is a composite index of 
economic, political and social globalization (Dreher 2006; Dreher, Gaston and 
Martens 2008).   
The political variables include Jusko‘s (2008) low-income seat and 
Brady et al.‘s (2009a) left political party influence and and union density.  
The social welfare commitment variables include: Brady et al.‘s (2009a) 
welfare state index and OECD‘s active labor market policy spending as a 
percentage of GDP and public educational expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP.  The domestic economic variable includes the unemployment rate from 
OECD. 
 
5.2.3. Hypotheses and Analysis 
This chapter closely examines the following hypotheses in relation to 
the globalization research question (Q1).  Controlling for other independent 
variables and demographic characteristics, 
Q1-H(a). Individuals who reside in countries with lower degree of 
globalization are less likely to be poor. 
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Hypotheses related to the political research question (Q2) are: 
controlling for other independent variables and demographic characteristics, 
Q2-H(a) Individuals who reside in countries with stronger 
representation of the poor will be less likely to be poor. 
 
Q2-H(b) Individuals who reside in countries with stronger Left party 
influence will be less likely to be poor. 
 
Q2-H(c) Individuals who reside in countries with higher union density 
will be less likely to be poor. 
 
Hypotheses related to the economic research question (Q3) are: 
controlling for other independent variables and demographic characteristics, 
Q3-H(a). Individuals who reside in countries with lower 
unemployment rate are less likely to be poor. 
 
Hypotheses related to the welfare states‘ commitment to social welfare 
question (Q4) are: controlling for other independent variables and 
demographic characteristics, 
Q4-H(a). Individuals who reside in countries with higher WSI are less 
likely to be poor. 
 
Q4-H(b). Individuals who reside in countries with greater investment 
in active labor market policies are less likely to be poor. 
 
Q4-H(c). Individuals who reside in countries with higher educational 
spending are less likely to be poor. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, a multilevel analysis is conducted.  
Due to the clustering of individuals within countries and regions, a 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) model with a logit link is used to test 
these hypotheses (Brady et al. 2008).  While this is a comparable approach to 
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a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) technique, the actual HLM software 
could not be used due to the LIS‘s micro data management policy which does 
not allow researchers to have direct access to the raw data.  Analyses are 
conducted using an online job submission portal called LISSY by which 
individuals can submit programs in SAS, Stata, SPSS, or R. 
 
5.2.4. Results 
Table 5.1 illustrates the base model (Model 1) without the country-
level variables.  When explaining relative poverty, some common individual-
level demographic variables did not display strong significant relationships 
with poverty.  Number of children under 18 living in the household and the 
number of household earners contributed significantly to the odds of being in 
poverty.  Also, employment status significantly reduced the chance of being in 
poverty.  Interestingly, low education was associated with lower probability 
of being poor.  
Table 5.1:  Poverty on Country Variations and Individual Variables 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
     
       
Intercept  -1.248 (.05)   -.32 (.05) *** 
       
Country-level variables       
Country (Reference=US 2000)       
Finland 2000 (108)     -1.21 (.06) *** 
Germany 2000 (121)     -1.24 (.06) *** 
Sweden 2000 (122)     -1.25 (.05) *** 
Italy 2000 (123)     -.91 (.05) *** 
Norway 2000 (124)     -.98 (.05) *** 
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Netherlands 1999 (125)     -1.76 (.09) *** 
Luxembourg 2000 (127)     -1.63 (.13) *** 
Ireland 2000 (137)     -.15 (.08)  
Austria 2000 (139)     -1.19 (.10) *** 
Belgium 2000 (140)      -1.39 (.11) *** 
Spain 2000 (142)     -.29 (.06) *** 
Switzerland 2000 (145)     -3.87 (.09) *** 
France 2000 (169)     -1.34 (.05) *** 
       
Individual-level variables       
Age  .0003 (.001)   .0007 (.001)  
Female  .03 (.02)   .02 (.02)  
Married  .0001 (.02)   .02 (.03)  
Number of children  .29 (.01) ***  .39 (.01) *** 
Working   -.08 (.03) **  -.03 (.03)  
Number of earners  -.85 (.02) ***  -1.29 (.02) *** 
Low education  -.07 (.03) *  -.006 (.03)  
       
       
BIC  55441.80   50697.56  
      
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
 
Model 2 enters the first order country-level variation in order to 
examine the cross-national differences in poverty at the individual level.  
Being in countries other than the United States alone, except for Ireland, is 
associated with significantly reduced chance of being poor.  When country 
variations enter the model, employment status is no longer significant.  
Household characteristics variables—having more children under 18 and 
having multiple household earners—maintain their significant presence in 
the model. 
Table 5.2 shows the relationship between globalization and individual 
poverty.  Unlike how globalization did not have any significant relationship 
with various aspects of poverty at the aggregate level, it was found to have a 
significant negative relationship with the probability of being poor.  
Globalization decreases the chances of living in poverty.  At the individual 
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level, number of children and household earners continue to display strong 
relationships with poverty.  
Table 5.2:  Poverty on Globalization and Individual Variables 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 3  Model 4  
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  
      
        
Intercept  5.67 (.16) ***  5.46 (.31) ***  
        
Country-level variables        
Globalization  -.08 (.002) ***  -.08 (.002) ***  
        
Individual-level variables        
Age  -.002 (.001)   -.002 (.001)   
Female  .04 (.02)   .04 (.02)   
Married  .01 (.03)   .01 (.03)   
Number of children  .31 (.01) ***  .31 (.01) ***  
Working   -.01 (.03)   -.01 (.03)   
Number of earners  -1.03 (.01) ***  -1.03 (.01) ***  
Low education  -.03 (.03)   -.03 (.03)   
      
Interaction variables        
Globalization * working     -1.03 (.01) ***  
Globalization * low education     -.03 (.03)   
        
        
BIC  50697.56   50697.56   
       
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
 
In Table 5.3, the domestic political variables are examined as they 
relate to poverty at the individual level.  The number of seats representing 
low-income districts had significant negative relationship with the odds of 
being poor (Model 5).  In this model, employment status and low education 
added to the individual effects of household characteristics.  The direction of 
the effects of low education shifts to where low education affects greater 
chance of being poor.  In Model 6, left party power contributes to lowering 
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odds of being in poverty for individuals.  Household characteristics remain 
significant, but the effects of employment and education variables disappear.  
 
Table 5.3:  Poverty on Country-Level Political and Individual Variables 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
        
          
Intercept  -.48 (.05) ***  -.85 (.05) ***  -.93 (.05) *** 
          
Country-level variables          
Low-income seat  -.03 (.0006) ***       
Left party power     -.03 (.0009) ***    
Union density        -.01 (.0005) *** 
          
Individual-level variables          
Age  .00 (.001)   .001 (.001)   .002 (.001)  
Female  .01 (.02)   .02 (.02)   .02 (.02)  
Married  -.02 (.02)   -.04 (.02)   -.03 (.02)  
Number of children  .29 (.01) ***  .26 (.01) ***  .27 (.01) *** 
Working   -.06 (.03) *  -.02 (.03)   -.03 (.03)  
Number of earners  -.98 (.01) ***  -.86 (.01) ***  -.81 (.01) *** 
Low education  .18 (.03) ***  -.02 (.03)   -.05 (.03)  
          
          
BIC  52611.42   53727.05   54674.80  
         
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
 
Table 5.3-1:  Poverty on Country-Level Political and Individual Variables 
with Interaction Terms 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
        
          
Intercept  -.46 (.06) ***  -.79 (.05) ***  -.83 (.06) *** 
          
Country-level variables          
Low-income seat  -.03 (.001) ***       
Left party power     -.04 (.002) ***    
Union density        -.02 (.001) *** 
          
Individual-level variables          
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Age  .0002 (.001)   .001 (.001)   .002 (.001)  
Female  .009 (.02)   .02 (.02)   .02 (.02)  
Married  -.02 (.02)   -.04 (.02)   -.03 (.02)  
Number of children  .29 (.01) ***  .26 (.01) ***  .27 (.01) *** 
Working   -.02 (.04)   -.08 (.03) *  -.12 (.04) ** 
Number of earners  -.98 (.01) ***  -.86 (.01) ***  -.82 (.01) *** 
Low education  -.03 (.05)   -.08 (.04) *  -.16 (.05) *** 
        
Interaction variables          
Low-income seat * working  .003 (.001)        
Low-income seat * low education  .009 (.002) ***       
Left party power * working     .006 (.002) **    
Left party power * low education     .005 (.002) *    
Union density * working        .003 (.001) * 
Union density * low education        .004 (.001) ** 
          
          
BIC  52592.76   53739.87   54683.87  
         
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
 
Examining the domestic economic variable as it relates to poverty in 
Table 5.4, there is a negative relationship.  As unemployment goes up, the 
odds of individual poverty goes down.  Employment status and household 
characteristics together contribute to the probability of being poor at the 
individual level.  It could be possible that this unexpected finding could be an 
artifact of Europe‘s more generous welfare states and higher unemployment 
rates. 
Table 5.4:  Poverty on Country-Level Economic and Individual Variables 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 11  Model 12  
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  
      
        
Intercept  -1.05 (.05) ***  -1.04 (.07) ***  
        
Country-level Economic variables        
Unemployment  -.03 (.004) ***  -.04 (.009) ***  
        
Individual-level variables        
Age  .00 (.001)   .0001 (.001)   
Female  .02 (.02)   .03 (.02)   
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Married  .002 (.02)   .002 (.02)   
Number of children  .28 (.01) ***  .28 (.01) ***  
Working   -.09 (.03) ***  -.02 (.06)   
Number of earners  -.84 (.01) ***  -.84 (.01) ***  
Low education  -.02 (.03)   -.24 (.07) ***  
      
Interaction variables        
Unemployment * working     -.01 (.01)   
Unemployment * low education     .03 (.01) ***  
        
        
BIC  55391.99   55397.37   
       
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
 
Table 5.5 examines the extent to which comprehensive welfare states‘ 
commitment to social welfare impacts individual poverty.  Welfare state 
generosity as measured by Brady‘s (2009a) WSI significantly reduces one‘s 
risks of being poor.  Welfare state works well with other individual labor 
market and human capital variables to impact poverty. 
 
Table 5.5:  Poverty on Country-Level Social Welfare Effort and Individual 
Variables 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 13  Model 14  Model 15 
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
        
          
Intercept  -1.49 (.05) ***  -.63 (.05) ***  .94 (.09) *** 
          
Country-level social welfare effort 
variables 
   
 
  
 
  
WSI  -.49 (.01) ***       
Active LMP     -.97 (.03) ***    
Public educational expenditure         -.43 (.02) *** 
          
Individual-level variables          
Age  .001 (.001)   .001 (.001)   .002 (.001) * 
Female  .02 (.02)   .02 (.02)   .03 (.02)  
Married  -.03 (.02)   -.03 (.03)   -.05 (.02)  
Number of children  .25 (.01) ***  .24 (.01) ***  .28 (.01) *** 
Working   -.06 (.03) *  -.06 (.03) *  -.02 (.03) * 
Number of earners  -.86 (.01) ***  -.86 (.01) ***  -.85 (.01) *** 
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Low education  .08 (.03) **  .10 (.03) ***  -.12 (.03) *** 
          
          
BIC  53520.37   49682.57   54037.30  
         
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
 
Table 5.3-1:  Poverty on Country-Level Social Welfare Effort and Individual 
Variables with Interaction Terms 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 16  Model 17  Model 18 
 βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig.  βˆ  (se( βˆ )) Sig. 
        
          
Intercept  -1.50 (.05) ***  -.58 (.06) ***  1.19 (.19) *** 
          
Country-level social welfare effort 
variables 
   
 
  
 
  
WSI  -.52 (.02) ***       
Active LMP     -1.04 (.05) ***    
Public educational expenditure         -.48 (.03) *** 
          
Individual-level variables          
Age  .001 (.001)   .001 (.001)   .002 (.001) * 
Female  .01 (.02)   .02 (.02)   .03 (.02)  
Married  -.03 (.02)   -.03 (.03)   -.04 (.02)  
Number of children  .25 (.01) ***  .25 (.01) ***  .28 (.01) *** 
Working   -.05 (.03)   -.09 (.04) *  -.17 (.19) * 
Number of earners  -.86 (.01) ***  -.86 (.01) ***  -.85 (.01) *** 
Low education  .12 (.03) ***  .10 (.03) ***  -.66 (.19) *** 
        
Interaction variables          
WSI * working  .01 (.03)        
WSI * low education  .08 (.03) **       
ALMP * working     .05 (.06)     
ALMP * low education     .18 (.06) **    
Pub Edu Ex * working        .03 (.04)  
Pub Edu Ex * low education        .11 (.04) ** 
          
          
BIC  53536.11   49695.98   54051.22  
         
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
 
 
5.3. Examining Poverty Gap using Luxembourg Income Study  
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This section reviews post-transfer poverty gap as a measure of poverty.  
While this measure was not so effective in terms of examining the structural 
effects on poverty at the aggregate level, it provides a significant contribution 
to the discussion on the depth of poverty at the individual level.  Table 5.6 
presents summary statistics of people in poverty, calculated using the LIS 
data.  The poverty gap ratio does not vary greatly across the countries but 
becomes a meaningful measure when it comes to asking about how far below 
each individual is to the poverty threshold.  It is particularly relevant to the 
effectiveness of the welfare state as it relates to improving the lives of the 
poor.   
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Table 5.6:  Descriptive statistics for LIS working age adults (18-65) in poverty 
 
Welfare 
state regimes 
Countries N 
Poverty gap 
ratio 
Age Female 
# of children 
under 18 
# of earners Working 
High 
education 
Medium 
education 
           
Social 
democratic 
Finland (2000) 389 .29 43.07 .51 .44 .74 - .37 .41 
Norway (2000) 503 .31 40.39 .48 .49 .70 - .26 .63 
Sweden (2000) 648 .37 42.38 .48 .61 .71 - .22 .56 
           
           
Conservative 
Austria (2000) 130 .24 41.19 .51 .71 .74 .80 .11 .68 
Belgium (2000) 104 .25 41.22 .41 .79 .32 .68 .36 .37 
France (2000) 523 .25 39.48 .55 1.01 .61 .64 .26 .40 
Germany (2000) 577 .27 40.10 .55 .77 .53 .75 .17 .52 
Luxembourg (2000) 75 .16 49.56 .45 1.38 .95 .43 .15 .37 
Netherlands (1999) 150 .31 39.81 .44 1.38 .78 .77 .23 .47 
Switzerland (2000) 167 .31 41.70 .56 1.11 - .74 .21 .62 
           
           
Liberal 
Australia (2001) 937 .31 40.58 .48 1.14 .40 .72 - - 
Canada (2000) 2,478 .32 40.24 .49 1.17 .92 .76 - - 
Ireland (2000) 270 .22 40.79 .52 1.29 .46 .66 .18 .29 
UK (1999) 2,265 .35 41.64 .52 1.31 .41 .70 - - 
US (2000) 5,493 .33 41.55 .52 1.63 .99 .74 .34 .53 
           
           
Southern 
European 
Italy (2000) 635 .31 41.85 .51 .97 .68 - .12 .40 
Spain (2000) 533 .27 38.56 .51 .95 .73 .58 .14 .28 
           
           
All countries  15,877 .32 41.26 .52 1.37 .80 .73 .28 .49 
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This continuous variable allows HLM analysis to be conducted using 
SAS.  One limitation of the measure is that it is not able to capture the 
individuals who were able to leave poverty as a result of social transfers.  It is 
only observing people who remained in poverty post-transfer which would 
indicate the chronic state of poverty experienced by this group.  Therefore, 
one would be have to interpret the findings with care.  The research question 
is: How does welfare state generosity affect the depth of poverty for those who 
remain poor post-transfer? 
 
Table 5.7:  Poverty Gap Ratio on Individual Variables 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Coefficients Sig.  Coefficients Sig.  
      
Random Effects [Country]        
Intercept  .005 (.002) **  .02 (.009) **  
Working     -   
Education     .001 (.001)   
Social transfer ratio     .02 (.009) *  
Residual  .07 (.001) ***  .07 (.001) ***  
        
Fixed Effects        
Intercept  .66 (.02) ***  .66 (.02) ***  
        
Age  -.0004 (.0002)   -.0004 (.0002)   
Male  .001 (.005)   .001 (.005)   
Married  -.003 (.006)   -.003 (.006)   
Number of children  .01 (.002) ***  .01 (.002) ***  
Number of earners  -.11 (.004) ***  -.11 (.002) ***  
Working  .008 (.006)   .008 (.006)   
Education  .001 (.007)   -.001 (.01)   
Social transfer ratio  -.56 (.008) ***  -.59 (.04) ***  
        
        
BIC  1876.3   1702.3   
       
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
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Table 5.7 shows the results from the models without the country level 
welfare state index variable.  The number of children and the number of 
earners in the household remained consistently significant.  Social transfer 
as a percentage of pre-transfer poverty gap was a new variable that was 
calculated and entered into these models.  This variable captures the 
individual level welfare state effect on poverty and it has a strong 
significance in both models.  Social transfer ratio also had the between-group 
significance in terms of affecting poverty.  The greater the average social 
transfer ratio of a country the less the post-transfer gap for the chronically 
poor individuals. 
Table 5.8:  Poverty Gap Ratio on WSI and Individual Variables 
 
Independent variables 
 Model 3  Model 4  
 Coefficients Sig.  Coefficients Sig.  
      
Random Effects [Country]        
Intercept  .005 (.002) **  .02 (.008) *  
Working     0   
Education     .0005 (.0006)   
Social transfer ratio     .02 (.008) *  
Residual  .07 (.001) ***  .07(.001) ***  
        
Fixed Effects        
Intercept  .68 (.02) ***  .68 (.04) ***  
        
WSI  .06 (.02) *  .08 (.05) *  
Age  -.0003 (.0002)   -.0004 (.0002)   
Male  .0009 (.005)   .001 (.005)   
Married  -.002 (.006)   -.003 (.006)   
Number of children  .01 (.002) ***  .01 (.002) ***  
Number of earners  -.11 (.004) ***  -.11 (.004) ***  
Working  .004 (.007)   .004 (.007)   
Higher education  .001 (.008)   .001 (.007)   
Social transfer ratio  -.60 (.03) ***  -.59 (.04) ***  
      
Interaction variables        
WSI * Social transfer ratio  -.06 (.008) ***  -.08 (.05)   
WSI * working  -.005 (.006)   -.005 (.006)   
WSI * education  .007 (.007)   .01 (.02)   
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BIC  1850.8   1719.1   
       
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001. 
 
Table 5.8 reports the results from the models that include the welfare 
state index variable.  The number of children, the number of earners in the 
household, and social transfer ratio were consistently significant.  Model 3 
shows the significant interaction term between WSI and social transfer ratio 
negatively affecting the post-transfer poverty gap ratio.  Welfare state 
generosity that was non-social transfer related (could suggest non-targeted 
programs and policies) in fact increased the poverty gap ratio significantly 
among the chronically poor.  In Model 4, there was a between-group 
significance for country differences in the average social transfer ratio 
positively affecting individual post-transfer poverty gap ratio.  
 
  138 
Chapter 6.  Implications for U.S. Poverty  
Previous chapters have shown that globalization, politics, and welfare 
state generosity provide the socio-politico-economic context in which 
structural poverty could be understood.  Although tentative, one can draw 
from the main findings that politics play a crucial role in light of many 
institutional risks and opportunities—open global competition and 
restructuring of the domestic industries and responding via the political 
system to enhance the welfare state generosity.  It is the key mechanism that 
protects the social rights of the citizens which in turn translates to reduction 
of poverty.  Poverty in this sense is rather an issue of social inclusion for 
many advanced generous welfare states.   
The United States fall significantly behind other rich democracies 
when it comes to promoting social inclusion.  Largely, the experience of 
dealing with poverty in the United States has been superseded by corporate 
business interests as the source of employment.  This chapter extends Rank‘s 
(1994; 2000; 2001; 2004) structural vulnerability thesis and adds another 
dimension of why American poverty is an inevitable structural consequence 
economically, socially, and politically.   
It is to maintain that there is a hierarchical order by which these 
structural failings occur using an analogy of a deep-rooted wound (see Figure 
1).  A structural dependence thesis begins with the idea that poverty exists 
naturally among those who play the economic game in the market system 
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(Rank 2004).  The problem is not so much that poverty is caused by the 
economic system but the fact that ideological values and political decisions 
are structurally dependent on the economic system.  Poverty, understood as a 
systemic condition resulting from market failure, is not adequately dealt with 
and even exacerbated by the failure of the structurally dependent political 
system. 
In order to further support this argument, first, I provide an account of 
the way in which the ideological value of individualism in the U.S. supports 
the market system as the dominant domain by creating an image of self-
reliant human beings as the righteous ones.  Then, I illustrate how the 
political system becomes the prisoner of the market system at the macro level.  
At the more micro level, I discuss how business interests dominate the 
interest group system (Cahn 1995a) and how moneyed interests obstruct 
democratic public policy making (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993). 
This chapter revisits some classical works to reopen the argument that 
the politics of problem definition in the U.S. involve making political 
decisions that exclude those without power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963) by 
keeping other problem definitions at the margin.  The structural definition of 
poverty becomes effectively marginalized in terms of shaping anti-poverty 
policies.  Available solutions for poverty, therefore, in this structurally 
dependent political environment, are restricted to individually-based ones 
since changing the structure would mean questioning the market ideology.  
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In turn, government ends up exercising non-decisions and incremental policy 
development continues to focus on individual change.   
 
Figure 6.1: Poverty as the Political Wound 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3): Structurally dependent political system 
 
6.1. Structurally Dependent Political System  
 
(6) POVERTY 
Individual / behavioral approaches (5) 
Structural / systemic approaches (4) 
Truncated Labor Market Policy 
(3) 
Business Power in  
Public Policy Decision Making  
(Interest group liberalism) 
(2) 
(1) Ideological value system 
(Individualism) 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
(Capitalism) 
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6.1.1. Economic System as the Structure: Capitalist Ideology 
Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973, 3-4, 15) define the term ideology as a 
system of related beliefs about how the social, economic, and political 
order does and should operate.  They see an ideology to be serving 
important political purposes by providing not only ―cues for understanding 
and evaluating public affairs,‖ but also by serving as ―a guide to action, a 
means of self-expression, and/or as a means of relating to other people‖ 
(Ibid, 4).  Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973) further suggest that an ideology 
tends to resist change and ―reaffirms its basic principles strongly, 
adapting to new conditions and problems only marginally, in patchwork 
fashion.  In part, this is because a network of social and economic 
interests, institutions, and practices is supported and justified by the 
ideology‖ (Ibid, 5). 
In accordance with America‘s dominant economic ideology being 
capitalism-liberalism, there is a continuing intimacy between economic 
and political system.  In fact, liberalism is the political arm of capitalist 
economic system and Americans live in a social system that reflects these 
ideologies in both rhetoric and practice.  Both see the economic market 
place to be the chief instrument through which ―individual self-seeking 
will lead to the greatest good for the greatest number‖ (Ibid, 17, 25).  
Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973) further explain, 
 
Capitalism is an ideology that is concerned with how and why the 
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economy should be organized.  As the economy is never divorced 
from the state or the society, the principles of capitalism relate to 
the manner in which the state should be organized and conducted, 
and these principles overlap substantially with liberalism.  
Liberalism is an ideology that concerns how and in the service of 
which values the polity should be organized and operated (Ibid, 18). 
 
Rank (2004) uses an analogy of the musical chair game when 
describing the nature of the American economic system.  He argues that the 
rules of the game itself in capitalist economy, by definition, produce losers in 
the first place to which the poor become structurally vulnerable.  In other 
words, the poverty wound is created in the natural operation of the capitalist 
economy.  The primary unit of interest in the capitalism is individual rather 
than community needs where the former can be satisfied by following the 
profit motive – seeking to maximize personal returns or net reward from all 
transactions in which they engage (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 27).  Also, 
by accepting the principle of competition, coupled with profit motivation, 
capitalism subscribes to the idea that self-seeking individuals will add up to 
greater progress for the entire society.   
Like Rank (2004) pointed out, capitalism is not sympathetic to those 
who are unsuccessful in the competitive race, viewing them as somehow 
―unfit or unsuited for the natural rigors and demands of the real world‖ 
(Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 28).  Artificial forces, such as unions or 
government regulations of prices, wages, and trade, inhibit the market to 
function as the natural regulator of the economy.  In this regard, the class 
structure resulting from economic life and the contemporary economic order 
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of the United States is taken as fixed or given and no fundamental challenge 
is raised to the characteristics, principles, or practices of either (Dolbeare and 
Dolbeare 1973, 17). 
 
6.1.2. Ideological Value System: Individualism 
Ideology is attached to some values, such as equality, stability, 
justice, and individualism.  Such values are understood and defined by the 
ideology, and ranked in priority (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 9).  
Capitalism‘s major value is individualism – individual self-fulfillment 
seen as material self-interest and accumulation.  This value emphasizes 
the moral responsibility, opportunity, and ―the natural rights of the 
individual to serve his own needs as he sees fit‖ (Ibid, 17).  It is the 
responsibility of the individual to ―act purposefully in his own behalf; he 
should not be concerned for others, nor should he expect others to serve 
his needs for him‖ (Ibid, 32).  Gilens (1999) cites Steven Lukes to outline 
philosophical varieties of individualism: (1) belief in the intrinsic value 
and dignity of individual human beings; (2) belief in the autonomy of 
individuals from social pressures and norms; (3) belief in the value of 
privacy and the right of individuals to be left alone to pursue their own 
ambitions; and (4) belief in the ability of people to develop themselves in 
their own unique ways (Ibid, 32).   
Individualism essentially has been a response to America‘s concern for 
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tyranny by a majority interest (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961) that 
translated into a political culture that has evidently feared big government 
from day one of the nation‘s existence.  American polity is not a structure of 
government, but a contract between the government and its people whose 
clauses contain shared values of individualism (White 1988, 24).  American 
political culture, according to Cahn (1995b, 336), is based on the natural or 
―inalienable‖ rights of individuals and this liberal individualism creates a 
dilemma for public policy.  Cahn (1995b, 336) uses the term ―Lockean 
individualism‖ to stress its commitment to individual property rights, which 
limit the notion of communal rights and create a problematic definition of 
communal good.‖  American liberalism, with its utilitarian roots, defines the 
common good as the aggregate sum of individual good.  The role of 
community is to provide the infrastructure to make individual rights possible.  
In Lockean terms, the role of the community is to create a stable environment 
for the acquisition, use, and disposition of private property (Ibid, 336). 
Simply speaking, individualism refers to a belief in the primary 
importance of the individual rather than the community (Gilens 1999).  
Throughout history, Rank (1994, 200) notes, ―Americans have 
enthusiastically embraced individualism.‖  Individualism was embraced 
originally as a corrective approach to the rigid social hierarchies and 
norms of the European society.  Even to this day, it is reflected in the key 
characteristics of the American ideal of liberty / freedom – autonomy, self-
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reliance, and full compensation for the private self-seeking (Dolbeare and 
Dolbeare 1973, 33).  The following quote from a blue-collar worker 
typically illustrates Americans‘ adherence to this ideological value: 
My God, I work where I want to work.  I spend my money where I 
want to spend it.  I buy what I want to buy.  I go where I want to go.  
I read what I want to read.  My kids go to the school that they want 
to go to, or where I want to send them.  We bring them up in the 
religion we want to bring them up in.  What else – what else could 
you have (White 1988, 24)? 
 
Indeed, individualism is about ―the insistence upon full opportunity for 
individual choices and action‖ (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 33).  However, 
what this person does not speak to is the fact that individualism also expects 
individuals to be accountable for their actions and accept the consequences 
whether good or bad. 
This value, or this distinct ―culture trait‖, is viewed here as a 
mechanism to legitimize capitalist competition, which turned individualism 
into a public ideological value in America (Lowi 1979, 40).  As such, 
individualism as the ideological value restricts poverty to be perceived more 
as an individual problem rather than a structural one.  Ideological values 
attached to individual explanations of poverty play a major role in defining 
poverty, advising some strategies for coping with the problem of poverty 
while rejecting others (Loewenberg 1974; Jennings 1994).  One example 
would be understanding poverty based on the individual choice theory 
developed by Friedman (1953).  It posits that the distribution of measured 
incomes at a point in time is ―to an important extent determined by 
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individual choice among opportunities that yield both different combinations 
of cash income and non-pecuniary advantages, and different profiles of cash 
income over time‖ (Johnson 1973, 221).  More specifically, according to the 
words by Theodore Schultz (1965), measured poverty is a consequence of 
voluntary choice.  Some people may look worse off in terms of measured 
income, whereas they may be better off in terms of utility based on their 
choices.  What to do about poverty in this instance would be to help 
individuals make better choices in life that will improve their chances of 
earning a higher pay in the labor market. 
Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973, 9) suggest that ideologies seek to attain 
―the conditions, institutions, and policies that will permit realization of their 
values‖ by way of defending the status quo, drastic changes, and the 
development of a series of interim goals.  In the case of individualism, a value 
representing the capitalist ideology, the status quo is preferred as the 
government is prevented from taking the lead in forming a social consensus 
on distributive justice.  While some societies have taken steps toward 
guaranteeing a decent level of well-being for all, the United States remains 
reluctant to interfere with individual freedom.  Any change to this, as 
Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973, 11) would say, will depend largely on the power 
distribution within the society – ―how those in power will force obedience to 
the rules that sustain the existing order.‖  Individualism and the power 
structure that support this ideological value can be challenged only when the 
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conditions are no longer favorable to achieve individual success for everyone 
through practices and policies based on individualism.  
 
6.1.3. Business Power in Public Policy Decision Making  
Liberalism‘s image of politics in the United States has been termed 
pluralism (Lowi 1979) or pluralist democracy (Dahl 1967) by some scholars.  
Liberalism sees interest group activities as the leading characteristics of 
American politics, ―the means whereby the contemporary political market is 
kept open and responsive to popular preferences‖ (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 
1973, 59).  Interest group is one of the major linkage mechanisms – i.e., 
political parties, media, and election – that provide information about the 
public interest to the government leaders.  However, when the interests of 
economic elites cohere and dominate in key policy areas rather than compete 
equally (Parenti 1970), it challenges Madison‘s democratic idea of curing the 
effects of the mischiefs of faction with checks and balances at all levels of the 
government (see the Federalist, No. 10 in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961).  
In this sense, the American pluralist system is thwarted in terms of being 
structurally captive to the economic environment at the macro level and by 
the growing power of business interests at the mezzo level. 
Madisonian design of the American political system to encourage 
competition among groups and reaching equilibrium in these varying 
interests was seen as the way for defining public good (Lowi 1979).  Pluralist 
representation assumes that the best policy decisions emerge from clashes of 
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interest groups in the political arena.  This is the process by which issues get 
freely and openly discussed and an overall balance of power is maintained.  
However, this is an ideal type in the Weberian sense.  The idea behind 
pluralism was to provide a structure of power with capacity to resist central 
political control by any given faction.  However, in practice, a market version 
of pluralism came in the form of interest group liberalism, which sought to 
maintain privileged positions of moneyed interests (Lowi 1979, 58-60).  The 
conservative tendencies of interest group liberalism were observed in its 
resistance to change (Lowi 1979, 60).   
Interest group liberalism differs from the original idea of pluralism in 
that it condones specific groups, capturing and controlling parts of 
administrative agencies without having to compete for policy rewards, which 
Lowi (1979) found to threaten the democratic basis of government.  
Complexity of issues in present world environment invites different players 
into the stage of framing and defining issues.  Interest groups are frequently 
responsible for bringing the issue to light in the first place (Berry 1997, 7).  
Whether small or big changes follow, the process of public policy making 
points out that interest groups play an important role at the agenda setting 
stagei (Kingdon 1989).  In the United States, business interests often control 
the agenda in the policy process by maintaining a privileged position 
(Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993).  This makes the task of intelligent, 
democratic governmental policy making extremely difficult (Lindblom and 
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Woodhouse 1993, 102). 
Many studies have documented how America has witnessed a huge 
proliferation of interest group activities since the late 1960s (Berry 1997; 
Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1983; 1991).  This as a result expanded 
the interest group system, which comprises the business, trade associations, 
professional associations, unions, nonprofits and citizen groups, government 
organizations, and others (Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  The past interest 
representation system has once been dominated by large peak associations or 
umbrella groups (Heinz, Laumann, Salisbury, and Nelson 1993, 374).  
Namely, some examples would be the American Farm Bureau in agriculture, 
the American Petroleum Institute in energy, the American Medical 
Association in health, and the Chamber of Commerce, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, and AFL-CIO in labor (Heinz et al. 1993).   
However, much more diverse sets of actors – particularly individual 
businesses – participate directly to influence political decisions these days.  
Business groups have come to generate strong voices within the political 
system by acting as an interest in society (Berry 1997; Vogel 1989).  
Schattschneider (1960, 31) contend that the business community is by a wide 
margin the most highly organized segment of our societyii.  Since the 
Progressive Era when modern liberalism first started to take shape, the 
business interests have grown to make up predominantly a large proportion 
of the interest group system.  Even prior to 1920, the number of trade 
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associations and related economic interests were larger in aggregate numbers 
than any other categories of interest groups (Tichenor and Harris 2002). 
Heinz et al. (1993) estimated that the number of major businesses 
strategically operating offices in Washington was 50 in 1961 and 545 in 1982.  
Using the data from the 1996 Lobbying Disclosure Reports, Baumgartner and 
Leech (2001) indicate that more than half of the Washington lobbying 
community consisted of businesses and trade associations when they 
examined both direct lobbyists and clients of lobbying firms.  Businesses 
alone were the largest lobbying group in Washington from the standpoint of 
total registrations (43%), followed by trade associations (16%), based on their 
study of 5,907 lobbying activities.  Business and trade dominance is also 
prevalent when examining the degree of activity, as they together added up 
to 63% of the reports filed and 63% of the issues mentioned (Baumgartner 
and Leech 2001, 1196). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the businesses and trade are by 
far the best endowed.  Out of the total aggregate lobbying expenditures of 
$822,765,784 reported in 1996, businesses and trade taken together 
accounted for 78% – 56% and 22% respectively – which was nearly 9 times 
more than citizen groups and nonprofits (Ibid).  Business dominance is even 
more pronounced when observing how the number and type of interest group 
representations are distributed across a sample of 137 issues (Ibid).  This 
extremely skewed distribution overall and the breakdown by different 
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categories of interest groups suggested that business advantage was 
generally evident but was even more distinct in the cases where the fewest, 
especially one or two, interest groups were active.  The top 10% of the cases 
attracted more than 10% of the interest group activities, while the bottom 
10% attracted much less than 1% of the total activities.  The proportion 
representing the interests of business rose from 57 percent to 72 percent 
since 1960.  However, the proportion of citizens‘ groups decreased from 9 
percent to 5 percent of all organizations and the proportion representing 
labor plummeted from 11 percent to 2 percent (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 
77-8). 
The central cleavage in the American political system is the clash 
between social elements organized around the business community and those 
organized around government and not-for-profit institutions in the public 
sectoriii (Walker 1983, 392).  Therefore, it makes a great difference whose 
game is played in politics (Schattschneider 1960, 48) because the rules of the 
game determine the requirements for political success.  Criticizing the 
pluralist approach of mobilizing interests, Schattschneider (1960) wrote, ―the 
flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong 
upper-class accent‖ (cited in Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 11).  Business has 
been able to mobilize the social bias around the idea that the market is the 
primary source of jobs, and that any harm to the business is a threat to 
survival as a society (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993).   
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6.1.4. Truncated Labor Market Policy  
If economics is so central to American social development, why has the 
range of policies that sought to promote employment or modify the operation 
of the labor market been so truncated in America?  Weir (1992) provided a 
detailed historical analysis of employment policy development by examining 
how citizens and politicians came to define problems, how they understood 
the range of choices open to them, and how they interpreted interests 
attached to a given set of possible policies.  Instead of considering policy as a 
direct product of preferences of politicians and voters, Weir (1992) stressed 
‗what is possible‘ or ‗what government is able to do‘ as critical to determining 
how problems are defined.  This was outlined as the process of possible 
solutions shaping public decisions rather than about what is desirable. 
Central to Weir‘s argument in this seminal work is that employment 
policy was organized and implemented in ways that progressively narrowed 
the realm of the possible and desirable.  Policy decisions reached in the 1940s 
restricted the scope for later initiatives leading to 1980s by channeling 
debates and subsequent political activities along distinctive paths.  She 
points to the remedial and ad hoc nature of American employment policy that 
added to frustration in lack of innovation.  Then, she illustrates the ways by 
which noninterventionist Keynesian stabilization policy emerged as the 
major employment policy in the United States. 
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Next, she details the evolution of labor market policy as it became 
subsumed into the War on Poverty in the 1960s and as it took the form of 
public service employment during the 1970s.  By emphasizing racial 
differences as it attached to the low end of the labor market, employment 
policy attracted various oppositions for being a special interest measure to 
African-Americans.  Also, because it was based on the limited capacities of 
federal government, particularly with the Department of Labor, it was 
criticized for waste, fraud, and corruption in administration.  The latter half 
of the 1970s can be characterized by the failure of attempts to establish 
planning mechanisms and forums for tripartite cooperation. 
American exceptionalism in policy-making coupled with constraints in 
American politics and culture can be linked to the sequence of changes and 
the ways in which policies collide with unanticipated events (p.162).  Weir 
(1992) supports how factors such as economic pressures, social movements, 
and politicians push policy outcomes one way that particular policy decisions 
become contingent on these uncontrollable circumstances.  The economic 
boom that followed World War II bolstering the argument against the 
passage of Full Employment bill, the emergence of the southern civil rights 
movement and urban riots in the 1960s, the collision of employment policy 
with black political mobilization, President Kennedy‘s assassination, and the 
escalation of Vietnam War were all contingent factors affecting the remedial 
form of employment policy. 
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These policy decisions exercised an enduring effect on future 
possibilities by limiting the kinds of choices likely to emerge for consideration 
(Weir, 1992).  Referring to this bounding effect as boundaries, Weir (1992) 
argues that existence of Council of Economic Advisors further limited the 
problem definition of unemployment caused by insufficient macroeconomic 
stimulation and lack of job readiness among the poor.  Also, prior 
establishment of state-level system of vocational education, which was poorly 
linked to the labor market, helped narrow the scope of policy.  Established 
arrangements characterized by scant interests that organized labor expressed 
in enhancing the training capacities of American government left the 
business to shape the market-oriented employment policy. 
All in all, a comprehensive employment policy was undermined by the 
very lack of interplay between ideas, politics and administration.  Public 
philosophy and research as ideas served little to support planning for a 
comprehensive employment policy.  Defining unemployment problem to be 
more individual rather than resulting from operation of the economy did not 
help to form a political rhetoric for more government responsibility in the 
domain of employment.  Furthermore, the history of administrative failure 
was in no position to influence innovative employment policy.  In turn, the 
resurgence of neoclassical assumptions about unemployment provided a 
rationale and language for the new politics of employment in the 1980s. 
 
 
6.2. Structural Dependence of Public Will  
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Marginalization of structural poverty—poverty understood as a 
structural condition resulting from the market‘s failure to include everyone—
is exacerbated by the structurally dependent public will. Iversen and 
Armstrong (2006, 206) assert that public will is ―freedom and responsibility of 
choice and choice making that is based on the foundational American 
principles of fairness and real opportunity.‖  They contend that these 
principles are ―obscured by geographic and political dispersion and by 
neoliberal reliance on the market to solve all ills and needs‖ (Ibid, 9). The 
market certainly enjoys the upper hand over the public will, as the latter is 
conditioned by how the former defines the degree to which fairness and real 
opportunities are acceptable and do not hurt the interest of the market. 
Frustrated liberal social scientists charge that ideology and politics are 
to blame for the ―paradox‖ of ―poverty amidst plenty‖ (O‘Connor 2001, 3). An 
ideology is typically ―held by some segment of politically active people and it 
has the potential of gathering support and affecting American politics‖ 
(Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 3). A dominant ideology, which is capitalism-
liberalism in the case of the United States, 
may be so pervasive, so all-encompassing, that it is not even perceived 
by observers and analysts. Or the observers and analysts may be more 
or less willing parties to the routine task of using that ideology for 
social control purposes—in this case, for the purpose of persuading 
others that the structures, policies, and practices (and the result 
thereof) of ruling elites were inevitable, desirable, and widely accepted 
by all strata of the population (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 1). 
 
Generally speaking, the capitalist economic life is central and politics 
occupies a strictly secondary sphere (Ibid, 56). Liberalism, in its classic usage, 
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is much like capitalism in that it stresses ―primacy for the individual and 
strict limitation upon governments to ensure full freedom for the individual 
to serve his needs as he saw fit‖ (Ibid, 55). Capitalism and liberalism both 
share the basic value of individualism. Having its roots in John Locke‘s idea 
that individuals have the right to have their property secured, in liberalism‘s 
conception the sole purpose of government was to protect this natural right of 
individuals. As capitalism became more prominent, liberalism evolved to 
apply capitalist principles to the organization and operation of government. 
Dolbeare and Dolbeare explain this process as follows: 
Liberalism‘s worldview not only assumes that the political system‘s 
task is to support and promote the operating capitalist economic 
system, but it views the political process itself through capitalist 
economic concepts. Politics is seen as a free market for the exchange of 
demands, support, and public policies. Each individual has his specific 
wants and equivalent purchasing power—one vote. He buys the 
policies and candidates of his choice in the competitive market on 
election day. If the products are not available, the demand will soon 
create the supply. Officeholders act as brokers, adjusting government 
policy products to the wants of the number of consumers necessary to 
obtain the votes of a majority. In this fashion, participating individuals 
control major government policies, which in turn may be understood as 
flexibly responding to changing popular preferences and representing 
the public interest. In realistic and modern language, this is democracy 
(Ibid, 57–58). 
 
On this note, Bowles and Gintis (1986) were not shy about claiming 
that democratic institutions have been mere ornaments in the capitalist 
economy and that both liberty2 and popular sovereignty3 have been sacrificed 
to securing economic hegemony. Similarly, Hofstadter (1948) argued that for 
the framers of the U.S. Constitution, political liberty was tied to property and 
not to democracy. This argument supported Beard‘s (1935) historical 
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analysis, in which he asserted that the self-interested economic elites drove 
the creation of the Constitution from the very start at the expense of the 
debtor classes—that is, the disenfranchised and small farmers. The resulting 
political economy of the American society was the direct manifestation of the 
framers‘ principle, which gave the market an upper hand over democracy 
(Cahn 1995a). 
If one typifies political and economic development as path dependent 
with increasing returns (Pierson 2000), one could argue that the Constitution 
was the critical juncture of politics and economy; it has had long-lasting 
consequences with positive feedback to this very day. As such, the market 
continues to dominate the political life in America. The structural 
dependence (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988) of the government on the 
market provides the context within which business interests benefit from 
their privileged positions (Block 1977; Miliband 1969; Lindblom 1977). In this 
sense, the market can be characterized as a ―prison‖ that limits political 
change and discourages attempts to improve political institutions (Lindblom 
1982, 329). 
It is a prison in the sense that often the market is treated not as a 
variable but as the fixed element around which policy must be fashioned 
(Lindblom 1982, 333). The market is an automatic system that triggers 
punishment in the form of unemployment or slow economy. Many types of 
institutional changes are of a character that the market does not like; 
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consequently, it reduces the inducements to provide jobs and performs its 
functions less effectively. In this market-based structural environment, the 
desire for reelection locks up politicians and forces them to favor business 
interests over public interests (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993; Smith 1999). 
One example that best characterizes this structural dependence is the 
employer-centered low-wage labor market. Government plays little role other 
than to reinforce the employers‘ demands. The market stays constant and the 
job seekers become variables in the equation of top-down labor matching that 
is designed to bring together the low-skilled workers (labor supply) and the 
employers with low-paying jobs (labor demand). While local companies and 
other institutions wrestle with the forces of globalization and restructuring, 
the market faces almost no challenge to be more inclusive when survival is 
the priority. In other words, the main focus of workforce development has 
been on changing the ―qualities and capabilities‖ of workers themselves 
(Melendez and Harrison 1998, 3), rather than on addressing the structural 
conditions of labor mismatch that are heavily weighted toward the demand 
side. 
Seccombe (2007) points out that welfare is a problem of the low-wage 
labor market‘s inability to provide adequate income for low-income families, 
rather than of the demoralizing system itself. Moving people from welfare to 
work by human capital development (HCD) and labor force attachment (LFA) 
depends on how the demand side of the labor market pictures a qualified 
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worker.  According to Holzer (1998), employers identify absenteeism and 
basic skill readiness as potential problems for welfare recipients seeking 
employment. During the employer screening process, particular credentials 
such as a high school diploma, work experience, and references are widely 
used (Holzer 1998). Notably, specific experience/training and passage of 
certain tests are required by some employers. Based on these screening 
devices, the top-down matching process begins by preparing welfare leavers 
to become work-ready or employable. 
Regarding the issue of public housing, the Chicago Housing Authority‘s 
(CHA) Plans for Transformation is a good example of how developers‘ 
interests dominate over those of residents (Bennett, Smith, and Wright, 
2006). The CHA process focuses heavily on transforming buildings and 
deconcentrating poverty through relocation vouchers, and establishes 
stringent self-sufficiency criteria for former public housing residents to move 
back into newly developed mixed-income neighborhoods (Bennett, Smith, and 
Wright 2006). When the public will stays structurally dependent and the 
economic structure is kept constant, individual explanations of poverty will 
by default continue to overshadow structural explanations that require 
systemic change to address the problems. Because of this entanglement, 
ensuring basic human rights and advancing the common good are distanced 
from the main goals of the U.S. anti-poverty policies. 
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This chapter maintains that the structural dependence of public will 
discourages poverty from being recognized as a public problem, and therefore 
allows the government to remain passive and follow policies that are guided by 
individual-based problem definitions of poverty. Releasing the public will from 
structural dependence should provide a context in which structural poverty is 
recognized and reflected in public policy debates and formulation. The 
challenging reality before us, however, is an employer-centered, low-wage 
labor market around which many policy and program alternatives are 
formed. Achieving self-sufficiency has gained ground as a new approach to 
helping the poor achieve the American Dream, in rejection of welfare 
dependency that has been politicized as the cause of trapping many people in 
poverty. 
 
6.3. Glocalizing Strategies to Combat Structural Poverty  
6.3.1. The End of Structural Poverty—Thinking Globally 
The idea that people ought to be self-sufficient or self-reliant prevents 
many Americans from reaching out to others to receive or provide help.  With 
very little political challenge, this notion of self-sufficiency has become the 
political engine of public policy. The post-welfare-reform policy practice in the 
nonprofit sector uses this concept as its main goal and measure of success. In 
fact, self-sufficiency is a myth (Shain 1994). No one in this world is truly self-
sufficient. All people have to rely on others to produce various goods and 
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services to meet their needs. For instance, one has to rely on others to 
produce milk, meat, bread, books, computers, and other necessities in life 
that get exchanged in the market. Also, workers are labor-market dependent, 
relying on the availability of jobs, payment of wages, and the possibility of 
positions opening up. Even some unemployed rich and upper-middle-class 
members remain family dependent for maintaining financial security. 
Instead of demonizing dependency as a social ill or failure, 
individualism as the market value should be complemented with greater 
emphasis on community and cooperation (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 20). 
Society is made up of interdependent individuals, so it is vital to understand 
economic mobility as a relational process that ―leads toward the 
establishment of genuine trust and reciprocity in the intersecting 
relationships among education and workforce development institutions, 
workers and firms, as well as families, firms, and children‘s schools‖ (Iversen 
and Armstrong 2006). To achieve any social or political change, individualism 
must be accompanied by the common-good approach that values everyone in 
a mutually dependent society. 
What, then, can be done at the global level to restore the public will? 
This article proposes a glocalization strategy, which is a hybrid between 
global thinking and local action. Thinking globally to end structural poverty 
begins with the understanding that global disparities in economic development 
threaten world security. Mindful of this concern, Sachs proposed to achieve the 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by performing differential diagnoses, 
accompanied by an investment plan, a financial plan, a donor plan, and a public 
management plan suited to the particulars of the local context. He also 
suggested that ending extreme poverty by 2025 will require addressing the debt 
crisis, global trade policy, science for development, and environmental 
stewardship at the global level. A global network of cooperation, in which the 
richest countries commit to fight poverty, is essential for achieving these goals. 
A movement toward an enlightened globalization is promoted to ―address the 
needs of the poorest of the poor, the global environment, and the spread of 
democracy‖ (Sachs 2005, 358). 
Capitalism is an ideal-type ideology. When power gets mixed into an 
ideal type, which is quite common in human history, it becomes something 
other than the best intention behind the idea. As for the market, its welfare 
function continues to be minimized by externalities. This jeopardizes not only 
the people who do survive the competitive market demands for labor, but also 
those who get left behind, particularly as the middle class starts to join the 
ranks of the working poor. Nathanson (1998, 137) states that once jobs 
become scarcer, and as poverty persists amidst extraordinary plenty for 
some, the impetus toward greater economic justice will be strengthened. 
Establishing a global social-policy system (Deacon 1997) would provide a 
safety net for people who become victims within the global capitalist market. 
  163 
Reforming or revising the degree to which America is committed to the 
capitalist ideology is important when it comes to the welfare of people 
(Seccombe 2007). A social-reform approach would have to focus on ―making 
capitalism work‖ in the interest of renewed public will to promote fairness 
and real opportunity (Iversen and Armstrong 2006). Public commitment to 
providing publicly endorsed and funded work supports, affordable pay, and 
benefits matters in encouraging upward mobility. Effective workforce 
development efforts require a collaborative venture among employers, 
community-based organizations, the public sector, and educational 
institutions. Iversen and Armstrong (2006, xli) cite Hart (2005), who argued 
that this reform would have to be an inclusive practice: ―By creating a new, 
more inclusive brand of capitalism, one that incorporates previously excluded 
voices, concerns, and interests, the corporate sector could be the catalyst for a 
truly sustainable form of global development—and prosper in the process.‖  
Bennett, Smith, and Wright (2006, 310) asked ―Where Are Poor People to Live?‖ 
and called for national and local public commitment to affordable housing: 
Fundamental human rights have been undermined by recent trends in 
U.S. public housing policy. . . . To develop new housing programs that 
meet the needs of America‘s low-income population via locally sensitive, 
publicly responsive institutional mechanisms actually looks like a 
meaningful, manageable step in reconstituting United States public 
policy. 
 
One thing that is critical to combating poverty at the policy level is to have 
this condition regarded as a public problem. Considering Wood and Doan‘s 
(2003) threshold model, individuals are more likely to voice their discontent 
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when their perception of the social nonacceptance rate is lower than the 
actual nonacceptance rate. The breakpoint for change from the silent (no-
action) state to public-outcry (public-problem) status is the point at which the 
perception corresponds to the actual rate of nonacceptance. Creative bridging 
of this gap will be key to transforming poverty from a mere condition to a 
public problem. 
First, it will be important to accurately and regularly report the results 
of public opinion polls on poverty, and to promote public education about the 
structural effects of poverty on the rest of the society. Second, it will be vital 
to provide evidence, informed by sound research, that poverty in many ways 
is not a consequence of choice exercised by the poor. Third, it will be crucial to 
reinvent the mental image of poverty by influencing the media portrayal of 
poverty.  These measures are especially important when it comes to 
reimaging poverty among children and families who play by the rules. 
Parents who have to work two jobs to try to make ends meet face difficulties 
finding time or energy to parent. The employment and poverty issues quickly 
become a parenting issue that would plague any similarly beleaguered 
family. Children often end up taking care of themselves, with all the 
consequences that result from that for their well-being. 
Adapting a conflict resolution model offered by Johan Galtung (1999), 
we can seek reconciliation between the individual and structural 
explanations of poverty. Figure 1 depicts a way in which an agreement on 
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poverty can be achieved between Party A (i.e., individual problem definition) 
and Party B (i.e., structural problem definition). Party A holds a problem 
definition at point A (a,0) while Party B maintains its own at point B (0,b). 
Both Parties A and B are most satisfied when their problem definitions are 
each accepted, which will give a total gain of (a x b)/2, or the entire right 
triangle below the line connecting the two positions. Consequently, there is a 
natural tendency to exercise policy monopoly by these parties in competition. 
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Figure 6.2: Towards an Inclusive Problem Definition of Poverty 
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This win-lose conflict situation cannot be resolved by the compromise 
of meeting halfway at point D (a/2, b/2). This is because both parties would 
have to sacrifice some portions of their desired definitions, and only gain the 
small square area within the triangle ([a x b]/4), instead of their potentially 
most satisfying gain of (a x b)/2. Therefore, point D (compromise) could never 
be achieved between the individual and structural problem definitions of 
poverty, because D is not a stable condition and the continued tension would 
stabilize only when the new equilibrium was reached at point A, B, or C. 
When the public is split on its view of poverty, both parties will withdraw and 
stabilize at point C (0,0), where the default individual explanation gains 
ground. 
Social policy entrepreneurs should take the lead in reframing or 
refocusing the issue of poverty within the concept of well-being or social 
inclusion, and bring the two explanations to a common acknowledgment that 
a problem of poverty exists reciprocally at both the individual and structural 
levels. Point E (a,b) is where both parties prevail, because the boxed area 
defined by (a x b) is inclusive of both problem definitions and the focus on 
poverty has been shifted to a broader concept. Both individual and structural 
approaches, proposed according to their respective problem definitions, could 
be attached to solutions to improve the well-being of people. This is the 
minimum threshold point at which an agreement can be reached, by giving 
both the conservatives and the liberals a winning ticket. When we transcend 
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the conflict between the two major explanations on poverty, an agreement on 
strategies to tackle poverty as a public problem can be achieved anywhere 
beyond this point in the shaded area, as a win-win solution. 
 
6.3.2. Acting Locally for Inclusive Labor Market Development 
Arguably, American capitalism is no longer an economy constrained by 
the national boundaries. Monetary stability will trump state sovereignty 
when increased international trade and investment require a stable currency 
value of a given country (Nitzan 2001). Therefore, when government can play 
only a very minimal role in balancing the market to protect the public 
interest of all the people, a proactive approach to reforming the market 
dominance must be accompanied by a bottom-up approach. The second part 
of the glocalization strategy—acting locally within the global paradigm—
suggests local development of an inclusive labor market system. 
In A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985), Dahl addressed the 
fundamental question of what core values constitute or underlie a just society 
and how Americans or world citizens could build a system that incorporates 
these values. He challenged the current American system, which does little 
(or is incapable of doing much) to protect the fundamental democratic values 
of equality, liberty, and justice. He suggested that a system of self-governing 
enterprises—a workplace democracy—would be one in which equality and 
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liberty could balance out by extending democratic principles into the 
economic order. 
This idea presents worker-owned and worker-controlled enterprises as 
a better foundation for democracy, political equality, and liberty than the 
current system of corporate capitalism. The main concern is that the older 
vision, based on an equality of resources maintained by the American citizen 
body of free farmers, no longer fits the new economic order. This new reality 
is constrained by economic enterprises that have heightened the inequalities 
among citizens in terms of wealth, income, social standing, education, 
knowledge, occupational prestige, and authority. 
Dahl compared his postulated self-governing enterprises to corporate 
capitalism and found several advantages in the former. For example, self-
governed economic enterprises would make the task of regulation and 
redistribution much easier than in a system of corporate capitalism. Also, 
Dahl saw that full and equal citizenship in economic enterprises would 
greatly reduce the adversarial and conflictive relationships within firms, and 
therefore in society and politics at large. Moreover, it could create 
participatory democracy and produce changes in human behavior. He 
stressed that the nature of this system would ―reduce the conflict of interests, 
give all citizens a more nearly equal stake in maintaining political equality 
and democratic institutions in the government of the state, and facilitate the 
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development of a stronger consensus on standards of fairness‖ (Ibid, 1985, 
110). 
Further, Dahl emphasized the importance of democratically governed 
economic enterprises by highlighting the importance of a democratically 
governed state. By exercising the right to govern democratically within 
economic enterprises, he asserted, one can possibly attain the goals of 
political equality, justice, efficiency, and liberty. However, he did note the 
limitation that self-governing enterprises would still require a central 
government to exercise authority over many important matters irresolvable 
within the market system alone: military actions, foreign affairs, fiscal and 
monetary policies, social welfare, and others. 
What did Dahl suggest for a new economic order if we were to make 
changes? He pointed out five goals that must be met to ensure political 
equality, the democratic process, and primary political rights: justice, 
economic fairness, efficiency, a good form of government, and decentralization 
of power. To achieve these goals, he recommended establishing an economic 
order that would decentralize many significant decisions among autonomous 
economic enterprises; that would operate within the market system; and that 
would function under democratically imposed laws, rules, and regulations. 
He argued that self-governing enterprises achieve these goals, and 
consequently greater equality and liberty, much better than the system 
Americans currently possess. 
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Schumacher (1973) was an early thinker in proposing ―smallness 
within bigness‖ as a strategy for effective operation of a large organization. 
This view maintains that effectiveness in large capitalist systems or 
governments is preserved when their elements or constituents behave as a 
network of small organizations. Offering a holistic approach in dealing with 
the multiplicity of economic stressors, this type of community-based practices 
can best address structural poverty by first developing individually tailored, 
need-based program planning for working-poor families (Wall et al., 2000). 
To support the discussion of glocalizing the economic enterprise, this 
article ends by introducing the model of community-based enterprise (CBE), 
which Peredo and Chrisman define as ―a community acting corporately as 
both entrepreneur and enterprise in pursuit of the common good‖ (2006, p. 
310). Through this process of reclaiming community power, individuals and 
families can rebuild self-efficacy and social fabrics. Members of the 
community collectively assemble a social vision, which is accompanied by 
creation of community-based market opportunities. CBE is process driven 
and encourages close participation of community members as key players in 
ownership, management, and employment. CBE also promotes 
entrepreneurial activities based on available community skills, thereby being 
more sustainable than a model based on business demands. Community‘s 
social vision and local resources shape local alternatives for economic and 
social objectives. Through a participatory decisionmaking process, CBE 
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addresses ―the diversity of needs at both the community and 
individual/family levels‖ (Ibid, 323). 
Using the CBE theoretical perspective, a bottom-up community 
building approach can facilitate market creation and venture opportunities 
that are rooted within the community. This could take the form of 
collaborative partnerships with community resources (schools, cultural 
centers, churches, hospitals, banks, etc.), businesses, and human service 
agencies to generate a holistic support system that ensures economic well-
being of individuals and families. All these require a strong public will at the 
community level, but not necessarily at the national or global levels, to 
encourage multi-institutional collaboration and to promote the common-good 
approach.  
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Chapter 7.  Conclusion  
This dissertation found in the earlier chapters leading up to the 
multilevel approach that social welfare effort in the global context is 
determined more by socio-economic development than political development.  
However, politics play a rather important role when the analyses become 
more controlled and executed among 17 affluent democracies.  Globalization 
and politics play a more significant positive role on social welfare effort 
among the advanced democracies.  Globalization also has a positive effect on 
politics.  Poverty at the aggregate level based on a series of bivariate analyses 
is not associated with globalization but with politics and social welfare effort.  
Local determinants of poverty show that human capital and demographic 
variables significantly affect poverty, but with differential effects of human 
capital for the poor compared to the near poor. 
Results from the multilevel analyses indicate that individuals who 
reside in countries with higher degree of globalization and greater left 
political power are less likely to be poor.  Plus, those residing in countries 
with higher welfare state generosity and active labor market policies are less 
likely to be poor.  Controlling for individual level demographic and human 
capital variables, the global and nation level structural variables were found 
to be significant.  Individual poverty is affected by: (1) globalization; (2) 
politics [representation of the poor; cumulative left party power; and union 
density]; and (3) social welfare commitment [welfare generosity; active labor 
  174 
market policies; and public educational expenditure].   
What does this mean for the politics of poverty in the United States?  
Without any doubt, throughout the history of humankind, there have always 
been those who were poor because of their laziness, incompetence, and 
making wrong decisions in life, who have been labeled as the ―undeserving 
poor‖ (Burton 1992, 24; Gilens 1999, 66; Schiller 2001; Spicker 1993).  The 
contrast between Americans‘ desire to help the poor and their equally strong 
desire to cut back on welfare spending springs from the public non-
acceptance of the latter between the deserving poor and the undeserving poor 
(Gilens 1999, 66).   
The deserving are those who try to help themselves and share a 
commitment to individual responsibility rather than those who prefer to rely 
on the government for support.  However, one cannot generalize their lack of 
motivation to their own fault alone.  The contemporary American society is 
much more multifaceted than to simply allow individual explanations to take 
credit for being the main cause of poverty.  To attribute poverty in general to 
this view needs a premise that it is possible for most of these people to escape 
poverty if they made efforts to do so. 
It is difficult to perceive that contemporary America is a land of 
freedom that will provide what every hard working individuals could make 
something of their abundant opportunities (Hacker 1998).  Levy (1998) 
supports this with a skeptical view on the labor market capacity that there 
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has been an increase in skill bias that reduced opportunities for less-educated 
labor in all industries beginning in the early 1980s.  The term American 
Dream for many people seems to have lost its meaning to become what the 
word itself literally spells out – a dream unreachable for many more people 
as society came to develop more on the highly competitive capitalist ground 
(White 1988; Rubin 1994; Schwartz 1999).   
Hacker (1992, 30) wrote about his concern that this society places so 
great a premium on getting ahead in the market system that ―it cannot spare 
much compassion for those who fall behind.‖  Those who fall behind in the 
United States tend to be blamed for their individual lack – lazy, hostile, 
violent, not wanting to work, low IQ, culture of poverty – rather than to be 
considered victims of institutional discrimination or other structural 
inequities (Hacker 1992). The perception on poverty still, in great degrees, 
remains attached to the individual explanations (White 1988).  This 
represents what the United States over the years decided to do about poverty 
as a society.  Along this line, Loewenberg (1974) noted: 
 
How a society defines a problem will specify in large measure the 
intervention techniques that can be utilized…  The various 
strategies designed to intervene in poverty or to alleviate its 
effects are chosen not for their effectiveness but because they 
promote or interfere with our major value systems.  Thus, 
training programs are nearly always favored because they seem to 
be geared toward work; whether or not the training is for real jobs 
is almost beside the point (p.47). 
 
Then, is America out of luck in terms of doing something collectively 
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about the condition of poverty?  The answer to this question would be a 
simple ―yes‖ if the discussion were to end by highlighting the structural 
dependence of the political system, discouraging poverty from being recognized 
as a public problem, and therefore the government remaining passive with 
policies that are guided by individual problem definitions of poverty.  
Demonizing the business interests as ―one big happy family, united around a 
common agenda of goodies they want from the federal government‖ (Berry 1999, 
6) would only resort to radical solutions such as not playing the current game of 
capitalism or changing the game itself.   
However, the answer to the question offered here is a very difficult ―no,‖ 
because many possibilities exist within the system of capitalism yet the 
poverty wound has to be treated by each layer that keeps the wound from 
healing.  And by no means any one of these layers offers an easy or simple 
solution and they have to be addressed in a coherent manner.  This paper 
concludes that progressive innovative community/social development 
strategies and counter mobilization of interests by the citizen groups could 
bring the cycle of economic dominance back into the hands of the American 
public. 
Poverty is like a wound created naturally by the economic system, as 
Rank (1994; 2000; 2001; 2004) suggested. The structural dependence thesis 
would add that poverty exists because the wound remains untreated by the 
political agent that represents the people. The poverty wound is the social 
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consequence that results from structural dependence of the political system 
on the economic system. Progressively breaking this cycle of dependency at 
the structural level, and taking proactive actions at the local level, will start 
to cure the wound by transforming poverty from a non-issue to a salient issue. 
Therefore, the glocalization strategy recommends community and policy 
practices that address the structural nature of poverty. 
Gans argued that poverty can be eliminated only when it either 
becomes sufficiently dysfunctional for the affluent or when the poor obtain 
enough power to change the system of social stratification (1972, 288). High 
concentration of poverty could work as a dysfunction to the community as a 
unit when hopelessness prevails in the absence of motivation for development. 
Hopelessness reflects a chronic group psychology reacting to the structural 
nature of poverty—racial discrimination, inequality, and depleted resources 
and opportunities. Ultimately, reclaiming hope for individuals and families in 
many at-risk communities should be the main goal pursued by the 
glocalization strategy: thinking globally and promoting bottom-up community 
sustainability by building an inclusive opportunity structure. 
For future studies, this dissertation recommends further analyses of 
the extent of structural effects on poverty, particularly by interpreting the 
magnitude of effects.  One could also conduct further investigations of other 
socio-politico-economic structural variables as they relate to poverty, both 
pre-transfer and post-transfer.  Particularly there are not many valid 
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economic variables that help explain this opportunity structure in the market.  
It may be useful to focus on pre-transfer poverty as a measure of market 
poverty when analyzing the effect of economic structure on poverty.  Also, 
when taking additional steps to study the local structure within the global 
context, it would be useful to include regional economic structural variables 
as a mid-level variable in a multilevel analysis of individual poverty. 
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End Notes 
                                                          
i Both frameworks of Baumgartner and Jones‘s (1993) punctuated equilibrium and Kingdon‘s 
(1995) window of opportunity explain how interest groups define an issue or problem. 
ii Schattschneider (1960) noted that the attempt to mobilize a untied front of the whole 
business community follows the logic of business politics, that is ―to keep peace within the 
business community by supporting as far as possible all claims that business groups make 
for themselves‖ (Schattschneider, 1960: 42).   
iii The relationship between the government and business largely determine the character of 
the regime and ―the struggle for power is largely a confrontation of two major power systems, 
government and business‖ (Schattschneider, 1960: 392). 
